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Abstract 
In psychology as well as behavioral economics, it is well established that our choices and judgments 
are not just a function of the available options, but also of the context surrounding them. Several 
models have been brought forward to explain these context effects. We use the decision by sampling 
model (DbS; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) and investigate possible mechanisms that might lead to 
the relativity of judgment and choice. Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015) demonstrated that shapes of 
utility and probability weighting functions could be manipulated by adjusting the distributions of 
outcomes and probabilities on offer. Chapter 2 reports a multi-level replication where we find that 
these effects are robust, but that DbS is unlikely to be the (sole) explanation for its origins. We 
conclude that problems with revealing utility functions from expected utility fits may be responsible 
for biasing the shapes of utility functions. Chapter 3 shows that reduced working memory capacity, as 
manipulated by cognitive load, does not reduce the effects found in Chapter 2. This further points 
away from a DbS explanation of the above findings. In Chapter 3, we also find that cognitive load has 
no impact on risk aversion, but find that choice consistency is reduced when working memory 
capacity is reduced, which also challenges the prominent dual process theories. Still, the question 
where the differences in preferential functions come from, remains unexplained. Chapter 4 reviews 
over 20 behavioral as well as neurophysiological studies showing that even if the rank effects are an 
artefact of the estimation procedure, this does not question the many findings that support a model 
encompassing a rank-dependent evaluation of alternatives. In Chapter 5, we test this hypothesis in a 
new design, where a monetary outcome is evaluated in the light of another foregone outcome with a 
history of other foregone outcomes. In contrast to our hypothesis, we find no evidence for a rank-
dependent evaluation here. In Chapter 6, we investigate how comparison processes can lead to the 
mutable-zero effect. In the mutable-zero effect, participants prefer an outcome entailing a “pay zero” 
or “lose zero” attribute over an outcome entailing a “receive zero” or “win zero” attribute. We find 
that the only comparisons that are made with “pay zero” are other payments and that the only 
comparisons that are made with “receive zero” are other receipts. This process leads to “pay zero” 
comparing favorably and “receive zero” comparing unfavorably, which in turn leads to “pay zero” 
options being preferred over “receive zero” options. Given the findings in Chapter 2 and 3 are robust, 
they point to a general problem with estimating preferential functions using models like expected 
utility theory or prospect theory. Chapter 3 and 5 were a first attempt at testing a DbS-predicted 
mechanism: In contrast to our predictions, cognitive load did not decrease context sensitivity. Instead, 
we observed a slight increase in random choices. Finally, in exploring the mutable zero effect, we 
added to evidence that comparisons spontaneously happen only within gains, or within losses, but not 
across gains and losses.
! 1 
1 Models of Choice 
In recent years, some researchers have put forth process based theories in the judgment and 
decision making literature that stand in opposition to the neoclassical and sometimes even the 
descriptive theories. Whilst these process-based models have the aspiration to be a more 
realistic account of judgment and choice, they propose specific mechanisms–like comparison 
processes or rank ordering– that can be studied more thoroughly. In this thesis, I investigate to 
what degree comparison processes can drive the construction of choice under risk and the 
evaluation of prospects or sure outcomes. These insights will eventually help establish the 
role of comparison processes in human judgment and choice and can be afterwards 
considered to inform policy, design learning applications or even build machines. 
In this chapter I will illustrate the breadth of accounts that have been offered to 
account for some key choice phenomena, starting at prescriptive models of choice, moving on 
to descriptive models, and finally to process models. Even for a phenomenon as simple as risk 
aversion, I will review how some accounts appeal to the notion of diminishing marginal 
utility, some accounts appeal to probability weighting, and some accounts appeal to heuristic 
processes. Table 1.1 summarizes each phenomenon and the corresponding explanation in 
each account. 
Early models of judgment and choice under risk are based on normative principles, 
and describe what the rational homo economicus should choose. Expected value (EV) is 
probably one of the most prominent models of rational decision making and the basis of many 
subsequent prescriptive as well as descriptive models of choice. Using solely the EV of an 
option as a criterion to make a choice would mean choosing the option with the highest 
expected outcome–that is, the option which, if played out multiple times, would give the 
highest average payoff. There are several reasons why EV is a sensible strategy when making 
decisions under risk. The aggregate is of essence here: If the same decisions are made 
repeatedly, if many different kind of decisions are made, or if different people make a 
2 
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decision in the EV manner, it will maximize EV when the events are all added up. The crux 
here is that this argument is only really true, if people live infinitely, if there are infinite kinds 
of decisions and if there is an infinite number of people. However, none of these is the case 
(Baron, 2007). Why the EV should not be a sufficient criterion for the chooser and why it is 
not a description of people’s choices, is nicely demonstrated in the St. Petersburg paradox: If 
hypothetically one would offer somebody a lottery to win £2 pounds if a coin lands on tails on 
the first toss, £4 if it lands on tails on the second toss, £8 if it lands on the third toss etc., 
according to the EV criterion, everybody should be willing to pay an infinite amount of 
money to play the gamble, because the EV is infinite. However, to people this lottery is worth 
only a small amount of money. The fact that people would not pay a lot to play this lottery 
shows that EV alone is an insufficient criterion for describing choice under risk.  
Daniel Bernoulli (1738) offered a resolution for the problem by introducing a 
(logarithmic) utility function, which transforms EV into expected utility (EU). The function 
takes into account the money a chooser already has when making a decision and assumes 
diminishing marginal utility. Diminishing marginal utility means that the utility of every extra 
unit of wealth is always positive, but is smaller than the utility of the previous unit. This 
assumption solves the paradox, because while ("#$)2$'$  is infinite, ("#$)()*2$'$  is finite at 
1.39. In addition to resolving the paradox, assuming diminishing marginal utility also nicely 
captures risk aversion: When offered £100 for sure or £200 with a 50% chance and otherwise 
nothing, many people will choose not to gamble and take the safe option. This choice is 
sensible if the utility of £100 is more than half the utility of £200. Although Bernoulli’s 
resolved this paradox already in the 18th century, his hypothesis only became popular when 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) showed that the expected utility hypothesis follows 
from simple assumptions or axioms about people’s preferences (Starmer, 2000, for a review). 
An individual’s utility function can always be estimated when the following axioms are met: 
1) when a person has well defined preferences, i.e. the person either likes A over B, B over A 
3 
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or is indifferent, 2) when a person’s choices are transitive, i.e. if she likes A better than B, and 
B better than C, then she should like A better than C, 3) when stochastic dominance is met, 
i.e. when she chooses A over B, if A is better in at least one aspect and equally or at least as 
good in other aspects and finally 4) when her preferences are independent of the method they 
were elicited or of the way the options were described. These axioms form the basis of 
normative models.  
Given a person does not violate any of these axioms, the person is said to reveal the 
utilities of the options open to them through making choices that maximize her utility. Using 
the person’s choice behavior, all options can be assigned a value under the EU model. For 
example, von Neumann and Morgenstern showed how the utilities of three options could be 
determined by repeatedly offering people a choice between one option, offering a probability 
mixture of the best and the worst vs. another option offering the middle-ranking option for 
sure. By adjusting the probability of the best in the mixture up when people choose the sure 
option, and adjusting it down when people choose the mixture, one can titrate in upon the 
probability that makes people indifferent. This probability value is then the utility of the 
middle-ranking option, with the best option arbitrarily being assigned utility 1 and the worst 
having utility 0. In this way, every option available can be assigned a real number on the 
cardinal utility scale. 
4 
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Table 1.1 
Choice phenomena and corresponding explanations of different accounts. 
 EUT (C)PT Regret Theory TAX Priority heuristic Decision by Sampling 
Allais Paradox 
(common ratio) 
– S-shaped 
probability 
weighting 
Disproportionately more 
regret if difference between 
states of the world is large as 
opposed to small 
Transfer of 
attention to 
smaller 
outcome 
If minimum gains 
differ by 10%, choose 
higher minimum gain 
A combination of the 
distributions of amounts and 
probabilities in the world 
together with a change in the 
distributions across the scaled 
up and scaled down choices 
Risk Aversion Diminishing 
marginal 
utility 
Diminishing 
marginal value 
Diminishing marginal 
choiceless utility 
Transfer of 
attention to 
smaller 
outcome 
If minimum gains 
differ by 10%, choose 
higher minimum gain 
Rank position of attribute 
values with positively skewed 
distribution for gains 
Loss Aversion – Transformation of 
losses, which loom 
larger than gains 
Convex regret function Transfer of 
attention to 
losses 
If minimum losses 
differ by 10%, choose 
lower minimum loss 
Rank position of attribute 
values with negatively skewed 
distribution for losses 
Isolation Effect – Reference 
point/status quo 
matters, not final 
wealth 
Consequences are state-
contingent, leading to 
different initial situations 
despite identical final wealth 
Transfer of 
attention to 
smaller 
outcome 
Choose the lower of 
the two minimum 
losses and the higher 
of the two minimum 
gains if difference 
exceeds 10%  
Separate samples for gains and 
losses 
Violation of 
Gain-Loss 
Separability 
– – – More weight on 
losses in mixed 
gamble than in 
losses-only 
gamble 
– – 
5 
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 Yet, people often violate the rationality principles and do not choose the way 
they ought to (Birnbaum, 2008, for a recent review). Hence EUT does not provide a 
very accurate description of people’s choice behavior either. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will outline some of the key departures from EUT, and will start with a 
classic example, the Allais paradox. What the St. Paradox is for EV is the Allais 
paradox (Allais, 1953) for EUT: Consider the following choice options: 
Option A: win 1Million for sure,  
or  
Option B: win 5 Million with a 10% chance, or win 1 Million with an 89% chance 
and otherwise nothing. 
People more often choose the safe option A, perhaps avoiding option B because they 
are scared of the 1% chance of receiving nothing. Now consider these modified 
options: 
Option C: win 1 Million with an 11% chance and otherwise nothing, 
or 
Option D: win 5 Million with a 10% chance and otherwise nothing. 
Now people more often choose the riskier Option D–as if they discount the difference 
between the 10% and the 11% chance of winning. This preferential pattern describes 
the common consequence effect. Removing an 89% chance of £1M from both options 
A and B gives options C and D. Thus, to be consistent with EU, people must choose 
either options A and C or B and D, because otherwise they violate independence from 
irrelevant alternatives. 
 The common ratio effect–also first demonstrated by Allais–deals with an 
EUT-inconsistency that considers probabilities instead of outcomes: 
Option A: win £3000,  
6 
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or  
Option B: win £4000 with an 80% chance, otherwise nothing.  
Again most people choose the safe Option A. On the other hand, when asked to 
choose between these modified two options, 
Option C: win £3000 with a 25% chance, otherwise nothing,  
or  
Option D: win £4000 with a 20% chance, otherwise nothing,  
people prefer the riskier Option D. Here, people are sensitive to the probability 
differences between Option A and B, but discount the difference between Option C 
and D, although the ratio of the expected utilities for A and B is identical to the ratio 
for C and D. 
Not only do people violate the independence axiom, but the way options are 
described also influences people’s choice behavior in a non-EUT way. People reverse 
their preferences if options are presented as losses instead of gains. The Asian disease 
problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984) illustrates this framing effect by asking people 
to choose between two scenarios described in different ways: The relatively safe 
option describes that program A will either save 200 out of 600 people or it describes 
that it will kill 400 out of 600 people. The relatively risky option describes that 
program B will safe 600 people with a 33.33% chance, otherwise nobody will be 
saved or it describes that nobody will die with a 33.33% chance, otherwise everybody 
will die. The first versions of the programs are framed as gains, by using the word 
“save”. The second versions are framed as losses by using the words “kill” or “die”. 
Note that all options have an identical EV and that the outcomes are objectively the 
same whether framed as gains or losses. However, people more often choose the safe 
option A when using a gain frame (scenarios using the word save) and prefer the 
7 
!
!
relatively risky option B when using a loss frame (scenarios using the word die). This 
clearly violates description invariance. 
  How can we capture these violations of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
(1947) compiled axioms, which also form the basis of EUT? Throughout the 
upcoming years there were different kinds of modifications. Three modifications in 
particular were gathered together within prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), a model that has become extremely influential. One type of modification was 
to introduce probability weighting to transform objective probabilities and integrate 
them with the corresponding outcomes. One of the earliest models, is Edwards 
subjective expected utility theory (SEU; 1955, 1962). EUT is a special case of SEU, if 
the subjective weights in SEU are set to their objective probabilities. As an aside, 
further developments led to Quiggin’s rank-dependent expected utility theory (RDUT; 
1982). The main difference between the two is that whilst SEU assigns the same 
weight to a specific probability independently of the magnitude of the outcome, in 
RDUT the weight assigned to a specific probability is dependent on the magnitude of 
the outcome, specifically, how good this outcome is in relation to other possible 
outcomes within the same prospect. Further modifications added psychological 
insights into how people think about money. Kahneman and Tversky suggested 
people think about changes in wealth, not final wealth states. Thus people consider 
the gains and losses on offer, and fail to integrate them into final wealth states. They 
also considered that people display diminishing sensitivity from the reference points 
and from extremes, motivating the shapes of their value and weighting functions. 
Finally, Kahneman and Tversky introduced the notion of loss aversion, where losses 
loom larger than gains. Together these modifications are the basis of prospect theory 
(PT, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
8 
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How does PT deal with the common-ratio and the framing effect presented 
above? PT describes a choice under risk in terms of an inverse S-shaped weighting 
function, and a value function with zero as a reference point. Often this zero is taken 
to be current wealth. The prospects are evaluated as losses and gains relative to the 
reference point, instead of the integration of these states into total wealth as in EUT. 
The weighting function allows objective probabilities to be transformed into 
subjective weights by underweighting high probabilities and overweighting low 
probabilities. This means that people are most sensitive at the extremes, i.e. they 
distinguish 5% from 10%, but are insensitive in the middle, i.e. 45% and 50% are 
treated similarly. Probability weighting is how PT accounts for the common-ratio 
effect: Because people are very sensitive to probability differences at the extremes, 
80% seems very different from 100% and thus makes the safe £3000 much more 
attractive than the risky £4000. On the other hand, when presented two risky options, 
where the chances of winning are 20% and 25%, which appear very similar to each 
other in a PT-account, the prospect of winning £4000 seems now much more 
appealing than a chance to win £3000. 
The value function transforms absolute amounts into subjective values, by 
measuring the change from the relative reference point, the status quo. The value 
function is kinked at the reference point and all amounts above it are translated into 
subjective utilities using a concave function, so that amounts further away from the 
reference point are treated similarly. All amounts below the status quo are translated 
into subjective utilities using a steeper, convex function (see Figure 1.1). The loss 
function is convex only because it is upside down. It is still the case that a loss of 
£100 vs £200 is a larger difference than £1100 vs £1200. A concave value function is 
how risk aversion was accounted for in the traditional EUT-manner. The new 
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property here is that the reference point serves the evaluation of prospects as gains 
and losses. 
PT’s value function nicely describes risk seeking behavior in the loss domain 
and risk averse behavior in the gain domain, as we saw in the Asian disease problem. 
When the programs are presented using a gain frame, people preferred the program 
that saves 200 people for sure over the program that saves 600 people with a 33.33% 
chance. If 200 lives saved for sure are evaluated using a concave function, they are 
worth more than 600 lives saved maybe. However, when the programs are presented 
using a loss frame, people preferred the program, which kills 600 people with a 
66.66% chance to the program that kills 400 people for sure. Losing a minimum 
number of people is so bad that one is willing to take the risk if one can avoid a loss 
altogether. 
 
Figure 1.1. Prospect theory’s value and probability weighting functions.  
The fact that people’s perspective matters and not final wealth is evident in the 
isolation effect: If a person is given $100 and is then asked to choose between 
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winning another $50 for sure or another $100 with a 50% chance, the person is more 
likely to choose the safe option. On the other hand, if a person is given $200 and is 
then asked to choose between losing $50 for sure or losing £100 with a 50% chance, 
the person is more likely to choose the risky option. If people integrated their initial 
gift of $100 into the choice and considered their final wealth, the two choices would 
be the same. Gains are treated differently from losses, because “losses loom larger 
than gains”. Because the impact of a loss is stronger than the impact of a gain, people 
are described to be loss averse; they prefer a sure gain in the light of a possible loss, 
even if the expected value is higher than the sure option can offer. 
PT without editing rules (“stripped PT” in Birnbaum, 2008) can violate 
stochastic dominance. In stripped PT the value of a prospect where one can win £100 
with 50% chance and otherwise £100 is smaller than the value of a sure £99. This is 
because of probability weighting: The weight for 50% is much smaller than an 
objective 50% so that when integrated into the £100 prizes the value adds up to less 
than £99. In order to avoid that, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) invented some editing 
rules. The prospects are edited through a) combination of probabilities if they are 
associated with the same outcome (this would be the case in the above example), b) 
separation of outcomes that are riskless, or c) if two prospects share an outcome, they 
cancel each other out, d) probabilities and outcomes are simplified by rounding and 
finally, e) when an alternative is dominated, it needs to be discarded. PT’s editing 
rules become obsolete when probabilities are transformed into cumulative decision 
weights, like they are in RDUT (Quiggin, 1982). Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
exchanged their former weighting function and editing rules with a cumulative 
probability weighting function and developed a more general model, cumulative 
prospect theory (CPT). CPT, as opposed to PT, is applicable for gambles with more 
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than two non-zero outcomes and in CPT different weights can be assigned to identical 
probabilities depending on whether an outcome was perceived as a loss or a gain. 
CPT does this by assuming people work with the probability of doing at least as well 
as £X instead of the probability of receiving £X–that is cumulative probabilities over 
a set of events are psychologically elemental, instead of the probabilities of individual 
events. With this new feature CPT is able to explain risk seeking and risk averse 
behavior or the four-fold pattern within one person by allowing different weighting 
functions for losses and gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The four-fold pattern 
describes risk seeking behavior when dealing with large prizes and small 
probabilities, and risk averse behavior when dealing with small prizes and low 
probabilities considering low stakes. In the loss domain, the same participant will be 
risk seeking when dealing with low stakes and will be risk averse when dealing with 
high losses. A person is risk-averse if she chooses the safe option over a risky option 
with an equal expected value. A person is risk-seeking if she chooses the relatively 
risky option under the same circumstances. If the same person chooses between a safe 
and a risky option in the loss domain and is risk-seeking and then is asked to choose 
between a safe and a risky option and plays for the same amount of money in the gain 
domain and is risk-averse, the person displays the reflection effect. 
A little after PT was proposed, Loomes and Sudgen (1982) developed regret 
theory to make predictions in line with the Allais paradoxes, risk aversion and loss 
aversion. In regret theory, there is a number of states of the world, which each occur 
with an objective probability that is known to the chooser, or stands for the chooser’s 
belief about the occurrence of each possible state. Given one action, there is one 
consequence for each state of the world. One assumption that Loomes and Sudgen 
make is that different people have different choiceless utility functions, just like in 
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expected utility. The choiceless utility function assigns a utility to a consequence that 
the chooser has not chosen herself. The consequence is either inflicted or awarded by 
somebody else. The utility of choosing an option A, given a particular state of the 
world, will be the sum of its choiceless utility and the difference between the joy of 
choosing A and not B, and the regret of choosing A and not B, all assuming the same 
state of the world, and considering that regret is convex in outcome difference. This 
means that large differences in outcomes in transformed into huge amounts of regret. 
Taken together, this means that the evaluation of option A is affected by the presence 
of option B. Thus, the evaluation is based on the comparison between the options 
available, given a specific state of the world.  
Note that the (C)PT and regret explanations of the common ratio effect are 
quite different. (C)PT explains the common ratio effect by means of an inverse S-
shaped probability weighting function. In contrast to that, regret theory predicts this 
effect by assuming that there is disproportionately more regret if the difference 
between what is and what might have been is large, as opposed to if the difference 
between what is and what might have been is small. In the scaled up version of the 
common ratio effect, the largest possible regret is caused when you choose B and get 
£0, when choosing A would have delivered a sure £3,000. But in the scaled down 
version, it is possible to choose C and receive £0 when choosing D could have offered 
£4,000. This difference is larger, and because of the convexity of the regret function, 
the anticipated regret of missing out on £4000 dominates the decision. In summary, 
scaling down the problems introduces new and particularly regretful comparisons 
which reverse the preference. In this framework, anticipated regret is also the main 
driver for the reflection effect: The relatively safe option as compared to a riskier 
option is more appealing in the gain domain, because potentially losing out on a 
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possible gain can lead to regret, which the decision maker wants to avoid, whereas the 
relatively risky option is more appealing in the loss domain, because of the higher 
possibility to avoid a loss. 
The models presented so far are all based on the standard normative models 
that were later modified to account for empirical data. (C)PT and regret theory used 
psychological insight to adapt EUT. Other modifications like RDUT only aimed at 
explaining empirical phenomena and were not concerned with the influence of the 
human factor in building their models. There is another class of descriptive models, 
which approaches the paradoxes and the choice reversals from a psychological 
perspective. In these configural weight models, the weight of an outcome in one 
prospect depends on other outcomes in the same prospect. Configural weight models 
are somewhat similar to rank-dependent utility models (Birnbaum & Navarette, 
1998), but also share similarities with rank-dependent weighting models like CPT. In 
configural weight models utilities of options are assumed to be weighted averages of 
all possible outcomes per option. The weights depend not only on the outcomes 
themselves, but also on the ranks, the probabilities of those outcomes and the point of 
view of the judge, e.g., if the judge is a buyer or a seller, or how risk-averse the 
person is. TAX, the “transfer of attention and exchange” model (Birnbaum & 
McIntosh, 1996; Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979), is a special case of one of these models, 
which predicts the paradoxes described above, the preference reversals and the four-
fold pattern. (In addition, TAX predicts many additional phenomena that CPT cannot 
account for, see Birnbaum 2008 for a review.) In TAX, a weight is the attention a 
decision maker pays to each outcome. An outcome that is more probable should also 
get more attention, but depending on somebody’s risk attitudes, the attention gets 
redistributed to other smaller outcomes. For example, consider a choice between a 
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50/50 chance for £100 otherwise £0, or £50 for sure. We know people will tend to be 
risk averse, and select the sure £50. In EU and prospect theory this risk averse 
behavior is explained using a concave utility function where the utility of £50 is more 
than the average of the utilities of £0 and £100. But in TAX, attention moves from the 
£100 outcome to the £0 outcome, and this movement of attention from the higher to 
the lower outcome reduces the attention weighted sum of the values, making this 
option less appealing. The same logic is used to explain why people behave as if they 
are loss averse: If people are unwilling to accept a bet where they could either win 
£200 or lose £200, one only has to assume that people place more attention to “lose 
£200” than to “win £200” to give this bet a net negative evaluation and reject it. It is 
not necessary to transform money into utility and have losses loom larger than gains, 
but just to assume that it is the transfer of attention–weighting–from the better 
outcomes to the worse outcomes–that causes risk-averse or loss-averse behavior 
(Birnbaum & Navarette, 1998; Birnbaum, 2008). Transfer of attention is also how 
TAX predicts the common ratio effect: When choosing between a safe gamble 
without the possibility of a £0 outcome, and a relatively risky gamble with the 
possibility of a £0 outcome, the weight within the risky gamble shifts from the 
possible amount of £4000 to £0, making the riskier gamble less attractive than the 
safe gamble with the £3000 win and prompting more risk averse choices. When 
choosing between two risky options that both involve the possibility of a £0 outcome, 
and evaluating each option separately within one option, attention is transferred from 
a possible gain to £0. Now that both options have a drawback, the riskier option 
becomes more appealing because it offers a higher win, prompting more risk-seeking 
choices. 
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There are several studies demonstrating inconsistencies with neoclassical 
rank-dependent theories–CPT is among those theories– that simple configural weight 
models can account for (see Birnbaum, 2004, and Birnbaum, 2008 for the most recent 
paradoxes). Gain-loss separability, which empirically is found to be violated, but is 
predicted by the neoclassical theories, is one of these examples. Wu and Markle 
(2008) asked participants to choose between gamble A+ and gamble B+ in the gain 
domain and gamble A- and gamble B- in the loss domain. They found that although a 
majority of people preferred gamble B+ to A+ and gamble B- to A-, when gamble A+ 
was mixed with A- and gamble B+ was mixed with B-, people suddenly preferred A-
mixed to B-mixed–that is in the gain domain participants preferred Option B+ when 
choosing between 
Option A+: win £2000 with a 25% chance or win £800 with another 25% chance and 
otherwise nothing, or 
Option B+: win £1600 with a 25% chance or win £1200 with another 25% chance and 
otherwise nothing. 
They also prefer B- when choosing between 
Option A-: lose £800 with a 25% chance or lose £1000 with a 25% chance and 
otherwise nothing, or 
Option B-: lose £200 with a 25% chance or lose £1600 with a 25% chance and 
otherwise nothing. 
Expectedly, people are risk averse in the gain domain and risk seeking in the 
loss domain. However, if the gain gambles are combined with the loss gambles, 
people suddenly reverse their previous preferences by choosing option A out of 
Option A: win £2000 with a 25% chance or win £800 with another 25% chance, or 
lose £800 with a 25% chance or lose £1000 with a 25% chance, 
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and 
Option B: win £1600 with a 25% chance or win £1200 with another 25% chance or 
lose £200 with a 25% chance or lose £1600 with a 25% chance (see what gambles 
Option A and B are composed of in Table 1.2). 
By preferring B+ and B-, but also A, people violate gain-loss separability (see 
also Birnbaum & Bahra, 2007). Thus, whilst neoclassical theories qualify to explain 
findings in single-domain gambles, they fail in mixed gambles. At the same time, 
other models–like TAX–can predict and can account for the violation of gain-loss 
separability or stochastic dominance (see Birnbaum, 2008). If we judge theories of 
choice against empirical evidence and we find that some very prominent theories–in 
economics and psychology–can be refuted based not only on violations of normative 
principles, but also on assumptions made that are not compatible with people’s 
choices, should we still use those models in appropriate contexts? 
Table 1.2  
Options A and B result from merging Option A+ with A- and Option B+ with B- 
respectively. The probabilities to win or lose are 25%. In the one-domain options, the 
gambles offer a 50% chance of nothing. 
Option A Nonzero Option A+ gains Nonzero Option A- losses 
 + £2000 + £800 – £800 – £1000 
Option B Nonzero Option B+ gains Nonzero Option B- losses 
 + £1600 + £1200 – £200 – £1600 
Up to this point the presented models were silent about the information 
integration and the choice process at hand when faced with a decision problem. There 
is another class of models, which does propose a specific cognitive process for 
different problems ranging from inference to preference. For inference tasks Simon 
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(1955) proposed that people do not or cannot optimize, but use simple choice rules–
heuristics–to make decisions; because there are constraints to human cognition, which 
make it difficult to adhere to normative principles. To reduce the requirements for the 
decision maker, the main feature of the proposed heuristics is the neglect or disregard 
of some information. The heuristics differ in terms of which information is ignored. 
Several researchers argued that by ignoring information when making a decision, 
people are able to make even better, or more robust decisions than if they took all 
available information into account (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).  
The decision making literature has benefitted from the formulation of process 
models. Already back in the 70s researchers have encouraged process-oriented 
models (Payne, 1976; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). They argued that collecting 
process data will guide us to more accurate models of choice and will help make 
much quicker progress in this endeavor (Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and 
Willemsen, 2008). The priority heuristic (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006) 
will represent this class here, although as process model as well as descriptive model 
it has been convincingly refuted (see Birnbaum, 2010, or Reiger & Wang, 2008, and 
also other references below). 
Heuristics are process models: they describe step-by-step how people 
supposedly make decisions and are perceived as decision making tools, where each 
heuristic can be selected depending on the choice problem and where different people 
might choose different heuristics for one and the same task. For tasks involving 
choices between two options, there are two classes of heuristics that could be 
considered: Tallying and lexicographic heuristics. Tallying works by looking through 
all attributes of both options in any order and whichever option has more satisfying 
attributes, gets chosen. For the lexicographic heuristic, different attributes of both 
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options are first ranked and whichever option has the highest value on the most 
important attribute, gets chosen (Tversky 1969). 
To account for some of the above mentioned violations of EU theory, like the 
Allais paradox, the reflection effect, the fourfold pattern or intransitive choice 
preferences, Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006) have proposed the priority 
heuristic (PH). Using PH, people consider the attributes of a gamble in the following 
order: minimum gain, the probability of the minimum gain and lastly the maximum 
gain. When the minimum gains differ by at least 10% of the maximum gain, people 
stop the evaluation process and choose the option with the higher minimum gain. If 
the minimum gains are too similar, then people compare the corresponding 
probabilities and choose the gamble with the higher probability of the minimum gain, 
if it exceeds the other by 10%. If this too is not the case, they choose the gamble with 
the higher maximum gain. The heuristic works the same way for the loss domain, 
where the gamble with the lower losses and higher probability of the minimum losses 
are chosen. 
To predict the fourfold pattern, consider the following two options. Option A 
offers a 95% chance of £100 otherwise nothing and option B offers £95 for sure. First, 
the minimum gains are compared; £0 from option A and £95 from option B. £95 (the 
higher minimum gain) is higher than 10% of £100 (the maximum gain) so that now 
according to the heuristic, people would choose the sure option B, displaying risk 
aversion. The priority heuristic would explain risk seeking choices in the exact same 
way if the above gambles would involve losses. This is also how the common ratio 
effect works in PH: When choosing between two gambles, 
Option A: 80% chance of winning £4000, otherwise nothing, 
or 
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Option B: 100% chance of winning £3000, 
PH predicts that people choose the safe gamble B, because the minimum gain of B 
(£3000) is by more than 10% of the maximum gain (10% of £4000 = £400) higher 
than £0. If these gambles are transformed into 
Option C: 20% chance of winning £4000, otherwise nothing, 
or 
Option D: 25% chance of winning £3000, otherwise nothing, 
PH predicts that people choose the riskier option C. Because the minimum gains are 
£0 in both options, and the probabilities of the minimum gains do not differ by at least 
10%, the option with the higher maximum gain will be chosen. 
The priority heuristic has been criticized on several levels. There are several 
studies showing that people do not deal with one cue at a time (Birnbaum, 2008; 
Hilbig, 2008), that choice patterns and reaction times are more supportive of 
strategies that integrate probabilities with outcomes (Ayal & Hochman, 2009; 
Glöckner & Betsch, 2008), and that probabilities, which are ignored by PH 
systematically influence people’s choices (Fiedler, 2010). Birnbaum (2008) also 
showed that PH failed to perform on a significant proportion of the paradoxes that he 
himself brought forward and was always outperformed by TAX. Hilbig (2010) 
pointed to a general problem considering the validity of heuristics: Even if the 
predictions of the simple choice strategies come true, it does not mean that those were 
the rules that participants used to make the decision with. Johnson, Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, and Willemsen, (2008) take the same line and strongly argue for the 
collection of process data when investigating process models; it is the only way to 
fully evaluate the PH. According to the process data these authors collected, the way 
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participants approach the choice problems varies across individuals and across the 
different types of gambles and cannot easily be built into the PH. 
The first models I presented are built on normative principles. In their 
development, those principles have been relaxed to account for more empirical data 
whilst abiding to as many normative rules as possible and dropping as many as 
necessary; all in the economic tradition. The TAX model, while not defined as a 
process model by its author, but as an as-if model, shifts the interpretation of options 
away from being perceived as prospects to trees with branches and proposes that the 
shift of attention to different possible outcomes is what leads to violations of 
normative principles and the observed choice behavior. What TAX has in common 
with the earlier models like PT, regret theory, and EU is the assumption that amounts 
are transformed into utility, or value by stable and well-defined functions. However, 
there is an increasing range of research (including the experiments presented later on) 
challenging this assumption of the stability of value functions. These challenges are at 
least partly met by decision by sampling (DbS, Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006), a 
process model based on simple psychological principles that combined lead to a 
context-dependent evaluation of options. 
The formulation and integration of the information process during choice often 
resembles a normative economic account rather than a model based on psychological 
principles. Models within psychology itself (although not in the adaptive decision 
maker literature) often even assume that value is computed (Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & 
Brown, 2011), for example by multiplicative integration of transformed attributes. 
Those transformations can depend on other available attributes in the option (like in 
TAX or, to some extent, CPT), or solely on a judge’s risk attitude (like in PT).  
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Opposed to this account, in other models, attributes are evaluated relative to 
other attributes so that the value of an option stands in relation to other available 
options in the choice set. In this account, value is not computed by using an internal 
map that transforms probabilities into weights and amounts into subjective value. 
Instead, comparisons between alternatives contribute to the evidence for one 
alternative over the other, so that the value of an option on its own is not ever even 
calculated or used at any point during a choice (Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & Brown, 
2011).  
In these models value is dependent on the comparison process, either with the 
immediate context or with attributes from long-term memory. All experiments 
presented in this thesis are constructed to test whether, when, and to what degree 
comparison processes influence choices between two gambles, ratings of gambles or 
simply monetary outcomes. Our hypotheses are based on predictions from decision by 
sampling (DbS, Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006). In DbS, the rank order of an 
attribute value within a decision sample, determines the subjective value of an option, 
without people ever calculating or constructing the subjective value of an option. 
Instead, DbS is formulated as a process model, where in order to evaluate an option, 
people compare it with other options on offer and keep track of the number of times 
the current option has won across a series of pairwise comparisons. Thereby people 
behave as if they use the subjective value when they make a decision. For example, in 
a sample of £3, £5, £6, £10, £13, the subjective value of £13 is higher than in the set 
of £6, £13, £16, £19, £23, because £13 wins all binary comparisons in the first set and 
receives the value 1, whereas it only wins one comparison out of four possible 
comparisons in the second set and receives the value 1/4 there. The higher the 
attributes of options rank, the more likely they accumulate sufficient evidence to be 
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chosen among other available options. The rank hypothesis suggests that the 
subjective value of any given option is determined by the distribution of outcomes 
available in the choice set and/or in long-term memory.  
Stewart, Chater, and Brown (2006) have shown that assuming pairwise 
comparisons, frequency accumulation, and sampling from memory, combined with 
the distributions of credits and debits in the world, is all you need to produce the 
shape of a typical psychoeconomic function–concave value function for credits, 
convex value function for debits. The real world distributions of amounts serve as 
approximation of what amounts are in people’s long-term memory. That is, to the 
extent that memory is adapted to and reflects the structure of the environment 
(Anderson & Schooler, 1991), properties of the distributions of attribute values in the 
environment could be a useful proxy for the properties of the distributions of attribute 
values in people’s memories. What Stewart et al. found in credits and debits to and 
from bank accounts, which they used as a proxy for the distributions of gains and 
losses in people’s memories, is that there are more small than large credits (i.e., a 
positively skewed distribution), and more small than large debits. The positively 
skewed distributions mean that for a fixed size increase, the effect will be larger if the 
increase is lower in the distribution than if it is higher in the distribution. For example, 
because there are more small gains than large gains, an increase of £100 from £0 to 
£100 overtakes more of the sample than an increase of £100 from £1000 to £1100. 
This is because there are many gains that lie in between $0 and £100, but few gains 
lie in between £1000 and £1100. The positively skewed distribution of gains in the 
real world combined with the decision-by-sampling principles gives a reasonable 
account for the diminishing marginal utility that is assumed in neoclassical theory and 
empirically observed. The logic works the same way for losses. 
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Recently, Stewart, Reimers, and Harris (2015) have experimentally tested the 
following DbS prediction: when participants encounter attribute values (e.g., amounts, 
probabilities or times) that are positively skewed, with many smaller attribute values 
at the low end of the range, the estimated psychoeconomic functions should come out 
more concave than when participants encounter attribute values that are negatively 
skewed, with many larger attribute values at the high end of the range. The 
psychoeconomic functions should also come out more concave than when attribute 
values are uniformly distributed. According to the rank principle, the utility of an 
attribute increases quickest where the distribution is densest. Finding the predicted 
functional forms, means that just by changing what distributions of attributes people 
have to deal with, is what will make them prefer more or less risky options. The 
authors asked participants to choose between pairs of gambles, whose outcome 
distributions were either positively skewed or the participants chose between pairs, 
whose outcome distribution was negatively skewed. As predicted, the recovered 
utility functions had a concave form when the distribution of outcomes was positively 
skewed, whereas it was convex when the distribution of outcomes was negatively 
skewed. This means that the subjective value of a presented attribute was higher when 
it was presented among a positively skewed distribution where it occupied a relatively 
high rank position than when it was presented among a negatively skewed distribution 
where it occupied a relatively lower rank position. The analogous procedure was 
performed for probabilities and also times separately, reaching the same conclusion. 
This means that people might not be inherently risk averse or loss averse, but 
that they just appear as if they were, because of the world we live in. With this logic, 
Walasek & Stewart (2015) tested a possible cause for loss aversion. Could it be that 
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because of the way losses and gains are distributed in the real world, people behave as 
if they were loss averse and only therefore displayed loss aversion? 
 
Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2(a) shows the predictions given participants experience the 
negative or the positive condition. The top part represents the distribution of amounts 
in the two conditions of the experiment. Figure 1.2(b) shows estimated value 
functions from real choices under the according conditions. 
To test this hypothesis, Walasek and Stewart manipulated the range of 
possible gains and losses to spread from $20 loss to a $20 gain (or $40 loss to $40 
gain), a $20 loss to a $40 gain or a $40 loss to a $20 gain. They then asked 
participants to accept or reject different offers composed of losses and gains, like a 
50% probability to lose $10 and 50% to win $10. What does the range of losses and 
gains mean for the ranks of the amounts in the respective categories? If the gain-loss 
ranges are symmetrical, $10 has the same rank among losses than it has among gains. 
Because the evaluation is predicted to be rank-dependent, participants should equally 
likely accept or reject a gamble offering to equally likely win or lose $10. If losses 
reach up to $20 and gains up to $40, then $10 has a higher rank among losses than 
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among gains. This means that participants should reject this gamble, because a high-
ranking loss cannot be compensated for by a lower-ranking gain. The reverse is true 
for the condition where losses range up to $40 and gains only up to $20. Now, $10 
ranks higher among gains than among losses. The gamble should be attractive, 
because the gain has a higher probability of favorable comparisons with the other 
gains than the loss has of favorable comparisons with the other losses. The authors 
found the predicted pattern: They demonstrated that just by manipulating the range of 
available outcomes, participants chose as if they were loss-neutral in the 
symmetrically distributed cases, loss-averse when the range of gains was larger than 
the range of losses, and even the opposite of loss-aversion in the reverse case. 
Both these sets of experiments show a serious departure from and present a big 
challenge to accounts of decision making and judgment that assume an inherently 
stable mapping between objective values into their subjective equivalents. The 
formulation of models that allow for experiments considering different components of 
the decision making process will help in identifying the main drivers of valuation. In 
this thesis, we test ideas that all assume comparison processes as key to judgment and 
choice. All experiments presented are inspired by the finding that context strongly 
influences what we choose and like. As many of these findings can be accounted for 
by DbS, we use this model to identify potential mechanisms leading to the above 
mentioned contextual effects. This thesis comprises of five chapters, in which we test 
different aspects of the decision by sampling model using experiments, cognitive 
modeling and meta-analyses of our findings. 
Chapter 2 and 3 are based on the findings from Stewart, Reimers, and Harris 
(2015). The aim was to test how reliable the rank effects mirrored by the difference in 
psychoeconomic functions (the SRH effect) are and to what degree they are 
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attributable to DbS proposed mechanisms. We used different within-subjects designs 
to measure differences in psychoeconomic functions: In a first step, we flagged 
gamble pairs, so that they belong either to a positively or negatively skewed 
distribution, to assess whether people can keep track of different samples of attribute 
values (as they are assumed to keep track of gains and losses separately). We then 
retrospectively divided the choices according to their flags and estimated the 
differences between the psychoeconomic function for the two different distributions 
of attributes. If participants do separate choice pairs according to their flags into 
different samples (just as assumed in Walasek and Stewart (2015), where gains are 
compared to other gains and losses to other losses), differences in psychoeconomic 
functions should resemble those estimated with a between-subjects design. In a 
second step, we unflagged those pairs and again retrospectively estimated those 
differences between psychoeconomic functions to check if the observed differences 
are indeed attributable to DbS-type processes. In Chapter 3, we investigated the role 
of working memory by using cognitive load manipulations, where participants made 
some choices under high cognitive load or no/low cognitive load, and again estimated 
the differences between psychoeconomic functions. If participants’ preferences are 
formed via pairwise comparisons of attributes from memory and DbS is correct in 
asserting a role for working memory in making a series of binary ordinal 
comparisons, we should see a change in people’s choices when working memory is 
loaded. In Chapter 4, we first reviewed the literature showing rank effects in risky 
choice and then present yet unpublished data by Stewart and Reimers (2008), where 
we estimated and compared effect sizes of attribute distributions on choice reversals 
and attractiveness ratings of gambles, which are also predicted by DbS. The 
experiments in Chapter 5 were set up analogously to the experiments in Chapter 4. 
27 
!
!
Here we moved from choice to valuation and were interested whether positive affect 
after winning a prize in light of a salient alternative and other foregone prizes would 
have an impact on positive affect ratings, yielding a comparable effect as in Chapter 
4. Finally, in Chapter 6 we examined potential causes for the mutable-zero effect, 
which describes the phenomenon that an option is favored when it is described with a 
“pay zero” attribute instead of a “receive zero” attribute. We investigated how 
different salient attribute values and counterfactuals triggered by the words “pay” and 
“receive” could lead to such context effects, prompting choice reversals. Chapter 7 
concludes, and describes implications for future investigation. 
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2 Examining how utility and weighting functions get their shapes: 
A multi-level, quasi-adversarial, replication 
Recently, Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015, SRH hereafter) presented evidence 
from a series of experiments putatively demonstrating that the utility and probability 
weighting functions revealed by fitting standard economic models to binary choice 
data were sensitive to changes in the distributions of payoffs and probabilities in the 
choice sets. While for some the existence of such sensitivity may be no surprise (e.g. 
Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013; Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Fehr-Duda et al. 2010, 2011), the 
extent of malleability identified by SRH is considerable. For example, for some 
distributions of probabilities and payoffs, SRH were able to produce concave utility 
functions and inverse-S shaped probability weighting functions as commonly reported 
elsewhere in the literature; yet, for other distributions they were able to generate the 
mirror image patterns (i.e., convex utility and S-shaped probability weighting 
functions). As a convenient label, we will refer to the apparent malleability of the 
utility and probability weighting functions identified by SRH as the SRH effect. 
At face value, the SRH effect poses a severe challenge to any model of risky 
decision making in the preference-theoretic tradition which, thereby, seeks 
explanations of choice grounded on the presumption of stable preferences.  If a 
researcher can, as SRH explicitly suggest, choose the shapes of the functions they 
wish to reveal by adjusting the set of gambles used to elicit them, then the 
interpretation that such procedures reveal underlying preferences is undermined and 
central premises of welfare economics should be reconsidered. Hence, the SRH effect 
provides powerful new ammunition for those critical of the adequacy of preference-
based models of risky-choice (Friedman et al. 2014, Gigerenzer, 2016). By contrast, 
the SRH effect provides support to those who favor process based models, and in 
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particular, it provides support for the model of Decision by Sampling (Stewart, 2009; 
Stewart et al. 2006), because predictions of this model (which we refer to as DbS for 
short) prompted discovery of the SRH effect. 
 But before interpreting the SRH effect as a strong challenge to preference 
based models (or support for procedural models including DbS), it is appropriate to 
question whether the effect is replicable and robust. That question is pertinent, not 
least, in the light of contemporary controversy surrounding the replicability of many 
of the findings in the behavioral sciences and elsewhere (e.g., Camerer et al. 2016; 
Maniadis et al. 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Given this background 
controversy and the challenging nature of the SRH findings, we believe good 
scientific practice demands careful scrutiny of the SRH effect, via attempts at 
replication, to properly assess its significance. With this motivation in mind, this 
paper reports an extensive set of replication experiments investigating two primary 
issues: first, we examine whether the SRH effect is replicable and robust to variations 
in experimental design; second, since we do find support for the SRH effect, we also 
probe its origins. 
 In what follows, we report a set of 14 new experiments conducted as part of 
what we call a quasi-adversarial collaboration, and combine these with a reanalysis 
of the fixed original experiments.  The term “adversarial collaboration” has been used 
to refer to experimental research projects jointly planned and executed by two or more 
researchers (or research groups) who have ex-ante conflicting hypotheses about its 
outcome (for discussion and examples see Bateman et al. 2005; Corrigan, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2003; Latham et al. 1988; Mellers et al. 2001).  While our collaboration 
does not have exactly this form (hence the qualifier ‘quasi’), the seven researchers 
involved in this collaboration come from different disciplines (economics and 
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psychology), different labs, and have very different degrees of prior investment in the 
competing theoretical frameworks that would be supported or challenged by the 
existence of the SRH effect. We also use the qualifier “quasi’ to signal that the set of 
experiments reported here did not emerge from a common plan of adversarial 
collaboration agreed before any of the experiments began. Instead, our collaboration 
emerged as subsets of the present co-authors began to discover that we were 
undertaking very closely related work exploring the SRH effect, independently, at 
different labs. We then began to compare results and, later, discuss designs for new 
experiments. Further experiments were subsequently run by different sub-groups of 
us, based in three different labs at two universities, using a mixture of lab-based and 
online protocols. The development of the designs involved varying degrees of 
consultation between us, as well as key variations in designs and procedures, which 
we document below. Through this process we have generated a rich source of 
evidence relative to the SRH effect, which we bring together in this paper. 
The somewhat organic evolution of the collaboration does not mean that the 
set of replications, when viewed as a whole, lack structure. We will argue that, 
although we did not set out with this explicit purpose, the resultant set of experiments 
reflect and, indeed, extend a replication strategy proposed by Levitt and List (2009).  
They advocate a methodology involving replication at three levels: reanalysing data 
from the original study to be replicated; running fresh experiments using designs 
approximating the experiment to be replicated and thirdly, conditional on replicating 
the original results, running experiments to probe origins of the phenomenon 
observed.  Our experiments involve replication at all three levels but we also add a 
further dimension to our analysis. Through our experiments, we generated a rich data 
set based on decisions of 1880 subjects which we use to run a meta-analysis. This 
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complements the individual experiments by placing confidence bounds on the size of 
the SRH effect and allowing assessment of how it varies with some key design 
features of our replications. As such we interpret part of our contribution as piloting 
an extended, four level, version of the Levitt and List (2009) methodology enhanced 
via a meta-analysis. 
We reach two main conclusions. First, based on replication Levels 1 and 2, we 
conclude that the SRH effect is replicable, robust and the meta-analysis (Level 4) 
confirms a non-zero effect size.  Hence, we reconfirm the challenge posed by SRH to 
those who seek to understand choice through the lens of standard preference based 
models.  Second, based on the Level 3 analysis, we cast doubt on DbS as an account 
of the SRH effect since this model at best explains only about half of the effect size 
observed in our analysis.  Hence, we identify the need for further investigation to 
explain the causes of the SRH effect that we observe in our data. 
 The paper is organized as follows. We first review key features of the original 
SRH study and its basic findings. We then summarize the analysis of our results from 
all four levels of the replication process. Next we discuss our main findings, and the 
last section concludes. 
SRH’s (2015) study: setup, motivation, methodology and results 
 The main results in the SRH original study are based on data generated from 
experiments in which individuals had to make a series of choices between pairs of 
gambles of the form “p chance of x, otherwise nothing” or “q chance of y, otherwise 
nothing” (where p<q and y<x). SRH use these data to estimate utility functions over 
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monetary payoffs (x, y) by fitting an expected utility model and probability weighting 
functions over probabilities (p, q) by fitting a subjective expected utility model.1   
 All experiments followed the same logic whereby, for any given treatment, a 
fixed set of (five or six) money amounts was fully crossed with a fixed set of (five or 
six) probabilities to create a set of gambles. This was then used to generate a set of 
pairwise choices, for any given treatment of the experiment, comprising all possible 
non-identical and stochastically non-dominant pairwise choices from the full set of 
gambles. A further 30 choices were added in which one option stochastically 
dominated as a catch for participants paying insufficient attention to the task; 
participants who violated more than 10% of catch trials were excluded from the main 
analysis. The order in which choices appeared was randomized across participants. 
 There were two treatments in each experiment which varied according to 
either the skew in the distribution of money amounts, or the skew in the distribution 
of probabilities, used in construction of the choice sets.  Each experiment then 
involved comparison of a treatment with a positive-skew distribution (of money 
amounts or probabilities) against a treatment with either a negative-skew or a zero-
skew distribution (of money amounts or probabilities).  It was comparisons between 
these pairs of treatments which generated the SRH effect.  
  The actual amounts and probabilities used in five of the different experiments 
reported by SRH are depicted in Table 2.1. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There was an additional series of temporal discounting experiments, which we do not address in this 
paper.!
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Table 2.1 
Outline of the amounts and probabilities used in each SRH original experiment to create the choice gamble. 
Experiment Manipulation    Skew Amounts (£) Probabilities (%) 
Utility function manipulation     
SRH 1A Amounts 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500 
vs. 
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
SRH 1B Amounts 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500 
vs. 
0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
SRH 1C Amounts 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
Probability weighting function manipulation    
SRH 2A Probabilities 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
10, 20, 30, 40, 70, 90 
vs. 
10, 30, 60, 70, 80, 90 
SRH 2B Probabilities 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 99 
vs. 
1, 50, 90, 95, 98, 99 
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Notice that for the first three experiments in Table 2.1 (Experiments SRH 1A-
1C) it is the distributions of the money amounts that vary between treatments, holding 
constant the set of probabilities used to construct the set of gambles. For example, in 
Experiment SRH 1A, the gambles are constructed using a common set of probabilities 
in both treatments (ranging from 20% to 100% in 20% steps); whereas the money 
amounts range from £10 to £500 in both treatments but for one treatment (with the 
positive-skew distribution) the intermediate outcomes are all in the lower half of the 
range, while for the other treatment (with the negative-skew distribution) all of the 
intermediate outcomes are in the upper half of the range. These experiments examined 
how changing the distribution of money amounts changes the revealed utility 
functions. In the last two experiments depicted in Table 2.1 (SRH 2A and 2B) the 
distribution of amounts is common across the two treatments for each experiment, but 
the distribution of probabilities changes between treatments. These experiments tested 
the same effect in the probability domain by changing the distribution of probabilities 
between treatments and examining the resulting probability weighting functions. 
 An example of the choice interface, based on SRH 1A, is shown in Figure 2.1. 
At the top of the screen participants saw the distributions of chances to win and prizes 
on offer across the set of choices. In most experiments, this information was on screen 
continuously while subjects made their decisions.2  Although subjects were not 
explicitly informed about the number of choices they had to make, a bar at the bottom 
of the screen kept track of their progress.  The number of the unique non-dominated 
pairwise choices was 150 for experiments SRH 1A, SRH 2B, 120 for experiments 
SRH 1B, SRH 2A and 100 for experiment SRH 1C. After making each decision, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This holds for all experiments but for SRH 1B, where subjects only saw the series of choices, without 
the distribution of chances and prizes on offer. 
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next choice appeared automatically. In any given choice, the two gambles were 
presented in the form of text in separate ‘buttons’ and subjects indicated their decision 
by clicking on one of them. They were told that at the end of the experiment one of 
their choices would be randomly selected and the gamble that they had selected in 
that choice would be played out for real using an exchange rate: 1 pound equals 1 
pence.3 All SRH original experiments were conducted at the University of Warwick 
(with SRH 1C run online).   
 
Figure 2.1. Interface used in SRH 1A. 
 In a moment we will review the main findings of SRH. As a prelude to that, 
we note that the treatment comparisons in SRH have a particular theoretical 
motivation because, as SRH explain, the DbS model predicts systematic differences 
between them. The DbS model is a mechanism for the construction of choices from a 
series of ordinal comparisons between pairs of attribute values. Readers interested in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In Experiment SRH 1A two choices were randomly selected for payment. The exchange rate was 
halved for this experiment. In Experiment SRH 1C the choices were hypothetical rather than 
incentivized. !
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the details of the DbS model should consult Stewart (2009), Stewart et al. (2006), and 
SRH (2015). For now, the following property is sufficient: Because the probability 
that an attribute value will win an ordinal comparison is given by its rank position 
within those attribute values available, DbS predicts people will choose as if 
subjective value is the rank position of an attribute value within all those available. 
For example, consider the evaluation of the amount £200 in the context of the 
distributions used in experiment SRH 1B.  In the positive-skew treatment where the 
amounts are £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and £500, the £200 outcome is better than 4 
out of 5 of the other outcomes that will be encountered. But now consider the 
evaluation of £200 in the context of the zero-skew treatment of experiment SRH 1B 
with the distribution of £0, £100, £200, £300, £400, £500. In this case, £200 is better 
than only 2 out of 5 other outcomes that will be encountered. Thus DbS implies a 
higher utility for £200 in the positive-skew treatment, but a lower utility for £200 in 
the zero-skew treatment.  
Figure 2.2 shows the estimated utility and weighting functions for all five 
SRH original experiments. In line with DbS predictions, the utility functions in the 
utility experiments (in Figures 2a, 2b, 2c) and the weighting functions in the 
probability experiments (in Figures 2d, 2e) were more concave when the skew in the 
distribution of amounts and probabilities was positive than when it was negative or 
zero. For example, the utility for £200 in SRH 2B is lower in the zero-skew treatment 
than in the positive-skew treatment. The intuitive explanation from DbS is that, 
because subjective value is given by rank position, subjective value must increase 
most quickly where attribute value densities are highest. This means a steeper 
increase early on distributions with positive-skew compared to distributions with 
negative- or zero-skew. 
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Figure 2.2. The revealed utility and probability weighting functions from SRH. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. Source: Adapted from SRH (Figures 4a, 4b, 4c, 5a, 
and 5b respectively). 
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Four Level replication 
We now present the results of our new analysis, which as explained above, 
involves four levels of replication, extending the methodology advocated by Levitt 
and List (2009) with an additional stage of meta-analysis to take advantage of the rich 
data set we have generated via our new experiments. In terms of data analysis, our 
strategy is to use methods which are essentially the same as those applied by SRH, 
except for some refinements explained below. We then hold constant the statistical 
methods that we apply across the four levels of replication reported in this study.4 
Analysis for each of the four levels is presented as a separate subsection. 
Level 1: Replication by reanalyzing the original data  
As a first step we reanalyzed SRH’s original experimental data and estimated 
the revealed utility and weighting functions. Specifically, we fit an expected utility 
model with a Luce (1959)-Shepard (1957) choice rule incorporating a stochastic 
component to estimate utilities. !"#$ %ℎ##'()'*+( = -./0) 1)2(4) 6-./0) 1)2(4) 67 8)2(9) 6   (1) 
Here :(;) is the utility of amount y and :(<) is the utility of amount x, q is the 
gamble probability of winning y and p is the gamble probability of winning x, $=*' is 
a general tendency to choose safe irrespective of the actual amounts and probabilities 
on offer, and > controls the level of determinism in responding (> =1 gives choice 
probabilities proportional to the expected utilities, and > >1 gives more extreme 
choice probabilities, so gambles with a slightly higher expected utility are very likely 
to be chosen). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 While one could entertain different approaches to modelling, basing our approach on that used by 
SRH minimizes the chance that differences between our results and theirs are due to modelling 
differences; and holding the approach constant within our analysis allows us to rule out the possibility 
that differences across our experiments or levels of replication could be plausibly attributed to our 
statistical modelling methodology. 
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The advantage of this model, though it is perhaps not obvious, is that for 
simple gambles it can be estimated as the following logistic regression: log BCD- EFDD0G)0/HGIJBCD- EFDD0G)0/HG = K + M log 18 +) N.). O.).)(2) 
In Equation 2, each O. is a dummy variable indicating the presence of amount i as y 
(coded +1), as x (coded -1), or absent from the choice (coded 0); ν = log $=*' ; M =>; and the utility of each amount : = = exp)(N./>). SRH give details in their 
Appendix A. A corresponding logistic regression for estimating weights for 
probabilities is given by exchanging the roles of p and q and of x and y.  log) BCD-(0/HG)IJBCD-(0/HG) = K + M log 49 +) N.). O.  (3) 
where the weighting of each probability is given by V(W.) = (<W(N./>). 
Our analysis differs from SRH’s original analysis in terms of the estimation of 
the confidence intervals. We used a more reliable bootstrapping method instead of the 
standard errors from the model fits as in SRH, because we wanted to allow for the 
possibility of asymmetric confidence intervals. Furthermore, we estimated the 
revealed functions separately for each condition. SRH mistakenly used one model for 
both conditions, but this is incorrect; random effects cannot be estimated for all 
amounts for all participants, because each participant experienced only a subset of 
amounts. Level 1 replication identified some trivial calculation errors in SRH’s 
original analysis, but does not change the conclusions of the original paper. A detailed 
comparison between SRH’s original analysis with and without those calculation 
errors can be found in Appendix A. 
The revealed functions from the replication analysis are shown in Figure 2.3. 
The panels correspond to those in Figure 2.2, where the original experiments are 
presented. For example, a direct comparison for Experiment SRH 1A shows that the 
replicated functions depicted in Figure 2.3a strongly mirror the original functions 
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depicted in Figure 2.2a. The same result holds for all experiments.  Hence, we 
conclude that Level 1 analysis successfully replicates the SRH effect, both in the 
utility experiments and in the probability weighting experiments.  
Level 2: Replication by using a new subject pool  
In this section, we report the results of a series of eight new experiments run 
by different subsets of the current authors.  Each experiment was designed to replicate 
one of the original SRH experiments but with several design variations introduced 
across our studies as set out below. Table 2.2 presents the details of the Level 2 
experiments. For example, at the top of the table, the experiment labelled “L2.a” is a 
replication of the original experiment SRH 1C comparing positive-skew and zero-
skew distributions of money amounts. The distributions of money amounts and 
probabilities correspond exactly with those in SRH 1C. Subsequent columns of Table 
2.2 indicate that L2.a was an incentivized experiment conducted with 54 incentivized 
participants at University 1 using 75 randomly selected choices from the original 
study. Looking further down Table 2.2, you will see that we have replicated examples 
of both the utility and the probability weighting experiments, though there is a focus 
on the utility experiments. This is partly an accident of history reflecting decisions 
made in the different labs when they started running these experiments independently. 
But, a focus on the utility dimension may, nevertheless, be useful for several reasons. 
First, utility is arguably a more fundamental concept, compared to probability 
weighting, in models derived from the preference theoretic framework; it features in a 
wider class of models and it is the core subjective dimension in what has been the 
leading theory of risk preference–that is, expected utility theory.  
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Figure 2.3. The revealed functions obtained from the replication analysis. Error bars 
are 95% confidence intervals.   
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While this focus seems justified by these arguments, we also wished to include 
at least one Level 2 test in the probability domain – hence the inclusion L2.h 
(additional experiments reporting manipulations of probability are reported as part of 
Level 3 replications). Notice that across the series of experiments there is variation in: 
the skew (positive- vs negative- or zero-skew), the domain (utility or probability), the 
location (group that conducted the experiment), whether the experiment was 
conducted online or in the lab, the number of participants, the number of trials and the 
incentives (by using both incentivized and hypothetical experiments). We think there 
is some advantage in focusing on particular SRH experiments to see the effects of 
small changes in procedures holding constant the distributions of amounts and 
probabilities. For this purpose we used SRH 1C, which contrasted positive-skew with 
zero-skew distributions of outcome values making experiments L2.a-L2.e different 
replications of SRH 1C. The advantages of choosing to replicate mainly the 
experiment SRH 1C are twofold: First, we can use the difference between the utilities 
of the common amounts for a direct comparison (there are no common amounts 
between the positive-negative conditions); Second, the round amounts used in the 
zero-skew condition are more representative of amounts often experienced by 
subjects in other experiments.  
We also replicate SRH 1A, comparing positive-skew and negative-skew in the 
distributions of amounts in a different lab than SRH 1A (our experiment L2.f).  In 
experiment L2.g we pushed the boundaries further by creating a distribution different 
from all the experiments reported in SRH and collected the data online. Finally, L2.h 
is a replication of SRH 2B and examines the probability domain. 
43 
!
!
Table 2.2 
Outline of the properties of all replication experiments from Level 2. 
Replication 
(Original) 
      Skew  Domain Amounts (£ or $)* Probabilities (%) Location 
(Sample) 
Nǂ No. Trials¥ Incentives 
L2.a (SRH 
1C) 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 
500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1 
(Student 
sample) 
54 Mean of 75 
randomly selected 
Course credit plus up 
to £5 
L2.b (SRH 
1C) 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 
500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1 
(Prolific 
Academic) 
200 150 £1.80 (non-
incentivized) 
L2.c (SRH 
1C) 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 
500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1  
(MTurk) 
492 40 $1.80 (non-
incentivized) 
L2.d (SRH 
1C) 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 
500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1  
(MTurk) 
145 Mean of 75 
randomly selected 
$1.80 (non-
incentivized) 
L2.e (SRH 
1C)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 
500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1  
(50% MTurk 
and 50% 
Prolific 
Academic) 
183 150 $2.25 or £1.50 and up 
to $/£25 
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L2.f (SRH 
1A)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
Utility 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500 
vs.10, 310, 410, 
460, 490, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 2 
(Student 
sample) 
40 180 £0 up to £5 
L2.g (New 
distribution) 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
Utility 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 
200, 500 
vs. 5, 300, 400, 450, 
480, 490, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1  
(MTurk) 
154 180 $3 (non-incentivized) 
L2.h (SRH 
2B)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
Probability 100, 200, 300, 400, 
500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 
500 
1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 99  
vs. 
1, 50, 90, 95, 98, 99 
University 2 
(Student 
sample) 
29 180 £0 up to £5 
Notes: *We used $ for all Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) samples and £ for all Prolific Academic and student samples. In experiments L2.f 
and L2.h, where the experiment was conducted using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited via the online system ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2015), a show-up fee of £7 was added to the earnings from the experiment.  
ǂ Catch trials were not included in replication experiments L2.b, L2.c, L2.d, L2.e and L2.g. 2 subjects violated dominance in more than 10% of 
catch trials in experiment L2.f and 1 in experiment L2.h. These subjects were excluded from further analysis. In experiment L2.e we decided in 
advance to take the conservative approach of removing people in the 5% of fastest or slowest people, all multiple submissions from the same IP 
address, and the 5% of people who alternated the most or the least between left and right responses. We removed 56 participants based on the 
above criteria that are not included on the reported sample size.  
¥ In experiments L2.a, L2.c and L2.d we ran fewer trials to make the duration of the experiment shorter. This allowed us to run the experiment 
with as many participants as possible within a fixed budget 
**These are experiments where I, Emina Canic, was not involved in up until the analysis of the data 
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To estimate the utility and probability weighting functions, we followed the 
same procedure as in Level 1; that is, we fitted Equations (2) and (3) to the choice 
data for the utility and the probability experiments respectively. Figure 2.4 shows the 
revealed utility and weighting functions from the set of Level 2 replication 
experiments.  For example, the top left panel of Figure 2.4 depicts the revealed utility 
functions from experiment L2.a, where the resulting functions were more concave in 
the positive-skew treatment compared to the zero-skew treatment: Subjects assigned 
higher utilities to the common amounts of £100 and £200 when they experienced 
them in the positive-skew treatment (relative to the zero-skew treatment). 
Eyeballing of Figure 2.4 reveals that the SRH effect is replicated in seven of 
the eight Level 2 experiments: in all cases apart from experiment L2.e, we see a more 
concave utility function in the positive-skew treatment compared to the other 
(negative-skew or zero-skew) treatment. While we cannot rule out other 
interpretations, it seems possible that the failure to replicate in L2.e may be due to 
random error. Either way, however, this overall pattern of results is strong evidence 
that the SRH effect is replicable and robust to a range of changes in procedures and 
subject pools. 
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Figure 2.4. Revealed functions from the replication experiments in Level 2. Error bars 
are 95% confidence intervals. 
Level 3: Replication by implementing a new design 
While our Level 2 analysis provides substantial evidence suggesting 
robustness of the SRH effect, it does not show whether the conceptual interpretation 
of the original finding is correct. We therefore proceeded to a form of analysis in the 
spirit of Level 3 in Levitt and List’s (2009) taxonomy. They suggest that Level 3 
replication should involve creating alternative experimental designs, in order to test 
the same hypothesis as that tested in the original target of replication. Our strategy is 
to develop new designs intended to test the explanation of the SRH effect based on 
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DbS. We do this in two ways: first by running new experiments in which, conditional 
on the truth of the DbS account, it may be harder for the SRH effect to work; second 
by running tests in which, conditional on the truth of the DbS mechanism, we will 
eliminate the SRH effect altogether.  
To this end, in one series of Level 3 experiments, which we refer to as 
‘flagged’ experiments, we used a within-subjects design and presented participants 
with choice options originating from two different choice sets, one with a positive-
skew distribution and the other with a negative-skew distribution. There are two key 
design changes in these flagged experiments (relative to Level 2 experiments): one is 
that individuals experienced both choice sets within the same task; the other is that 
gambles from the different choice sets were flagged to indicate which gamble pair 
belonged to which choice set.  For example, in one of the experiments different sets of 
choices were described by different people using video recordings. One speaker 
“Joanne” was in her early twenties, white British woman; the other, “Patrick” was in 
his late twenties, white North American man. On a given trial, both of the gambles 
presented were drawn from the same set; that is, either both were from the set with 
positively skewed rewards or both were from the set with negatively skewed rewards. 
 For this within-subjects design, all option pairs from the two different 
distributions were merged to compose one choice set and this was presented to 
subjects in a randomized order. When it comes to analyzing the data, however, we 
retrospectively split the data, by choice set, to test whether there is an SRH effect 
observable (even though decisions for the two types of choice set were made by the 
same individuals). What would the model of DbS predict for such tests? 
 If participants simultaneously keep track of the two separate distributions (one 
presented by Patrick, the other presented by Joanne), and choose as if their decisions 
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are informed by applying DbS separately to choices that come from the separate 
distributions, then DbS would predict that splitting the combined choice set into the 
original two sets for the analysis will yield the same effects in the flagged within-
subjects experiments as in the original between-subjects experiments. On the other 
hand, we do not know that individuals would try to use flags and separate the 
distributions accordingly. Even if they did it seems possible that SRH effects might be 
reduced due to interference and imperfect memory. As such our flagged experiments 
provide a tougher environment for the operation of the mechanisms imputed by DbS. 
 Our second series of Level 3 replication experiments (which we label “non-
flagged”) uses the same within-subjects design just described, except that in these 
experiments we provide no flags. Hence, in these experiments participants had no way 
of knowing what distribution the choices belonged to and had therefore no way of 
attributing choices to one distribution or another. As such, while a DbS model would 
still imply that any measured utility and probability weighting function would depend 
on the background distributions of probabilities and amounts, in this case there is 
effectively only a single background distribution provided in the experiment. Yet, as 
experimenters, we can still retrospectively split the data according to the two different 
distributions generating the choices for the analysis. According to DbS, the SRH 
effect should disappear. Should we continue to observe the SRH effect this would be 
evidence against DbS’s proposed mechanism as the cause of this context effect. In 
fact, it would be a finding that no existing model could account for. 
 Because of the completely within-subjects nature of the experiments, we 
reverted to the original SRH modelling, where we fit one model to both conditions in 
an experiment. Random effects can now be estimated within one model, because all 
participants experience the attribute values from both distributions. In the logistic–
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regression–form the model looks as follows for the experiments estimating a utility 
function: log $%&' ()&&*+,*-.+/0$%&' ()&&*+,*-.+ = 2 + 45678 + 9 log :; + <5678 log :; +,, =>,> ?> (4) 
An addition to the model described in Equation 2 are the terms involving cond. Cond 
is a dummy to account for the two conditions, which set to 0 indicates the positive-
skew and set to 1, the other condition. Setting log(ABCDE&FG) = 2 + 45678, IE&FG = 9 + <5678, and JE&FG(CK6J7L> = 9 +MNO(=>/IE&FG) follows, when Equation 1 is adapted to account for both conditions. 
To estimate the probability weighting functions we fit the following model: log, $%&'(*-.+)/0$%&'(*-.+) = 2 + 45678 + 9 log QR + <5678 log QR +, =>,> ?> (5) 
and calculate the weights via SE&FG(O>) = MNO(=>/IE&FG). 
These are exactly the models estimated by SRH (see their Appendix A) and 
are extensions of our Equations 2 and 3. Table 2.3 summarizes the set of Level 3 
experiments. As in Level 2, we varied the domain, the location, the incentives, the 
number of trials, the number of participants, and whether the experiment was 
conducted online or in the lab. For example, the second row of Table 2.3 describes the 
details of experiment L3.a, which used the positive- vs. negative-skew in the 
distribution of amounts from the original experiment SRH 1A, and flagged them by 
labelling prizes as either mobile phones or holidays. We present the main results of 
Level 3 analysis in Figure 2.5. 
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Table 2.3  
Outline of the properties of all experiments from Level 3. 
Replication 
(Original) 
Skew Amounts (£ or $)± Probabilities 
(%) 
Location (Sample) N! N Trials" Payment 
Flagged Experiments# 
       
L3.a  
(SRH 1A)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500 
vs. 
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 2 (Student 
sample) 
48 330 Course credit (non-
incentivized) 
L3.b 
(SRH 1A)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
10, 20, 50,100, 200, 500 
vs. 
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1 (Student 
sample) 
42 160 Some for course 
credit some were 
paid £6 plus up to 
£5  
 
Non-flagged Experiments 
  
    
L3.c 
 (SRH 1A)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 
vs. 
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 2 (Student 
sample) 
45  450 Course credit (non-
incentivized) 
L3.d  
(SRH 1A)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 
vs. 
10, 310, 410, 460, 490, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 2  (Student 
Sample) 
50 450 £0 to £5 
L3.e 
(SRH 1C)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Zero 
10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
vs. 
20, 40, 60, 80, 100 
University 1  (50% 
MTurk and 50% 
Prolific Academic) 
89 140 $2.25 or £1.50 and 
up to $/£25 
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L3.f 
(SRH 2B)** 
Positive 
vs. 
Negative 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
vs. 
100, 200, 300, 400, 500 
1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 99  
vs. 
1, 50, 90, 95, 98, 99 
University 2 (Student 
sample) 
49 390 £0 to £5 
Notes: ±We used $ for all Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) samples and £ for all Prolific Academic and student samples.In experiments L3.d 
and L3.f, where the experiment was conducted using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) subjects were recruited via the online system ORSEE (Greiner, 
2015), a show-up fee of £7 was added to their earnings. 
!Catch trials were not included in replication experiments L3.b and L3.e. 1 subject violated dominance in more than 10% of catch trials in 
experiment L3.d and 3 in experiment L3.f. These subjects were excluded from further analysis. In experiment L3.e, we decided in advance to 
remove people in the 5% of fastest or slowest people, all multiple submissions from the same IP address, and the 5% of people who alternated 
the most or the least between left and right responses. We removed 32 participants on these criteria that are not included on the reported sample 
size. 
"In experiments L3.b, L3.e we ran fewer trials with as many participants as possible within a fixed budget. 
#The flagged experiments were as follows: In experiment L3.a for half of the participants 150 positively skewed questions were framed as 
holidays and 150 negatively skewed questions were framed as mobile phones. For other participants it was the other way around; in experiment 
L3.b the choice options from the different distributions were described by different people using video recordings. For half of the participants, 
Patrick described 80 gambles from the positively skewed set and Joanne described 80 gambles from the negatively skewed set; for the other half, 
this assignment was reversed. 
** These are experiments, where I, Emina Canic, was not involved in up until the analysis of the data
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Figure 2.5. Revealed functions from the replications of SRH in Level 3 using a within-
subjects design. L3.a-L3.b involve flagged choices, L3.c-L3.f do not. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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The top two panels of Figure 2.5 show results for the flagged experiments (L3.a and 
L3.b) where participants could potentially track what distribution the attributes in the choice 
set belonged to. The difference between the revealed utility functions for the two differently 
distributed samples of amounts remain: the utility function using the choices from the choice 
set with positive-skew is more concave than the one from the choice set with negative-skew. 
 Surprisingly–and in contrast to DbS predictions–when estimating the revealed utility 
and weighting functions in the non-flagged experiments L3.c-L3.f, the comparison of curves 
within each panel still shows the pattern of an SRH effect. It is hard to see how these 
differences can be rationalized with the DbS model.  Hence, our conclusion is that Level 3 
results at least partially challenge the DbS interpretation of the SRH effect. 
Level 4: Meta-analysis 
The nineteen experiments we have analyzed in this study (including the five Level 1 
cases from the original SRH study) provide a large data set, based on the decisions of 1880 
subjects, and are suitable for conducting a meta-analysis in order to examine the overall size, 
variability, and moderators of the effect of context on utility and probability weighting 
functions. We see this as a useful complement to the replication analysis of Levels 1 – 3 and so 
as a natural extension of the Levitt and List methodology, in cases where a suitable, comparably 
rich, data set has been generated.5 
 We first estimated the overall effect size using the differences in the revealed utility and 
weighting functions between conditions across all experiments for one attribute value. 
Subsequently, we calculated the effect sizes separately for (i) the between-subjects design 
experiments (ii) the within-subjects flagged experiments and (iii) the within-subjects non-
flagged experiments. From an explanatory point of view, the comparison of results for 
experiments in categories (i) and (iii) is especially interesting:  If the within-subjects 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 We do not consider a meta-analysis of replication studies generated from a quasi-adversarial collaboration as a 
sufficient condition to obtain a definitive estimate of the underlying effect sizes.  However, we regard it as an 
important step in the right direction. 
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experiments’ non-flagged effect size were as big as the between-subjects experiments’ effect 
size, we could reject the DbS interpretation of the context effects, because the effect in the non-
flagged experiments cannot emerge through the mechanisms proposed by DbS. However, if the 
effect size in the non-flagged within-subjects design experiments is smaller, DbS could still 
remain a candidate model for the interpretation of some part of the SRH effect.  
 For the effect size measure, we identified the amount or the probability that was 
common to the two distributions in a given experiment and calculated the difference between 
the utility (or weighting) functions of the two distributions at that point. If no attribute was 
common within an experiment, we picked the two attribute values that were most similar to 
each other across the positive- and zero- or negative-skew distributions. For the experiments 
comparing zero- vs positive-skew, £200 (or $200) occurs in both distributions, so we 
subtracted the utility estimate of £200 in the zero-skew treatment from the utility of £200 in 
the positive-skew treatment. For experiments with positive- vs. negative-skew distributions of 
amounts, we calculated the difference between the estimated utility of £200 and the utility of 
£310 for the utility experiments (we used the £200 vs. £300 comparison for experiment L2.g). 
Note that DbS predicts £200 in the positive-skew condition to be a higher utility than £310 in 
the negative-skew condition. The fact that £310 is a higher number than £200 makes this a 
conservative comparison. For the experiments manipulating the probability distribution we 
calculated the difference between the estimated probability weights of the common 30% (for 
SRH 2A replications) and the common 50% (for SRH 2B replications) in each condition. 
 We fitted a linear random effects model to estimate the effect of experimental design 
(between vs. flagged within vs. non-flagged within) and the skewness comparison (positive-
negative vs. positive-zero) using mean differences.6 The results of the meta-analysis are 
depicted in Figure 2.6. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The estimations were obtained by using the metafor package in R by Viechtbauer (2010). 
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Figure 2.6. Meta-analysis results from Level 4. Mean differences (MD) and 95% confidence 
intervals are shown as a function of the experimental design for between-subjects, and for 
flagged and non-flagged within-subject experiments. 
 Figure 2.6 shows that our best estimate of the difference between the revealed utility 
or probability weight of the common attribute between the two distributions (positive-
negative skew comparison or positive-zero skew comparison) overall is 0.17 95% CI [0.13, 
0.22] on a scale where, arbitrarily, the utility of £500 for the utility experiments and the 
weight of 99% in the probability experiments are fixed at 1. Thus, taking all our experiments 
and SRH’s experiments into consideration, the meta-analysis confirms that the SRH effect is 
replicable and real. 
We estimated the effect of distribution comparison (positive-negative vs. positive-
zero). The estimates do not differ between distribution comparisons, but could potentially 
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differ by approximately 0.10 in each direction, (betaDistribution = 0.00 95% CI [-0.10, 0.09]). 
That is, the difference between the estimated utility of £200 from the positive-skew condition 
and £200 from the zero-skew condition is similar to the difference between the utility of £200 
in the positive-skew condition and the utility of £310 in the negative-skew condition. 
However, there might be slight differences as the confidence interval is reasonably wide, 
leaving open the possibility that there are real differences between positive- vs zero-skew 
comparisons and positive- vs negative-skew comparisons. 
 Looking at the effect sizes for the three designs separately, the effect is largest in the 
between-subjects experiments (MDbetween=0.19 95% CI [0.14, 0.24]). The effect is reduced in 
the flagged within-subjects experiments (MDflagged_within=0.14 95% CI [-0.03, 0.32]) and is 
smallest–with a reduction of 30% of the between-subjects experiments–in the non-flagged 
within-subjects experiments (MDnon-flagged_within=0.13 95% CI [0.03, 0.24]). According to the 
meta-analytic model, the differences could be very small, or they could be opposite, such that 
the effects are larger in the non-flagged experiments, or it could be that the difference 
between the between-subjects experiments and the non-flagged experiments is about as large 
as the effect itself in the non-flagged experiments, (betaDesign = 0.04 95% CI [-0.04, 0.12]). 
Given that the DbS account cannot apply to the non-flagged experiments, and the effect size 
in the non-flagged experiments is estimated to be similar to the two other groups, it is likely 
that much of the effect in the flagged and between-subject experiments should not be 
attributed to the DbS model. 
Conclusion 
We showed that the qualitative effects of attribute distributions on utility and 
probability weighting functions reported by Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015) are highly 
replicable: we obtained utility and probability weighting functions that were qualitatively very 
similar to those of the original study across a set of experiments (our Level 2 replications) 
involving various design changes. More substantial variations in the experimental design (our 
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Level 3 replication) plus our meta-analysis, however, suggest that although the SRH effect 
can be reliably reproduced, the interpretation proposed by SRH, based on the model of 
Decision by Sampling, is unlikely to be the sole explanation of the apparent manipulability of 
utility and probability weighting functions. The findings have two implications: First, they 
reinforce the challenge to preference-based accounts of risky choice behavior posed by the 
existence of the SRH effect; second, they suggest the need to pursue new directions in the 
hunt for an explanation of the SRH effect. One possible explanation for the SRH effect could 
be that the parameter estimates are biased in a way that the bias depends on the set of values 
that are presented to the participants. This would mean that the estimates for the uniformly 
distributed amounts and probabilities are biased in a different way from the estimates for 
amounts and probabilities that are either positively or negatively skewed. The consequence 
would be that the estimates between the conditions (with differently distributed attribute 
values) are not comparable and thus should not be compared, because the parameters are not 
generalizable across differently distributed attribute values. Stewart, Canic and Mullett (2017) 
provide a more detailed explanation of this account.  
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3 Choices remain context sensitive, even under high cognitive load 
To what degree and in what way does cognitive load alter our decisions under risk? The main 
interest in this chapter lies in the effect of cognitive load on our risky decisions. When our 
working memories are filled up by a concurrent task (a cognitive load), working memory 
capacity is less available to support our risky decision making. The studies presented here will 
investigate whether our preferences, as measured by estimating the utility functions that best 
describe our choices, differ when we are choosing under high or low cognitive load. We 
contrast three accounts of how cognitive load may affect our risky decision making: cognitive 
load could lead to more or less risk averse choices, to more or less noisy choices, or to choices 
more or less sensitive to the context in which they are made. 
 We will start by reviewing the literature which supports the argument that reduced 
cognitive capacity will make us more risk averse. We first address the literature that shows 
how lower intelligence is associated with reduced cognitive capacity, and then the literature 
associating lower intelligence with more risk aversion. We then review a more recent 
reevaluation of this evidence that instead illustrates how reduced intelligence is associated 
with more noisy decision making. Finally, we introduce our new hypothesis, which emerges 
from the DbS model and the consideration of the role of memory in the decision making 
process. Based on the decision-by-sampling account cognitive capacity should reduce 
sensitivity to the decision context. 
How do intelligence and working memory capacity relate to each other? 
Making decisions under cognitive load implies that participants’ working memory 
capacity at this point will be reduced. Research that ties working memory capacity (WMC) to 
general cognitive abilities, which in turn moderate decisions, including those in risky 
environment, makes the link between WMC and intelligence important. We will therefore 
start by reviewing research that investigates the relationship between WMC and general 
cognitive abilities. 
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In the early days, some researchers defined the connection between WMC and 
cognitive abilities to lie in the ability to keep a representation active, especially whilst 
distracted (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin & Conway, 1999).  Although the relationship between 
working memory capacity (WMC) and general cognitive abilities has been widely 
established, there is still an ongoing discussion about what the direct link between the two is 
(Unsworth & Engle, 2005). In contrast to more recent research, initially some thought that 
WMC was a construct that underlies intelligence or that directly influences it (Conway, Kane, 
& Engle 2003). Some researchers have even argued that WMC and general intelligence are 
equal (Colom, Flores-Mendoza, & Rebollo, 2003; Engle, 2002; Jensen, 1998; Kyllonen, 
2002). More recently however, some of those have revised their argument (Conway, Kane, & 
Engle, 2003). To establish whether the two constructs were isomorphic, Ackerman, Beier and 
Boyle (2005) have conducted a meta-analysis and indeed have shown that general cognitive 
abilities are highly correlated with working memory capacity, that they share around a quarter 
of their variance, but that they are not the same thing. Whilst some researchers argued that a 
quarter is a huge underestimation and that the true share of variances is around 50 percent, 
they all agreed that the two constructs are not identical (Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005; 
Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhem, & Süss, 2005). Furthermore, Oberauer et al. clarified that the 
goal of investigating the correlation between WMC and intelligence is to “[…] validate WMC 
as an explanatory construct for intellectual abilities” (p. 64). This is important, because WMC 
is a central element in theories of cognitive architecture, and is proposed to play a crucial role 
when performing complex tasks, like making decisions. There is however, some controversy 
in regards to how similar or different the two constructs, intelligence and WMC, are. A big 
difference between the two is that whilst there are testable theories of what WM is and how it 
functions, no comparable theories exist for fluid intelligence. So far, we know that WMC 
(among other theoretical constructs) correlates most highly with general cognitive abilities 
and is a strong predictor of such (Martínez et al., 2011; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, 
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& Engle, 2009). Shahabi, Abad and Colom (2014) have recently investigated the relationship 
between short-term memory and fluid intelligence across different age groups and have found 
short-term memory to be a stable predictor (see also Barrouillet, Portrat & Camos, 2011). 
Because we have a clearer picture and more specific theories about WMC than we have about 
general cognitive abilities, learning more about WMC might help us understand what 
mechanisms underlie intelligent information processing. 
The behavioral economists’ perspective: In dual process theories cognitive capacity is 
associated with normative choices 
The concept of how general cognitive capacities could be related to decision making is 
nicely captured in dual process theories of cognition. They make clear predictions about the 
effect of cognitive load on risky decision making. Dual process theories generally propose the 
existence of two systems that operate under different circumstances: an emotional system 
(System 1) that is responsible for fast intuitive decisions, which can be vetoed by the analytic, 
rational reasoning system (System 2), which serves to decontextualized and depersonalize 
problems. System 2 however, is cognitively costly and can therefore only be applied or can 
operate when the necessary cognitive resources are available. Cognitive load is therefore 
hypothesized to reduce the contribution from System 2, leaving System 1 unchecked or 
unmonitored. Dual process theories predict that the two systems lead to different responses 
(Stanovich & West, 2000). In terms of risky decisions, given a certain context one of the 
systems would predict risk seeking, the other risk aversion. Or, in terms of intertemporal 
decisions, patient versus impatient choices, respectively. This framework is also the one under 
which behavioral economists have made sense of many findings that demonstrate departures 
from subjective utility theory (Benjamin, Brown & Shapiro, 2013; Fudenberg & Levine, 
2006; Mukherjee, 2010). The idea is that System 2 is an inner, rational economic man who, 
given sufficient time and resource, will overcome an irrational System 1, as popularized by 
Kahneman (2011). 
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In contrast to the traditional view in economics, behavioral economists have started 
taking into account cognitive abilities as individual factors that might moderate economic 
behavior. Barberis and Thaler (2003) argued that even on aggregate, behavioral biases found 
in their data cannot be eliminated by aggregating over everybody nor can they be eliminated 
by rational arbitrage (i.e., a process where “[…] rational [agents] can undo the dislocations 
caused by less rational agents […]” (p. 1052). Although classic economic models do not 
specify how cognitive abilities influence preferences, the last 10 to 15 years produced several 
empirical findings relating better outcomes in the labor market to higher cognitive abilities, 
and conversely relating excessive risk aversion and impatience to lower cognitive abilities. 
Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2013) found that Chilean students with higher 
cognitive capacities are less likely to choose the safe option when low stakes are on offer and 
less likely to choose the sooner option when the time interval between the smaller sooner and 
the later larger reward is very short. Those children behave according to normative models. 
The authors found the same pattern when they manipulated cognitive capacity by asking some 
of their participants to memorize a long number, whilst others were not subjected to a 
memorization task. Memorizing a long number before making a choice led to more risk-
averse decisions as compared to no memorization task before the choice. In a meta-analysis 
Shamosh and Gray (2008) found that higher cognitive abilities were positively correlated with 
patience. Bergman, Ellingsen, Johannesson and Svensson (2009) among others have found 
stronger anchoring effects in participants who scored lower on a cognitive abilities test. This 
difference was smaller for scores on the cognitive reflection test (see also Oechssler et al. 
2009). On the other hand, using self-reported SAT scores as proxy for cognitive abilities, 
Stanovich and West (2008) could not establish an association between SAT scores and 
anchoring effects. Oechssler, Roider & Schmitz (2009) showed that behavioral biases like the 
conjunction fallacy and less accurate belief updating in probability estimation are more 
pronounced in people who scored lower on the cognitive reflection test, and that people’s 
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probability judgments are impacted by working memory capacity (see also Frederik, 2005; 
Sprenger & Dougherty, 2006). Although higher cognitive abilities seemed to reduce these 
biases, they did not disappear. In addition, the observed differences in risk aversion and delay 
discounting between low scorers and high scorers were much smaller in Oechssler et al.’s 
study than in Frederik (2005) or Dohmen et al. (2007), although Oechssler et al. used real-
staked lotteries and adopted a similar set of gambles as Frederik (2005) and Dohmen et al. 
(2007). Nevertheless, many other researchers too found that lower scores on a cognitive 
abilities test were related to more sooner lower payments and more risk averse choices 
(Bergman et al., 2010; Burkes et al., 2009; Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2008).  
Using dual system theories, economists argue that using System 2 would lead to 
rational, unbiased choices. People who do not use this analytical System 2 enough are just not 
smart enough. The rationale is that if only people were smart enough, they would use System 
2 and they would make normative decisions like the ones predicted by classic economic 
models. Thus, descriptive as-if models like Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), which say little about the actual cognitive mechanisms that underlie a 
decision, would be sufficient to predict everyday decisions normal people make under risk: 
The curvature of the value function and the S-shaped probability weighting functions would 
be good enough tools to capture the degree of irrationality. From this perspective, excessive 
risk aversion, loss aversion, or distortions of probability weighting are anomalies that only 
“idiots” show. (Although it is rational to be risk averse when high stakes are at play, Rabin, 
2000, argues that the typical levels of risk aversion in low-stakes gambles in laboratory 
experiments are irrational because they imply absurd levels of risk aversion when scaled up to 
real-world problems.)  
As long as people that differ in motivation or cognitive ability still exist, we can 
capture differences in their degree of risk aversion by estimating differences in the curvature 
of the utility functions: Assuming expected utility theory (EUT), people with lower cognitive 
63 
!
!
abilities should also choose as if they have a more concave utility function when making their 
decisions. This consequently leads to more risk averse choices. Whilst making everybody 
smart enough and giving them more time, would lead to everybody making more rational 
decisions–because they could perform expected utility calculations (Stanovich & West, 
2000)–restricting cognitive capacities by imposing high cognitive load would lead to limits on 
the computations they could complete, and thus to less rational decisions. 
In most cases so far, the impact of cognitive capacity on choice was studied by 
assessing cognitive abilities (i.e., measuring operation span or using the cognitive reflection 
test) and examining its moderating or mediating potential. However, to identify a potential 
causal relationship, one must manipulate cognitive load. On this basis, several studies have 
been conducted investigating to what degree anchoring effects, framing effects, self-control 
and delay discounting, dietary choice or risky choice is affected by high as opposed to no or 
low cognitive load. Whitney, Rinehart, and Hinson (2008) found that although the typical 
framing effects remained (participants are risk averse with a positive framing and risk seeking 
with a negative framing), under high cognitive load participants were more risk averse in both 
types of framing. Other researchers have shown that participants were more likely to eat 
unhealthy food over fruit and thus exhibit greater impulsivity when having to remember a 
seven-digit instead of a two-digit number (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 
1999; Ward & Mann, 2000). Similarly, studies showed that under high working memory load 
people were less patient, preferring more sooner, smaller rewards and performed worse on a 
gambling task (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002; Jameson, Hinson, & Whitney, 2004). In 
addition, Fudenberg and Levine (2008) have reported an Allais paradox reversal when they 
induced cognitive load. In a recent study, Deck and Jahedi (2015) used a within-subjects 
design looking at a number of interesting outcome variables. Their studies yielded effects of 
high cognitive load in terms of a reduction in numeracy, increase in risk averse choices, 
64 
!
!
impatience over money, but not over an unhealthy diet nor more anchoring within one 
participant. 
Cognitive load is associated with more random responding, not more risk aversion 
There is a very different interpretation of the findings reviewed above. Some studies 
point to an issue that was thus far completely overlooked when investigating the relationship 
between cognitive abilities and risky or delayed choices, despite the fact that there is older 
literature relating limits on computation to performance error across reasoning tasks (Cohen, 
1991; Stein, 1996). The researchers argue that what everybody is observing and interpreting 
as an increase in risk averse or impatient choices, is actually an increase in randomness, due 
to mistakes when cognitive resources are insufficient. Franco-Watkins, Rickard & Pashler, 
(2015) as well as Andersson et al. (2013) provide compelling evidence that participants made 
more random choices under high cognitive load: Taking noise into account, the authors found 
no relationship between cognitive abilities and risk aversion. Andersson et al. argue that the 
reason why previous research found an association between risk and cognitive abilities was 
because those authors “[…] failed to account for the heterogeneous nature of the propensity to 
make mistakes, which may lead to biased inference about preferences for risk from observed 
choices (pp. 2-3).” What these authors found is that, if they ignored noise, participants with 
higher cognitive abilities were less risk averse. However, if noise was accounted for, the 
relationship disappeared and instead they found that participants with higher cognitive 
abilities made more consistent choices and not less risk-averse choices. In line with this 
notion and in contrast to what dual system theories would predict, is research showing that 
sometimes even stronger behavioral biases exist in people with higher cognitive capacities 
(Corbin, McElroy, Black, 2010). 
At this point, we have two competing hypotheses about the link between WMC and 
risky decisions. Either smarter people are less risk averse because of a greater reliance on an 
expected-value-calculating System 2. Or, smarter people are less noisy and, because of the 
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design of the studies that have been run so far, these more consistent decisions have been 
mistaken for less risk averse decisions.  
Decision by sampling predicts cognitive load will reduce sensitivity to the distribution of 
attribute values 
We can also use decision by sampling (DbS, Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Chater & Brown, 
2006) to make predictions about the effect of cognitive load on risky decision making. DbS 
postulates a major role for working memory in the decision making process. In DbS, working 
memory is required for all three of its constituent mechanisms: sampling recently encountered 
attribute values, pairwise comparisons between the attribute values, and an accumulation 
process which counts the number of favorable comparisons. As we explain below, DbS 
predicts that, when working memory affects these three processes, people’s risk propensity 
should be less sensitive to the broader context in which their decisions are made.  
Maintenance and retrieval of items are the two main functions of working memory 
(Unsworth & Heitz, 2007). Thus, if participants are under high cognitive load when they 
make a decision, the attribute values they are considering could either be pushed out by the 
load items, the load items could interfere with the relevant attributes, or the accumulation 
process could be impaired. Consequently, cognitive load should diminish the context 
sensitivity demonstrated in a recent study by Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015). In that 
study, participants’ utility functions were found to be strongly affected by the distributions of 
prizes, probabilities, and times on offer during the course of the experiment. More 
specifically, when participants were presented with a positively skewed distribution of prizes, 
the utility function estimated from people’s choices was concave and participants’ choices 
were risk-averse. In contrast, when participants were presented with a negatively skewed or 
uniform distribution of prizes, the estimated utility function was convex or linear, 
respectively, with participants appearing to make risk-seeking or risk-neutral decisions. As in 
Chapter 2, we call the sensitivity of the preference functions to the attribute distributions, the 
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SRH effect. Will the difference between the utility functions for differently distributed prizes 
remain for choices under high cognitive load? This is a test of the specific mechanism in DbS, 
by which the distribution of attribute values influences choices via a working memory 
mechanism. 
 Thus, DbS adds a third hypothesis to the set: Reduced working memory capacity 
should impact the proposed cognitive processes. If risk aversion is the result of the interaction 
between cognitive processing and the distribution of attribute values in the environment, 
reduced working memory capacity should reduce this interaction. This third hypothesis was 
the motivation for the design of the experiments in this paper. However, our data allowed us 
to test the first two hypotheses as well, so we did. 
Experimental Programme 
In the following studies we crossed two factors: the distribution of attribute values in 
the choice set with the working memory load imposed within participants whilst the choices 
were made. Decision by sampling predicts that the effect of the distribution of attribute values 
should be reduced with high cognitive load. The dual system account predicts that decision 
making should be more risk averse under cognitive load, irrespective of the distribution of 
attribute values. The increased-noise account predicts that decision making should be less 
consistent or deterministic under cognitive load, irrespective of the distribution of attribute 
values. Thus the aim of manipulating cognitive load was to be able to answer three questions: 
(a) How robust are rank effects in the presence of cognitive load within participants? (b) Will 
participants make more irrational (i.e., more risk averse) choices under cognitive load? (c) 
Will participants make less consistent responses under cognitive load? 
We are presenting three versions of a similar experimental set-up where participants 
make consecutive risky choices partly under no or low cognitive load, partly under high 
cognitive load, to investigate the effect of high cognitive load on the context sensitivity of 
valuation. From a theoretical point of view, the studies could help identify boundary 
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conditions, namely whether people’s choices might follow the DbS proposed mechanism only 
when enough cognitive resources are available to the decision maker. Ultimately, establishing 
whether cognitive abilities influence risk preferences matters, given that recommendations for 
policy makers would differ if people were risk averse due to their low cognitive abilities, or if 
their choices were just random because low cognitive abilities lead to noisier decisions.  
Experiment 1A 
Method 
 Participants. 54 Warwick psychology undergraduates participated for course credit. 
After the experiment, a random gamble was played out so that participants could win up to £5 
depending on the choice that they made in the experiment. 
 Design. Following Stewart et al. (2015) we created 30 gambles with a positively 
skewed amounts distribution where participants encountered £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and 
£500 throughout the experiment. For the uniform amounts distribution, we created 25 
gambles where participants encountered £100, £200, £300, £400, and £500 throughout the 
experiment. The probabilities were 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% percent in both 
conditions. We crossed all gambles and dropped the pairs where one gamble stochastically 
dominated the other so that participants in the uniform condition made choices out of a 
possible set of 100 pairs and participants in the positive skew condition made choices out of a 
possible 150 pairs. 
Procedure. Participants were instructed that they were going to make 75 choices, they 
could take as much time as they liked and that depending on their choices they could win a 
bonus. 75 pairs out of the 100 and 150 possible pairs were randomly selected. For each trial, 
participants were faced with either a string of two (Low-load) or seven random letters (High-
load), which they were told to memorize and recall when asked. Whether participants were 
under low cognitive load or high cognitive load per trial was random too. They could take as 
much time as they liked to remember the string, before proceeding to the pair of gambles to 
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choose from. Each gamble was presented on the screen as a button and participants indicated 
which gamble they preferred by clicking on it. When they made a decision, the recall screen 
appeared with a textbox where participants were asked to fill in the letter they had memorized 
beforehand in the same order. The experiment was over after all choices were made, one 
gamble was played out and participants received their compensation. 
Results and discussion  
Manipulation check. We first tested whether participants performed better during 
recall, i.e. recalled more strings correctly, when under low than under high cognitive load, 
which they did, Mean difference (MD) = .32 95%CI [.26, .38]. This shows that participants 
indeed were under load when trying to memorize the string and simultaneously making a 
decision and that remembering seven letters was harder than remembering two. We also 
checked whether there are differences in recall between the two distributions and cognitive 
load; there were no interaction effects, MDLow = .01 95%CI [-.01, .04] and MDHigh = .06 
95%CI [-.06, .18]. 
Context sensitivity. Stewart et al. (2015) reports the details of the estimating 
procedure for the value of each amount for the two conditions (Positive-skew and Uniform) 
and for bootstrapping confidence intervals. We used mixed effects logistic regressions 
separately for the two distributions, using cognitive load as a within-subjects variable to 
estimate the value for trials in the low-load condition and trials in the high-load condition. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the value function for the positive-skew and the uniform conditions, the left 
side shows low-load condition trials, the right side shows high-load condition trials. Both 
patterns replicate previous results where a positively skewed distribution yielded a more 
concave and the uniform distribution a linear value function. The effect sizes of the effect of 
distribution, estimated using the differences between the estimates of £200, are very similar 
between Low-load and High-load, mean difference for the Low-load (MDLow) = .34 95% CI 
[.08, .59] and MDHigh = .26 95% CI [.03, .49]. The pattern for Low-load was predicted by DbS 
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and replicates previous findings. The pattern in High-load largely remains, contrary to 
predictions of DbS. 
Risk aversion. To test whether people were more risk averse under high load (i.e., 
whether the functions are more concave under high cognitive load), we chose to compare the 
estimate of the amount of £200 within the corresponding distribution between high and low 
cognitive load. Cognitive load was a within-subjects variable in these experiments and the 
model estimates take that into account: In the positive-skew condition the estimate in the 
high-load condition is slightly lower than in the low-load condition, and only slightly higher 
in the uniform condition, MDPositiove_200= .04 95% CI [-0.07, .15] and MDUniform_200= -.02 95% 
CI [-.20, .15]. More cognitive load does not lead to more risk-aversion; The estimates are not 
reliably higher in the high-load condition, which would make the function more concave–
indicating more risk aversion–in the high-load conditions than in the low-load conditions. 
Noise. Using γ, the determinism parameter, which captures the degree to which 
participants choose consistently across trials, we can estimate how noisy participants’ choices 
were (see Stewart, Reimers & Harris, 2015 for details). According to Andersson et al. (2013), 
high cognitive load should lead to less consistent choices. We do find higher estimates for γ in 
the low-load than the high-load conditions, suggesting more noisy responding in the high-load 
conditions. Yet, our best estimate reveals only small differences between γs for low-load and 
high-load trials, MDPositiove_γ = -0.08 95%CI [-0.17, 0.01] and MDUniform_γ = -0.06 95%CI [-
0.19, 0.08]. 
Cognitive load does not seem to affect risk aversion but it does affect consistency a 
little, according to our data. To gain further insight whether cognitive load indeed has no 
effect on context sensitivity, we have replicated this experiment online with a larger sample. 
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Figure 3.1. Utility functions for Experiment 1A. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
Experiment 1B 
Method 
 Experiment 1B replicates Experiment 1A with a larger sample using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. 145 people participated for $1.80. The only other difference between 1A 
and 1B was that here participants were not incentivized beyond us urging them that reporting 
their true preferences and trying their best during the memorization and recall task was very 
important for the task. 
Results and discussion 
 Manipulation check. Participants again were far more accurate during the recall task 
when under low than under high cognitive load, MD = .39 95%CI [.34, .43]. The difference 
here is a little bigger than in Experiment 1A, because accuracy was a little higher during the 
Low-Load trials and a little lower during the High-Load trials as compared to Experiment 1A. 
However, the differences are within a similar range. There are no interaction effects of load 
and distribution on the proportion of accurate recalls, MDlow = .01 95%CI [.00, .02] and 
MDhigh = .06 95%CI [-.03, .15]. 
 Context sensitivity. Figure 3.2 depicts the value function for the positive-skew and 
the uniform condition. As above the left side shows estimates for low-load condition trials, 
the right side shows estimates for high-load condition trials. In the low-load condition, the 
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positive-skew condition compared to the uniform condition resulted in a more concave utility 
function. However, the difference is much smaller than in Experiment 1A, MDlow= .16 95% CI 
[-.09, .40]. In the high-load condition, the differences between value functions of the positive-
skew and uniform conditions are even smaller than in the low-load condition and almost 
collapse, MDhigh= .05 95% CI [-.23, .34]. This indicates that cognitive load might slightly 
desensitize participants’ choices to the distribution they experience. 
 
Figure 3.2. Utility functions for Experiment 1B. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
Risk aversion. We also see almost no change in risk aversion with cognitive load. 
When comparing the high-load estimates with the low-load estimates for the positive-skew 
and the uniform condition separately, cognitive load has no effect, MDPositive_200= .01 95% 
CI[-.09, .11] and MDUniform_200= -.09 95%CI [-.24, .06 ]. 
Noise. When comparing γ for the high-load against the low-load trials, γ in the high-
load conditions are estimated to be a little lower than in the low-load conditions, again 
showing a small effect on noise within participants, MDPositive_γ = -0.07 95%CI [-0.08, -0.07] 
and MDUniform_γ = -0.12 95%CI [-0.25, -0.00]. 
From previous experiments, we know that participants are sensitive to the distribution 
manipulation when making sequential choices. However, in the 1B low-load conditions the 
differences between the positive-skew and the uniform conditions were much smaller than in 
Experiment 1A and other previous experiments. Failing to find a contrast between high-load 
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and low-load trials in both 1A and 1B, led us to slightly change the experimental design in 
Experiment 2. In this experiment too we have consistent findings across conditions 
considering choice consistency, which we will also test for in the next experiment. 
Experiment 2 
We made the following changes to the design: First, we decided on a block design. 
Instead of randomly selecting low load and high load trials, all participants first made choices 
without load and then proceeded with the high-load trials for the last choices. Second, to be 
able to purely estimate the effect of cognitive load, for the first part of the experiment we 
decided to completely omit the low cognitive load part of the trials. Both these changes were 
supposed to ensure that participants' working memories actually contained the attributes we 
wanted to manipulate and to reduce interference. We feared that in the first two experiments 
the ongoing load, low or high on every trial, was sufficient to prevent participants from 
learning the distribution of attribute values as well as we might expect them to, leading to the 
findings in 1B.  
Method 
 Participants. Because we failed to detect differences between the low-load and the 
high-load conditions in Experiments 1A and 1B, we ran Experiment 2 with 492 participants 
via Amazon Turk. Each received $1.80 for taking part. Based on a power analysis and the 
effect sizes measured in SRH-type experiments, we estimated that sample size needed to be 
tripled to have a 99% chance of detecting the SRH effect, i.e. differences between the 
distribution manipulation conditions.   
Procedure. For the first 40 trials participants only made choices between gambles 
where the memorization and recall tasks were completely omitted. After the no-load trials 
participants proceeded to the 20 remaining high-load trials with the same procedure as in 
Experiment 1A and 1B: Memorization was followed by the choice between two gambles, 
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which was followed by recalling the seven letter string. As before, participants were told that 
they could take as much time as they liked to complete the task. 
Results and discussion 
 Manipulation check. Because there were no low-load condition trials, here we only 
checked whether recall was equally poor for both distribution conditions, MD = .03 95%CI [-
.02, .08], making sure that remembering a seven-letter string was hard enough to induce 
cognitive load independently of the distribution of amounts participants experienced.  
Context sensitivity. The estimated value functions are depicted in Figure 3.3. The 
original distribution manipulation effect was replicated under no cognitive load: In the 
positive-skew condition, participants’ utility functions were more concave than in the uniform 
condition, MDNo_Load= .15 95% CI [.05, .24]. Under high cognitive load, the SRH effect is of 
similar size as under no load, but with a less reliable estimate, MDHigh_Load= .11 95% CI [-.06, 
.27].  
Risk aversion. We also see, that cognitive load has no effect on risk aversion within 
participants in the positive-skew condition, MDPositive= .00 95% CI [-.06, .06] and very little 
effect in the uniform condition, MDUniform= -.04 95% CI [-.09, .01].  
Noise. The wider confidence intervals on the estimates in the high-load condition 
indicates that choices might be noisier under high cognitive load compared to no cognitive 
load. Indeed, when looking at the γs, both the positive-skew condition and the uniform 
condition–though with wide confidence intervals here–yield lower γs in the high-load 
condition than the no-load condition, MDPositiove_γ = -0.58 95%CI [-0.87, -0.28], and 
MDUniform_γ = -0.15 95%CI [-0.76, 0.46]. The findings across experiments are consistent with 
Andersson et al.’s hypothesis about the negative effect of load on choice consistency. 
 Across all three experiments, we found that the effect of the distribution manipulation 
replicated. There is very little evidence that cognitive load had an effect on risk aversion, but 
we consistently find that cognitive load decreases choice consistency. To get an overview 
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across experiments, and in order to estimate the effect of cognitive load on the SRH effect, on 
risk aversion and choice consistency, we conducted three meta-analyses. 
 
Figure 3.3. Utility functions for Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals (CIs 
are asymmetrical in the high-load conditions and are hidden under the dots and triangles). 
Meta-analysis 
Above we have described three experiments, with a mostly consistent pattern of 
results: The original distribution manipulation effect replicated four times in Experiment 1A 
and Experiment 2, but did not replicate in neither the low-load nor the high-load conditions in 
Experiment 1B. Given all previous findings (see Chapter 2), we have reason to believe that 
this possibly occurred due to random variation. To conclusively answer our main question, we 
combined the evidence and tested whether on aggregate the effect size of the distribution 
manipulation is reduced by high cognitive load as compared to no/low cognitive load. We 
also add estimates of the effect sizes of noise and the risk aversion hypotheses. All analyses 
will yield a conservative estimate of the difference between high and no/low cognitive load, 
because they do not take into account the within-subjects nature of our data (see Dunlop, 
Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996 for reasons why this is the appropriate procedure). The 
models used to estimate the parameters do however take the within-subjects design into 
account. 
The SRH effect remains under high cognitive load 
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Because the experiments are not exact replications of each other, we implemented a 
random effects meta-analysis using the metafor package for R (Viechtbauer, 2010). Following 
our previous meta-analysis, we used the differences in the estimate of the subjective value of 
£200 (or $200 for Experiment 1B and 2) of the positive-skew and the uniform condition, as 
our measure of the effect of the distribution of attribute values. We separated the effects by 
adding cognitive load as moderating variable. Decision by Sampling predicts a smaller 
difference between the Positive-skew and the Uniform condition under high cognitive load 
than under low/no cognitive load, because the WM component, presumably involved in the 
choice process, should be impaired by cognitive load. 
Figure 3.4 shows effect size estimates for Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2, separately for 
no/low-load and high-load conditions. The estimate of the difference between the subjective 
values of £200 in the positive-skew and uniform conditions for the no/low-load conditions is 
0.17 95% CI [0.10, 0.23] on a scale where the value for £0 is zero and the value for £500 (or 
$500) is set to be 1. The estimate of the difference in the high-load conditions is .16 95% CI 
[0.03, 0.29]. The estimates strongly resemble one another, and the confidence intervals of the 
High-load estimate completely encompasses the No/Low-load estimate. The random-effects 
model estimates the difference between risk aversion on the no/low-load and the high-load 
condition trials to be nearly zero, betaLoad = -0.01 95% CI [-0.15, 0.14].  
The meta-analysis has helped to identify that even on aggregate cognitive load does 
nothing to reduce the SRH effect. In addition, we can compare this overall estimate with the 
overall estimate in Chapter 2, where we found the difference between the subjective values of 
200 to be MDOverall_Chapter2 = 0.17 95% CI [0.13, 0.22], which is almost identical to the overall 
estimate in this chapter, MDOverall = 0.16 95% CI [0.10, 0.23]. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean differences between the estimate for £200 (and $200 respectively) in the 
positive-skew and the uniform conditions with 95% confidence intervals. The estimates are 
shown as a function of the presence and the amount of cognitive load. 
Risk aversion does not increase under high cognitive load 
To estimate, whether cognitive load increases risk aversion, as above we used the 
differences in the estimate of the subjective value of £200 (or $200 for Experiment 1B and 2) 
for low cognitive load trials and compared them with estimates for high cognitive load trials. 
We separated the effect between positive-skew and the uniform condition. Figure 3.5 shows 
effect sizes for risk aversion estimates in Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2, separately for positive-
skew and uniform conditions. The estimate for the difference in subjective values of £200 
between the no/low-load and high-load conditions overall is -0.01 95% CI [-0.05, 0.02] on a 
scale where the value for £0 is zero and the value for £500 (or $500) is set to be 1. The 
estimate of the difference in the uniform conditions is -0.04 95% CI [-0.09, 0.01] and in the 
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positive conditions it is 0.01 95% CI [-0.04, 0.06]. The random-effects model estimates the 
difference between risk aversion in the positive-skew and the uniform conditions to be very 
small, betaDistribution_RiskAversion = 0.05 95% CI [-0.01, 0.11]. In one experiment we find a 
decrease in risk aversion with high cognitive as compared to no/low cognitive load, in half we 
find no effect and in two conditions there indeed was an increase in risk aversion under high 
cognitive load. However, contrary to what is implied by dual-system theories, the effect of 
cognitive load on risk aversion given our data is basically zero. 
 
Figure 3.5. Mean Differences between the estimate for £200 (and $200 respectively) in the 
no/low load and the high load conditions with 95% confidence intervals, shown as a function 
of distribution (Positive-skew or Uniform) 
Cognitive load decreases consistent choice behavior a little 
We used the differences in γs between the no/low load and high load condition to 
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estimate the consistency of participants’ choices. In all our experiments we found lower γ in 
the high-load condition than the no/low-load condition. The overall effect size is -0.08 95% 
CI [-0.08, -0.07] with an effect of -0.21 95% CI [-0.50, 0.08] in the positive-skew condition 
and -0.15 95% CI [-0.76, 0.46] in the uniform condition. Figure 3.6 shows all effect sizes 
separately for the positive-skew and uniform conditions. The random-effects model estimates 
the difference between γs in the positive-skew and the uniform conditions to be very small, 
betaDistribution_Consistency = -0.08 95% CI [-0.37, 0.21]. As in Anderson et al. (2013), high 
cognitive load does decrease choice consistency. However, on a scale where the γs are 
estimated to range from two to four, the overall effect we observe here is very small. 
 
Figure 3.6. Mean Differences between estimates of γ in the no/low load and the high load 
conditions with 95% confidence intervals, shown as a function of distribution (positive-skew 
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or uniform condition). Γs are consistently lower in the high-load than the no/low-load 
conditions. 
General Discussion 
By asking people to make choices between two gambles under no/low and high 
cognitive load, our study primarily investigates whether context sensitivity is reduced in the 
presence of high as opposed to no/low cognitive load. Previous results looking into the impact 
of cognitive load on risky choice are inconclusive (see Deck & Jahedi, 2015 for a recent 
review): Some find an increase in risk-averse choices (Dohmen et al., 2007; Oechssler, Roider 
& Schmitz, 2009), others find a decrease in choice consistency with lower cognitive abilities 
or under high cognitive load (Andersson et al., 2013; Franco-Watkins, Rickard & Pashler, 
2015). Looking at our data, we find no evidence that high cognitive load leads to more risk 
averse choices (High-load utility functions are not more concave than No/Low-load utility 
functions). We do find however, that high cognitive load leads to noisier choice behavior, 
although the effect is very small. Although participants’ choices are noisier under high 
cognitive load, they are still sensible, given that all utility functions increased monotonically. 
To understand how our choices are impacted by cognitive load, Andersson et al. 
(2013) recommend using models that distinguish parameters for preferences from parameters 
for somebody’s tendency to make mistakes. They also recommend measuring cognitive 
abilities in order to be able to factor it in when eliciting choice preferences. From a theoretical 
point of view this makes a lot of sense, if enough evidence corroborating their finding is 
accumulated and if we started using a more diverse sample as opposed to student samples. 
From a practical point of view, it might not pay off if the sample is too homogenous.  
What in other studies might be mistaken for risk aversion, might as well be noise (and 
we should find out if this is the case). Our model does allow us to distinguish between the 
two. Probably also of importance is that our model also allows us is to estimate the effect size 
of cognitive load on choice consistency: We only find a small effect size and Andersson et al. 
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do too (correlation coefficient of 0.09 and 0.1 between cognitive abilities and noise). Even if 
the effect size could be influenced by our cognitive load manipulation and no control of 
cognitive capacities, it needs to be considered when evaluation these findings. Still, they serve 
as another lesson in how wrong models can lead to spurious results and wrong conclusions. 
Besides Bruza, Welsh and Navarro (2008), where they investigated framing effects 
controlling for working memory on the basis of DbS, to the best of our knowledge, our 
experiments are the first direct test of the involvement of working memory considering DbS 
predictions. We found no effect of working memory in moderating the association between 
the distribution of attribute values in the choice set and the revealed utility functions. One 
possible reason for this is our choice of cognitive load task. We deliberately chose to have 
letter strings rather than digit strings, because we did not want people to be comparing the 
digit strings to the attribute values. But perhaps there is a separation of the numerical attribute 
values experienced from the letters that are to be remembered. Thus, should working 
memory’s content facet consist of a separate verbal and numerical category, the numbers and 
letters could be stored and retrieved separately (see Oberauer, Süss, Schulze, Wilhem & 
Wittmann, 2000) and the risk of interference would be diminished.  
Our experiments ignore response times. The additional constraint on capacity by high 
cognitive load could be compensated with taking more time to make a choice. This could be 
tested by testing whether participants take longer to respond under high rather than low 
cognitive load. An additional factor that we have not accounted for, which might have led to 
no impact of high cognitive load, is participants’ operation span. However, given that we 
tested around 700 people, it is unlikely that a small number of participants with very high 
cognitive capacities have distorted the data. Still, it would have been advantageous to have 
controlled for operation span, considering that Deck and Jahedi (2015) in their study found 
that participants whose answers were most negatively affected by high cognitive load (i.e., 
participant with low operation span), were also the participants who under cognitive load 
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made more risk averse choices. 
Another explanation of the SRH effect could be offered by Parducci’s range-frequency 
theory (RFT; 1965). In RFT the judgment of an attribute is a compromise between the rank of 
an attribute within a set of other present attributes and its position within the range of the set 
of the same attributes. RFT is not formulated as a process model, but assumes that any kind of 
judgment or evaluation of some sort of magnitude is a weighted mix of positions within the 
rank and range of stimuli. While DbS hypothesizes a rank effect arising from binary ordinal 
comparisons, RTF does not postulate a mechanism. Instead the argument is one of optimality: 
the rank principle leads to a reduction in reconstruction error if representation capacity is 
limited. Anyway, it could be that the rank effects in Stewart et al.’s (2015) experiment arise 
through some non-working-memory mechanism that reflects this rank principle. For example, 
if participants stretch their internal scale that represents the sums of money in the real world 
so that there is greater resolution where amounts are more frequent, to mirror the distribution 
of the amounts presented here, we would need no specific working memory part to observe 
these results, even under high cognitive load. 
Across different experiments, the rank hypothesis holds. In previous work, Stewart, 
Chater, and Brown (2006) really just highlighted a coincidence: With the shape of the 
distribution of attribute values in the world, and the mechanism proposed by DbS, the authors 
observed that utility, weighting, and discounting functions had the same qualitative shape as 
described in the literature. Ungemach, Stewart, and Reimers (2008) and Stewart (2009) 
reported some experimental evidence to support this link. By manipulating the distribution of 
attribute values that people recently experienced, they were able to change people's decisions 
in a way DbS predicted. Stewart, Reimers, and Harris (2015) extended this result, showing the 
direct manipulations of the skew of the distribution of attribute values indeed alters decisions, 
with revealed utility functions changing just as predicted by DbS. However, in Chapter 2 we 
showed that it cannot all be DbS, but that the reason the functional forms take the shapes they 
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do, might as well be completely independent of the samples of attribute values in people’s 
working memory. We estimated that only about half of this effect should be attributed to the 
DbS mechanism, with at least one half as yet unexplained. The fact that cognitive load does 
nothing to diminish the effect size under our experimental circumstances, does not help in 
finding the mechanism leading to about half of the apparent rank effects found in our studies. 
All previous work on DbS did hypothesize that working memory was a key component, 
responsible for the effect of the distribution on choice. With the design used for the 
experiments in this chapter, we could not provide any evidence that differences in working 
memory capacity lead to changes in the SRH effect, leaving us with more questions about its 
exact role in risky choice. 
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4 Stewart & Reimers (2008): More evidence for the rank hypothesis in judgment 
and choice 
We know the SRH effect is robust across different experiments. However, we also know from 
our within-subjects design experiments from Chapter 2 (Alempaki, Canic et al., 2016), in 
which participants made choices across both sets of amounts, that not the whole effect, and 
perhaps not any of the effect should be attributed to decision by sampling (DbS, Stewart, 
Chater, & Brown, 2016). We know that at least to some degree, the effect is caused by 
systematic biases in the estimation procedure, which vary as a function of the attribute values 
presented (Stewart, Canic, & Mullett, in prep). One might wonder, whether these results 
entirely question the decision by sampling model. We will show that DbS predicts many 
findings that are unaffected by these estimation problems. First, we will reintroduce decision 
by sampling and older theories that motivated the model. Then we will review behavioral and 
neurophysiological evidence that is in line with the rank hypothesis and unaffected by the 
estimation problems causing reported in Chapter 2. Lastly, we will present yet unpublished 
data by Stewart and Reimers (2008) and will estimate the rank effects in these experiments. 
That context influences judgment has been established well before Stewart, Chater, 
and Brown proposed DbS, especially in psychophysical models dealing with perceptual 
judgments. In his adaptation level theory (ALT), Helson (1964) assumed that judgment about 
magnitudes, like the intensity of sounds or the brightness of lights, are made relative to a 
reference point–the adaptation level–which was often taken as the attributes’ average. 
Parducci (1959) tested ALT predictions for the effect of presentation order, i.e. whether the 
stimuli were presented in increasing, decreasing order or whether participants saw all stimuli 
before they started judging their magnitude by assigning them into categories. He also tested 
how the number of judgment categories influenced judgment. Parducci found that not only the 
order of judgment but also the order of presentation, biased judgment towards the first 
presented (not consistent with ALT) and the first judged (consistent with ALT). In addition, 
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the number of judgment categories also strongly affected people’s judgments. Specifically, 
Parducci found that if the number of categories was increased or the number of stimuli was 
decreased, such that there were a lot of categories relative to the number of stimuli, the effect 
of order of judgment was strongly reduced. Other experiments involved looking at effects of 
stimulus extremes, the measure of central tendency (mean, midpoint of the judgment scale, or 
median) or other effects of the distribution of stimuli (Parducci, 1963). Varying the mean had 
no substantial effect on AL. However, varying the midpoint of the stimulus extremes and the 
median independently of each other and holding the mean constant, had an impact on AL 
(Parducci et al., 1960): The stimuli around the middle of a distribution are judged to be lower 
when the midpoint between two stimulus extremes is high instead of low and when the 
median is low instead of high. Parducci’s (1963) key insight was that while adaptation level 
theory captures the finding that people evaluate magnitudes against the mean of the 
distribution from which they come, it foregoes the important property that people are also 
sensitive to the variance of the distribution of values. For example, being £10 above the mean 
seems more significant when all of the other values are within +-£5 of the mean rather than +-
£50 of the mean. Given his results, Parducci concluded that ALT had to be adjusted, because 
it does not describe what principles are actually critical for judgment. 
Parducci (1965) assumes participants’ judgments are subject to two tendencies: The 
first tendency is to divide the range into subranges, where each category of judgment is 
applied to a subrange. The second tendency is to use a category proportionately to the number 
of times one makes a judgment. Assuming these two tendencies, Parducci (1965) formulated 
range-frequency theory (RFT) to account for people’s sensitivity to the spread of magnitudes, 
which are to be evaluated, and their relative frequencies. According to RFT, judgment is a 
compromise between a stimulus’ position within the range of the contextual stimuli (the range 
principle) and the stimulus rank among the contextual stimuli (the frequency principle).  
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When Stewart, Chater and Brown (2006) proposed the decision by sampling model, 
they also referred to RFT. The process described in DbS reflects RFT’s frequency principle, 
which makes the two theories closely related. Despite arriving at the same principle, the 
models are distinct in that DbS takes its inspiration from established aspects of judgment and 
choice concerning domain-general simple cognitive tools: ordinal comparisons, sampling and 
frequency accumulation. In DbS, an attribute is evaluated through pairwise comparisons 
between a current attribute and attributes from memory, and the attributes are evaluated 
according to their rank position within this memory sample. The fact that it’s easy for people 
to establish whether one stimulus is louder, brighter, or longer than the other, but it’s hard for 
people to establish their absolute magnitude (Laming, 1997), makes the ordinal comparison 
component in DbS a plausible one. Other authors in their theories have also considered DbS’ 
sampling from memory and subsequent comparisons and their accumulation as important 
aspects. In norm theory, Kahneman and Miller (1986) proposed that the evaluation of a 
current outcome depends on alternatives that are implied by a norm. Here, norms are 
constructed on the fly, using the specific attributes available at the moment of evaluation. In 
decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), evidence is accumulated sequentially 
and the decision is made when a threshold is hit. In MINERVA-DM, hypotheses are 
supported depending on the similarity to traces from memory (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 
1999). In query theory, people make a choice according to the accumulated answers they give 
to internally proposed and ordered queries, whose order depends on the relationship of the 
decision maker to the problem at hand (Weber et al., 2007). Relativity is also an aspect of 
fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna, 2008), where people make choices using fuzzy representations, 
which could be relative. 
To demonstrate the relativity of option values, Ungemach, Stewart, and Reimers 
(2011) asked participants to choose between two gambles, just as they came out of a 
supermarket: choose Gamble A with £1.50 and a low probability or Gamble B with £0.50 and 
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a high probability. They found that if participants purchased goods in-between the amounts of 
£0.50 and £1.50 (inside-range, they preferred Gamble A. However, if participants purchased 
goods outside this range, either smaller than £0.50 or larger than £1.50 (outside-range), then 
participants’ preferred Gamble was B. This preference reversal is exactly what DbS predicted: 
Participants chose as if £1.50 was very different from £0.50 (big difference in rank), because 
many other amounts laid in-between, whereas in the latter case all prices outside this range 
made £1.50 seem very similar to £0.50 (very small difference in rank). There are several other 
experimental demonstrations of context effects in preference, where either choices sets or the 
response scale was manipulated, that all fit into a DbS account. Table 4.1 summarizes the key 
features of the experiments presented below.  
Behavioral Evidence 
 Over the course of several years, many studies have either investigated context effects 
in risky choice and judgment or context effects were a by-product of these investigations. We 
have divided the studies into three groups of behavioral studies where either the choice set 
was manipulated, studies where the response scale was manipulated, and others where the 
valuation background was manipulated. The studies’ dependent variables were choices, using 
gambles, or judgments like attractiveness ratings, buying prices or certainty equivalents. 
Within those sections, most studies looked at range effects, and only a few manipulated the 
skew of the distribution. Both these manipulations can lead to different ranks of specific 
target values, which in turn make a DbS account testable. We will present studies using 
manipulations of the background context first, move on to choice set manipulations and lastly 
present studies with response scale manipulations. 
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Table 4.1 
Key features of experiments investigating context effects in judgment and choice. 
Measure Author Manipulation of Response Mode Distribution Manipulation 
Behavioral Adaval & Monroe (2002) Background context Price rating Range 
 Beauchamp et al. (2012) Response scale Choice Skew 
 Benartzi & Thaler (2001) Response scale Choice Range 
 Birnbaum (1992) Response scale CE Skew 
 Bohm et al. (1997) Response scale Reservation price Range 
 Ert & Erev (1997) Choice set Choice Range 
 Haggag & Paci (2014) Response scale Taxi tipping Range 
 Janiszewski & (1999) Background context Price rating Range 
 Mazar et al. (2013) Response scale Reservation price Skew 
 Mellers et al. (1992) Choice set Prospect rating and buying price Skew 
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 Rigoli, Rutledge et al. (2016) Choice set Choice Range 
 Stewart et al. (2003) Response scale and choice set CE and choice Range 
 Stewart & Reimers (2008) Choice set Rating and Choice Skew and Range 
 Ungemach et al. (2011) Background context Choice Range 
 Vlaev et al. (2007) Choice set Choice Range and Skew 
 Vlaev & Seymour (2009) Choice set and response scale Price rating Range 
 Walasek & Stewart (2015) Choice set Choice Range 
Neurophysiological Holroyd et al. (2004) Outcome set Event-related brain potential Range 
 Kobayashi et al. (2010) Outcome set Single-cell recordings Range 
 Mullett & Tunney (2013) Outcome set BOLD response Range 
 Rigoli & Rutledge et al. (2016) Choice set BOLD response Range 
 Rigoli & Friston et al. (2016) Choice set BOLD response Range 
 Tremblay & Schultz (1999) Outcome set Single-cell recordings Range 
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 Yeung & Sanfey (2004) Outcome set Event-related brain potential Range 
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Background distribution manipulations. Whereas Ungemach et al. (2011) 
retrospectively checked participants’ receipts to assign participants to the inside-range or 
the outside-range context, other studies specifically manipulated the background context 
to investigate how people evaluate alternatives in comparison to current attribute values 
from memory. Janiszewski and Lichtenstein (1999) asked participants to indicate what 
price they expected to pay for a product and how attractive a specific price seemed, after 
they were exposed to a list of 10 different brands with different prices for a specific 
product. The prices ranged from $0.74–$1.49 (low-range), $0.74–$1.74 (moderate-
range), or $0.99–$1.74 (high-range). Participants judged the attractiveness of a specific 
market price as least attractive when they were previously exposed to low-range prices, 
more attractive when they were previously exposed to moderate-range prices, and most 
attractive when they were previously exposed to high-range prices. Expected price 
estimates were affected the same way: Participants expected highest prices when 
experienced prices were high-range prices, and expected lowest prices when experienced 
prices were low-range prices. Adaval and Monroe (2002) obtained analogous results 
when they asked participant to evaluate three models of a product. The products were 
either high in price ($184.75–$197.85), low in price ($127.65–134.75) or all presented 
models cost $159.65. A target product was rated to be less expensive in the context of 
high-priced products than in the context of low-priced products. This was true, even if 
people remembered that the price was higher in the high-priced products condition than 
the low-priced products condition. In addition, the prices encountered for this product 
even influenced the judgment of a different product two days later. Both these studies 
show that an option is evaluated against its alternatives. If the price of an option ranks 
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low within its context, it is perceived to be more attractive than if it ranks high within its 
context. 
Choice set manipulations. Unsurprisingly, research investigating context effects 
in valuation of risky prospects and risky choice was conducted well before DbS was 
formulated. Mellers, Ordonez, and Birnbaum (1992) investigated context and response 
mode effects by asking participants to rate the attractiveness and indicate buying prices 
(how much money somebody would pay to be able to play the gamble) of a set of simple 
binary prospects, whose expected values were either positively skewed or negatively 
skewed. The authors knew people reacted to response mode (indicating higher buying 
prices for relatively risky Gamble A than the relatively safe Gamble B, but choosing 
Gamble B over Gamble A) in a different way (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971), but did not 
know how the effects interacted with the distribution of attribute values. Mellers et al. 
found higher attractiveness ratings for a gamble in the positively skewed distribution than 
for the corresponding gamble in the negatively skewed distribution. This is consistent 
with DbS (and RFT as well), because a given gamble will have a higher rank when many 
others have a smaller EV (in the positive-skew condition) compared to when few others 
have a smaller EV (in the negative-skew condition). However, distribution basically had 
no influence on buying prices with simple gambles, but influenced buying prices in 
mixed gambles in the same way the attractiveness of prospects was influenced.  
Ert and Erev (2013) were interested in loss aversion and manipulated the gains (in 
₪=Shequels) in mixed gambles to range either from ₪4 to ₪16 (low-value range) or 
from ₪10 to ₪22 (high-value range). They found that a risky option with a 50% of 
winning ₪10 or losing ₪10 was chosen more often when participants encountered gains 
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that were lower in the mixed gamble (in the low-value context) than when ₪10 was the 
lowest encountered gain (high-value context). Other across trial context effects are 
reported recently in Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, and Dolan (2016). In a new choice task, 
using four blocks of trials, the authors asked participants to choose between a sure option 
and a risky option with a 50% zero outcome and 50% double the sure outcome. In two 
blocks, the risky option comprised gains between £1-£5 or £0, in the remaining two 
blocks, the risky option comprised gains between £2-£6 or £0. Prior to each block, 
participants were informed about the range of values. They found that some individuals 
risked more with increasing amounts, and some risked more with decreasing amounts. 
Those who risked more with increasing amounts also gambled more with choices that 
were larger within the context. And those who risked more with decreasing amounts in 
turn, gambled more with choices that were lower within the context. This means that in 
both the Ert and Erev (2013) and the Rigoli et al. (2016) studies, participants behaved as 
if the subjective value of an equivalent choice was larger in the low-value context (₪4-
₪16-context and £1-£5-context) than in the high-value context (₪10-₪22-context and 
£2-£6-context). The DbS explanation would be that a target amount has a higher rank 
position among many smaller and few higher amounts, than among many higher and no 
or few smaller amounts.  
These findings are also consistent with Vlaev, Seymour, Dolan, and Chater’s 
(2009) findings when estimating the value of pain: Participants paid more to avoid 
electric shocks in the condition where they experienced a lower-pain sequence as 
compared to a higher-pain sequence. Additionally, participants paid double the price to 
avoid identical pain intensity when the range of prices from which a sale price was to be 
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drawn was doubled. Shifting the range of stimuli to be evaluated, or manipulating the 
response scale (see more response scale manipulations below) will shift the rank position 
of target stimuli and influence the willingness to pay, respectively. If somebody 
experiences the strongest electric shock in a sequence and is asked to indicate how much 
money she would pay to avoid it, it makes sense that she is willing to pay the highest 
price. The highest price is going to be higher when the range is doubled, which will lead 
to a willingness to pay a higher price in this condition. 
Just by manipulating the range of gains and losses, Walasek and Stewart (2015) 
were able to reverse loss aversion, which is often assumed to be an individual difference 
with a corresponding neural representation (Rick, 2011). In a choice task where 
participants could always choose to accept or reject a 50% chance of gaining or losing an 
amount, they found that participants were more likely to accept an offer with an EV of 
zero if the range of losses was equal to the range of gains than if the range of losses was 
smaller than the range of gains. And more surprising, participants were more likely to 
accept offers with negative EVs if the range of losses was double the range of gains than 
if the range of losses was half the range of gains, reversing loss aversion. DbS explains 
this phenomenon based on the rank positions of attribute values: Given a choice to accept 
or reject the offer of a 50% chance of winning or losing $10, a loss of $10 if other losses 
range from $5–$40 has a lower rank than winning $10 if other gains range from $5–$20. 
According to DbS this should lead participants to accept this offer. Conversely, people 
should reject the same offer if the losses range from $5–$20 and gains range from $5–40, 
because a loss of $10 ranks higher than a gain of $10. If the amounts are not evaluated 
according to their absolute values, but according to their rank positions, a choice receives 
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a positive subjective EV if a negative low rank and a positive high rank are offered. As 
Walasek and Stewart (2015) show, this can lead to phenomena like loss aversion, but also 
to the opposite. 
Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart (2007) were interested in how valid these context 
effects were in a real world context and chose to ask participants to make choices 
concerning retirement income provisions. They manipulated the range and the skew of 
attribute values of saving or investment choices. People chose less risky savings and 
investments when offered mainly low-risk alternatives with only one high risk 
alternative, and chose mainly high-risk alternatives when offered mostly high risk 
alternatives and only one low risk alternative. 
Response scale manipulations. In his experiment Birnbaum (1992) tested 
whether asking participants to make choices instead of judgments would reduce context 
effects. He presented participants with a gamble. Underneath the gamble there was a list 
of sure amounts of money (either positively skewed or negatively skewed) in ascending 
order. Participants were asked to circle all sure amounts that they preferred over the 
gamble. Consistent with the above findings, more people selected the sure amounts to the 
gambles when the offered alternative amounts were positively skewed than when they 
were negatively skewed. If presented with a gamble of a 5% chance to win $48 and 
otherwise $0 and as an alternative a list of 25 sure gains with more amounts below $20 
than above$20, then $20 is looking more attractive than when it is presented within a list 
of few amounts below $20 and many amounts above $20. Thus, the gambles were worth 
less in the positive-skew condition than in the negative-skew condition, which is reflected 
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by people selecting a lower sure amount within a positively skewed context than within a 
negatively skewed context.  
Similarly, in Stewart, Chater, Stott, and Reimers (2003) participants rated gambles 
also by indicating certainty equivalents (CE) with one set CEs with low values and the 
other set with high values. What the authors found was that in general, participants chose 
the CEs that were in the middle and not at the high or lower end of the range, 
respectively. Note that the effects reported here as well as in Birnbaum (1992) are within 
trial effects and not across trial effects as when the set of choices is manipulated. Mazar, 
Koszegi, and Ariely (2013) elicited reservation prices using an incentive compatible 
procedure, where in some experiments participants were presented with a distribution of 
prices and in other experiments participants learned the price distribution over time 
through repeated choices. The price distributions were either positively or negatively 
skewed. When the price distributions were negatively skewed, participants were willing 
to pay more money for a certain good than if the price distributions were positively 
skewed. The DbS explanation would be that the rank position of a certain amount, for 
example $20, is higher within a price set of prices with a positive skew than within a 
price set with a negatively skew. Therefore $20 seems like more money in the positively 
skewed price set than in the negatively skewed price set, making participants willing to 
pay more money when prices are negatively skewed than when they are positively 
skewed. There is a similar experiment where reservation prices were elicited and 
participants experienced the price distribution (with either a low or high range) through 
drawings out of a bingo cage with similar results (Bohm, Linden, & Sonnegard, 1997).  
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In a choice task (with a gain or loss domain or across domains), where 
participants were asked to choose between a fixed gamble and a list of safe choices, 
where the smallest and the largest safe options were fixed but the amounts of the 
intermediate safe options varied between conditions, participants were more risk averse 
when the intermediate amounts were close to the lower end of the range, i.e., positively 
skewed than when the intermediate amounts were close to the higher end of the range, 
i.e., negatively skewed (Beauchamp, Benjamin, Chabris, and Laibson (2012).  
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) offer a real world example for similar context effects. 
They obtained data from a propriety database with retirement saving plans and different 
investment options. There was always at least one safe option and one risky option 
available, so investors could always select an option to match their true preference–if 
they had one. They found that as the proportion of risky options increased, the proportion 
of allocations to risky options increased also. In another real world scenario, Haggag and 
Paci (2014) found that when taxi drives varied default tip suggestions on their payment 
terminals to include relatively high values as opposed to relatively low values, people 
tipped more. All these results are consistent with the rank hypothesis: When participants 
encountered a positively skewed context in which they evaluated a prospect by choosing 
a certainty equivalent, indicating a buying or reservation price, or giving an attractiveness 
rating, the mean CE, buying or reservation price is smaller than when participants 
encountered a negatively skewed context. 
Neurophysiological evidence 
In addition to behavioral data, there is research using data from brain imaging on 
humans or single cell recordings from animal brains, investigating value representation, 
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which too shows context dependent activation in regions associated with value 
computation. In an experiment where participants were presented blocks of either low 
(10p, 20p, and 30p) or high amounts (£5, £7, and £10) of money, which they could win 
by pressing a button as quickly as possible, using fMRI scans, Mullett and Tunney (2013) 
found activity in the ventral striatum (VST) and the thalamus, sensitive to the relative 
value of prizes within one block: The neural response to the highest amount in the low-
values block was stronger than to the highest amount in the high-values block, despite the 
£5  having a much higher objective value than the 30p. Another interesting finding here 
was that whilst the striatum and the thalamus responses were context dependent within 
blocks, by the time participants experienced both blocks of the high and the low values, 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex responded 
with activation proportional to the rank of all experienced stimuli. Although the stimuli 
are far from uniformly distributed (10p, 20p, 30p, £5, £7, and £10), activation followed 
ranks of values, not absolute value. In addition to the behavioral evidence above, Rigoli 
et al. (2016) also collected fMRI data to examine the relationship between the behavioral 
effects and neural activation. In a within-subjects block design, they asked participants to 
choose between a sure option and a risky option. In the risky option, the chance of 
winning double the amount of the sure option was 50%, otherwise £0. In two blocks, the 
range of gains in the risky option was between £1-£5 or £0 (low-value context), or £2-£6 
or £0 (high-value context) in the remaining two blocks. They found that some 
participants did adapt to the different ranges, others did not. The ventral tegmental 
area/substantia nigra (VTA/SN) activation differences were conditional upon whether 
people were context sensitive or insensitive. Context-sensitive participants did not have a 
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higher activated VTA/SN between the high-value and low-value context, reflecting 
context adaptation and rescaling of subjective value. However, context-insensitive 
participants did have a higher activation in VTA/SN in the high-value context than the 
low value context. In a different study Rigoli, Friston, and Dolan (2016) additionally 
found that higher activation in the hippocampus at the start of a block is related to more 
context-sensitivity in the VTA/SN. Although expected value was equal for the safe and 
risky options, activation in the vmPFC indicated differences between the chosen and the 
unchosen option and at the same time VST activation pointed to non-linear mapping 
between the absolute amounts of rewards and their subjective values (Rigoli et al., 2016). 
Holroyd, Larsen, and Cohen (2004) and also Yeung and Sanfey (2004) asked participant 
to choose between two cards and learn which was associated with monetary gains and 
which was associated with losses. They manipulated the range of gains and losses and 
found that the error-related negativity (an event-related brain potential) depended on the 
position of the current outcome within the range of other possible outcomes. All these 
findings suggest internal rescaling and a relative representation of available attributes or 
outcomes in the brain.  
There is more evidence also from animal studies, where the range of outcomes 
was manipulated to either be wide or narrow. Kobayashi, Pinto de Carvalho, and Schultz 
(2010) planted electrodes into two monkeys’ orbitofrontal cortices and showed that 
neural firing adapted to different distributions of outcomes, so that the sensitivity to the 
different prizes changes dependent on the distribution. Using single cell recording in the 
macaque orbifrontal cortex, Tremblay and Schultz (1999), using separate blocks with 
food which the macaques liked and food that they did not like, found higher firing rates 
!!
99 
for an outcome that they liked in the light of an outcome that they disliked, compared to 
when the outcome they liked was paired with an outcome that they absolutely loved (see 
also Elliott, Agnew, & Deakin, 2008 and Seymour & McClure, 2008 for a comprehensive 
review on relative coding of value in the brain). 
 We have presented over 20 studies that manipulated the range of possible 
outcomes or attribute values (most behavioral studies and all the neurophysiological 
studies were of this type) and some studies that manipulated the skew of the distribution 
of outcomes and attribute values. The manipulation was either across or within trials and 
investigated its impact on judgment and choice. The results show that valuation is 
context-dependent and this sensitivity in valuation is correlated with neural firing and 
activation of reward related regions in the brain. Changing the range or the skew of 
possible outcomes can lead to shifts in the rank position of target outcomes within the 
current sample. The relativity of outcomes or attribute values can be reconciled with a 
DbS account, where attributes are evaluated according to their rank position within other 
available attributes from memory. A rank-based evaluation of attributes and alternatives 
can lead to a reversal of loss aversion, to high prices being perceived as more attractive 
than comparably lower prices, a willingness to pay more money to avoid the same 
intensity of pain, higher tipping in taxis, or even more risky choices regarding money 
allocations in retirement saving funds. 
Stewart & Reimers (2008) 
There are several yet unpublished experiments that Stewart and Reimers (2008) 
ran prior to the SRH (2015) experiments, investigating choice-set context effects, which 
yield results that are in line with the rank hypothesis. In the first series of experiments, 
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participants rated gambles, where the authors either varied the skew of the probabilities 
(SR1A) or the distribution of amounts (SR1B). They found that gambles were rated as 
more attractive if participants experienced a positively skewed distribution of either 
probabilities or amounts than if participants experienced a negatively skewed distribution 
of either probabilities or amounts. In the second series of experiments (SR2A-SR2E), the 
range of probabilities or amount or both were varied and (under certain conditions) 
participants reversed their preferences on the critical common question, depending on the 
distribution of outcomes and/or probabilities from previously answered questions. Note 
that just like in SRH (2015) the attributes and not the expected values were varied. 
Experiments SR1A and SR1B 
Method. There were 21 participants in SR1A and 32 participants in SR1B. Both 
experiments were not incentivized and participation was for course credit at the 
University of Warwick using an undergraduate subjects’ pool. Participants were 
presented with a simple gamble of the type “p chance of winning x” and rated its 
attractiveness on a scale ranging from 1 (“not attractive at all”) to 7 (“very attractive”). 
 SR1A manipulated the distribution of probabilities 1%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 
80% in the positive-skew condition and 20%, 80%, 90%, 95%, 98%, and 99% in the 
negative-skew condition. The probabilities were crossed with the amounts £200, £400, 
£600, £800, and £1,000 to create 30 different gambles for each condition. The two critical 
probabilities 20% and 80% occurred in both conditions and occupy the highest two ranks 
in the positive-skew condition whereas they represent the lowest two ranks in the 
negative-skew condition. We tested whether gambles entailing 20% or 80% in the 
positive-skew condition were ranked higher than in the negative-skew condition. 
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According to the rank hypothesis, this should be the case. 
SR1B had the exact same design, apart from manipulating amounts instead of 
probabilities. The five probabilities 5%, 20%, 50%, 80%, and 95% were constant across 
conditions and amounts £10, £20, £50, £100, £200, and £800 for the positive-skew 
condition and £200, £800, £900, £950, £980, and £990 for the negative-skew condition 
were manipulated between participants. Here, we tested whether gambles with a £200 or 
a £800 amount were rated higher in the positive-skew condition than in the negative-
skew condition. 
Participants were told that a particular gamble was to be understood as an urn 
containing 100 balls out of which one ball is drawn. They could click on a radio button to 
indicate how attractive they found the presented gamble on the current trial using a 7-
point scale. After they clicked on Next, the following gamble appeared on the screen. 
 Results. We compared mean attractiveness ratings for gambles with probabilities 
20% and 80% across the two conditions in SR1A and gambles with amounts £200 and 
£800 across the two conditions in SR1B. Figure 4.1 shows that the distribution 
participants experienced influenced the attractiveness ratings: Attractiveness ratings for 
all critical attributes were higher in the positive-skew conditions compared to the 
negative-skew conditions, MD20% = 1.83 95% 95% CI [1.41, 2.32], MD80% = 1.64 95% 
CI [1.12, 2.16], MD£200 = 1.19 95% CI [0.57, 1.81], MD£800 = 1.25 95% CI [0.61, 1.88]. 
The results support the rank hypothesis. 
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Figure 4.1. Mean attractiveness ratings with 95% confidence intervals for experiments 
SR1A and SR1B. Gambles containing the critical attributes in the positive-skew 
conditions were rated consistently higher than in the negative-skew conditions. 
Experiments SR2A to SR2E 
Method. In five experiments conducted online via Maximiles, Stewart and 
Reimers (2008) have presented participants with 20 (Experiment SR2A) or 10 trials 
(Experiments SRB to SR2E) with two gambles to choose from on each trial. The gambles 
were of the sort of (A) a 75% chance of £25 or (B) a 25% chance of £75. In each 
experiment, the authors compared the probabilities of choosing gamble A or B on the 
common questions. As in our experiments, the context (induced by different 
distributions) was set with the trials leading up to the second to last (critical) trial. 
As above, participants were told that a particular gamble was to be understood as 
an urn containing 100 balls. Two buttons with the probabilities and outcomes displayed 
on them represented the different gambles. The left and right buttons were set up to 
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contain the relatively risky versus safe gamble in a random order. Participants made a 
choice by clicking on the button after which the next gamble appeared. In contrast to the 
SR1A and SR1B, participants played for real money. Half of the trials were picked at 
random and played out. Winning 100ipoints was equivalent to winning £1. 
SR2A. In this experiment the authors presented participants with 20 questions 
with the common question being A: a 75% chance of 25 ipoints or B: a 25% chance of 75 
ipoints (N=98). In Probabilities-Together-Amounts-Apart 75% and 25% were made to 
look similar by adding 5%, 15%, 85% and 95%. 75% being the third highest and 25% the 
fourth highest probability. In the same condition 25 ipoints, 35 ipoints, 45 ipoints, 55 
ipoints, 65 ipoints, and 75 ipoints were used to make 25 ipoints and 75 ipoints look 
different in rank (lowest versus highest). According to the rank hypothesis, people should 
prefer gamble B, because combined with similarly ranked probabilities only amounts 
should matter. Because 25 ipoints is very different to 75 ipoints in rank, gamble A should 
appear inferior. In Probabilities-Apart-Amounts-Together, however, probabilities were 
25%, 35%, 45%, 55%, 65%, and 75%, making 25% more different in terms of their rank 
position than 75%. The presented amounts were 5 ipoints, 15 ipoints, 25 ipoints, 75 
ipoints, 85 ipoints, and 95 ipoints, making 25 ipoints and 75 ipoints appear very similar to 
each other. In this condition participants should have a preference for the relatively safe 
gamble 75% of £25. 
SR2B.  The design in SR2B was identical to SR2A apart from presenting 
participants with different distributions of amounts and probabilities (N=100). The goal 
was to avoid suspected strong preferences for one gamble independently of the 
experiment. All amounts and probabilities are presented in Table 4.2. The common 
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question was between gamble A: a 30% chance of 100 ipoints and gamble B: a 40% 
chance of 75 ipoints. Analogous to SR2A, Probabilities-Together-Amounts-Apart should 
induce more choices in favour of gamble A, the relatively risky gamble. Probabilities-
Apart-Amounts-Together should produce more choices in favour of gamble A, the 
relatively safe gamble. 
SR2C. The experimental set-up was exactly the same apart from holding the 
probability distribution constant with varying amount distributions between conditions 
(N=399). The critical common choice was between gamble A 30% chance of 100 ipoints 
and B: a 40% chance of 75 ipoints. Amounts-Apart should boost choices for gamble A. 
Amounts-Together should boost choices for gamble B. 
SR2D. SR2D is identical in design and common question to SR2C and SR2B 
(N=200). This time all amounts were kept constant. The probability distributions were 
varied so that Probability-Together should make gamble A, the risky gamble more 
appealing. Probabilities-Apart should make the relatively safe gamble B more appealing. 
SR2E. The design was identical to SR2C except that gambles were losses 
(N=174). The common trial was choosing between A: 30% chance of losing 100 ipoints 
and B: a 40% chance of losing 75 ipoints. The hypothesis follows the same logic, but 
because the experiment entails losses, Amounts-Together should boost gamble A, the 
relatively risky gamble. Amounts-Apart, on the other hand, should boost the relatively 
risky gamble B. 
Results. Because we had data of multiple experiments we decided to run a 
random-effects meta-analysis using the metafor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010) and to 
estimate the effect size of the context effect. We chose to include all experiments ran by 
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Stewart and Reimers, although they varied in terms of the domain and the manipulated 
attributes. This allowed us to obtain the most conservative estimate of the distribution 
effect size in choice using this type of experimental set-up. 
We used odds ratios of the probability of choosing safe divided by the probability 
of choosing risky. We left out any possible moderating variables, because we did not 
have enough experiments to use.  Figure 4.2 shows the odds ratios for each of the five 
studies conducted and their 95% confidence intervals. The overall OR is 1.59, 95% CI 
[1.22, 2.06], which indicates that participants were 1.59 times more likely to choose the 
relatively safe option, when they are in the safe favoring condition as opposed to the risk 
favoring condition. 
Table 4.2 
Experimental set-up in all five SR2 experiments. 
Experiment Trials Manipulation Amounts Probabilities in % 
SR2A (Gains) 20 Amounts and 
Probabilities 
25,35,45,55,65,75 
5,15,25,75,85,95 
5,15,25,75,85,95 
25,35,45,55,65,75 
SR2B (Gains) 10 Amounts and 
Probabilities 
75,80,85,90,95,100 
25,50,75,100,125, 
150 
10,20,30,40,50,60 
30,32,34,36,38,40 
SR2C (Gains) 10 Amounts only 75,80,85,90,95,100 
25,50,75,100,125, 
150 
10,20,30,40,50,60 
10,20,30,40,50,60 
SR2D (Gains) 10 Probabilities 
only 
25,50,75,100,125, 
150 
25,50,75,100,125, 
150 
10,20,30,40,50,60 
 
30,32,34,36,38,40 
SR2E (Losses) 10 Amounts only 75,80,85,90,95,100 
25,50,75,100,125, 
150 
10,20,30,40,50,60 
10,20,30,40,50,60 
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Figure 4.2. Odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals for experiments SR2A to SR2E 
and the estimated overall effect size (blue diamond with width representing the 95% Cis). 
Experiment features described in Table 2.2. 
The meta-analysis suggests that people’s preferences can be reversed by changing 
the distribution of attribute values. When the presented amounts appeared close to each 
other in rank, participants tended to choose the safe option more often. When amounts 
appeared different in rank, on the other hand, more participants chose the risky option. 
This result also supports the rank hypothesis. 
Conclusion 
Although in Chapter 2, we cast doubt on the true origin of the context effect 
observed (when participants learn about distributions by sequentially choosing between 
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two gambles), the experiments presented here show that the observed context effects are 
not just revealed through differences in the utility functions (which we now know are 
partially caused through using the wrong model to fit the data), but also show through 
differences in attractiveness judgments and choice proportions. 
Just as in Chapter 2 or Stewart, Reimers, and Harris (2015), by manipulating the 
skew of probabilities and amounts in experiments SR1A and SR1B, Stewart and Reimers 
(2008) demonstrate that attractiveness ratings are lower for gambles with attribute values 
that are negatively skewed than for attribute values that are positively skewed. 
Correspondingly, in experiments SR2A to SR2E choices were more risk averse when 
attribute values were close in rank, whereas they were more risk seeking when attribute 
values were different in rank. Thus, given these results we can still conclude that 
valuation and choice are, or at least appear to be rank dependent. 
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5 Affective evaluation of monetary outcomes is unaffected by rank 
position 
Kassam, Morewedge, Gilbert, and Wilson (2011) asked participants to evaluate outcomes 
in the light of forgone outcomes and presented an intriguing result: Participants are only 
sensitive to the absolute amount they win when the prize is the lower of two possible 
prizes, not the higher. This suggests an asymmetry in the way people evaluate gains. For 
us, that is particularly interesting, because Kassam et al. hypothesized that this 
asymmetry depends on working memory and strongly implicates a sampling-and-
comparison process much like the one proposed in decision by sampling (Stewart, 
Chater, & Brown, 2006). In this chapter, we present a replication of Kassam et al.'s basic 
results, and a reanalysis of their original data. We then present further experiments that 
test a possible decision-by-sampling-like account of the mechanism underlying their 
effect. We find a clear cut null result–a null effect of the distribution of attribute values–
which we think is an interesting boundary condition for the effects reviewed in the 
Chapter 4. 
Kassam, Morewedge, Gilbert, and Wilson's (2011) experiments 
Kassam et al. (2011) presented participants with a card upon which were two latex 
panels. Each panel covered a sum of money. The participant was asked to scratch one of 
the two panels, whichever they liked, to reveal their prize. Then they were asked to 
scratch off the remaining panel to reveal the alternative now forgone prize–the prize they 
would have won had they only made a different initial choice of which panel to scratch 
off. After they scratched off both latex panels, participants were asked to report how 
happy, regretful and disappointed they were about the amount that they had won, on a 
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scale from one (labeled not at all) to seven (labeled extremely). These three responses 
were combined into one positive affect index.  
 Each participant was handed one of three possible types of cards: Cards had either 
$1 and $3 prizes, $3 and $5 prizes, or $5 and $7 prizes. The authors hypothesized that if 
people won the higher of the two prizes (winners) their positive affect ratings would be 
independent of the absolute prize value. They suggested that the reason for this is that 
people stop the comparison process after a satisfactory comparison. People would 
therefore stop after the first and most salient comparison (to the alternative prize, which 
is lower), which will be satisfactory. For example, if people won $5 but could have won 
$3, if they had only scratched the other panel first, people make an initial comparison 
between $5 and $3. This comparison is favorable, so they no longer make further 
comparisons. From this follows an insensitivity to the absolute prize value for winners. 
Whichever card people are given, if they scratch to reveal the higher amount, the higher 
amount will win one comparison (to the lower, forgone amount). If affective evaluation is 
based on comparisons as Kassam et al. argue, then, because there is no difference in the 
comparisons, there will be no difference in the affective valuations.   
 Kassam et al. had a different hypothesis for people who scratch off the lower of 
the two prizes first. These participants were hypothesized to be sensitive to the absolute 
prize value. This is because people’s most salient comparison (again the alternative prize, 
which is higher) would not be satisfactory. This unsatisfactory comparison will lead 
participants to invest cognitive resources to try and find a more satisfactory comparison 
value. For example, if people won $5 but could have won $7, if they had only scratched 
the other panel first, their first most salient comparison between the $5 prize and the 
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forgone $7 prize will make them unhappy. They would therefore make comparisons with 
other values that come to mind. It is this stage that makes participants sensitive to the 
absolute value of their prize. The higher their prize, the more likely it is that it will be 
compared favorably against the other values that come to mind. Comparing their prize to 
any stable set of values from outside the experiment, for example, should generate 
positive affect ratings that increase with the absolute value of the prize.  
Figure 5.1 plots this interaction effect from Kassam et al.'s Experiment 1. 
Following Kassam et al. we label conditions with the prize won first and then the forgone 
prize in brackets. So "$1 ($3)" means a prize of $1 was revealed first, followed by a 
second and thus forgone prize of $3. Winning the higher of the two prizes (winners) 
resulted in the same and high positive affect ratings for $3, $5 and $7 prizes (left panel). 
Winning the lower of the two prizes (losers) resulted in lower positive affect ratings for 
$1, than for $3 than for $5 prizes. In addition, and unsurprisingly, participants reported an 
overall higher positive affect when they won the higher of the two amounts compared to 
when they won the lower of the two amounts.  
Kassam et al.'s Experiment 2 hints at their proposed mechanism of why and how 
this interaction effect emerges. Following their hypothesis, it should be cognitively costly 
to engage in further comparison processes after the initial, most salient comparison with 
the foregone prize is unsatisfactory. This is because, when participants lose, they must 
recall or form some further expectation (or distribution of expectations) against which to 
evaluate their low prize. To test this hypothesis, Kassam et al. conducted a study where 
they invited participants in the laboratory and asked them, over multiple trials, to 
complete a computerized version of the scratch card game. Each participant saw some 
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filler trials and four critical trials. During the critical trials, participants either had to 
remember a two-digit number (Low Load) or an eight-digit number (High Load). These 
trials were rigged so that no matter what box the participants clicked on, they would end 
up getting the lower of the two amounts (either $3 instead of $5 or $5 instead of $7). If 
participants were really engaged in an effortful comparison process when they received 
the lower of the two amounts, imposing a low cognitive load should not impair the 
comparison process. Thus, under low load participants should remain sensitive to the 
absolute value of their prize. On the other hand, when participants were under a high 
cognitive load, they should not be able to engage in the additional comparison process. 
Thus, in the high load condition, the sensitivity to the absolute value of the prize should 
disappear. 
 
Figure 5.1. Redrawn mean ratings to different prizes with 95% confidence intervals from 
Kassam et al.’s Experiment 1.  
Kassam et al. found a Load-by-Prize interaction with participants being sensitive 
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to the absolute value of the prize in the low load condition but not the high load condition 
(Figure 5.2). This experiment replicates Experiment 1’s sensitivity to prize within 
subjects in the low load condition. In the high load condition, in contrast, participants’ 
affect ratings were independent of the absolute prize value. Kassam et al. concluded (a) 
that people’s affective valuations of outcomes do not depend only on the received 
outcomes themselves, but also on whether the (salient) alternative was higher or lower, 
i.e. on people’s relative status and (b) that the cognitive load manipulation might point to 
effortful comparisons as one important process involved in the affective valuation of 
outcomes. 
This last result is intriguing; Whilst in Chapter 3 we have unsuccessfully 
attempted to show working memory capacity as a key factor in the decision making 
process, Kassam et al. appear to have shown that there has to be a link: Finding that the 
sensitivity to the absolute size of the prize disappears with high cognitive load, implies 
working memory is an important part of the mechanism for valuation–at least when 
participants are engaged in the further evaluation of their prize, prompted by receiving 
the smaller of the two prizes. This finding is what led to us further exploring working 
memory load in the experiments below. We return to this issue when we introduce our 
experiments. First, however, we review the broader literature for differences in 
processing of good outcomes (e.g., winning the higher of two prizes) and bad outcomes 
(e.g., winning the lower of two prizes). 
Differential processing of positive and negative outcomes 
In the early days of the judgment and decision making literature, Galanter and 
Pliner (1974) reported that a decrement results in a disutility exponent that is larger than 
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the utility exponent for an equal increment. Following that, a core idea in prospect theory 
is loss aversion–that losses loom larger than gains–which manifests itself a steeper value 
function in the loss domain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
 
Figure 5.2. Redrawn mean ratings to prizes with 95% confidence intervals in critical 
trials from Kassam et al.’s Experiment 2. We have presented the y-axis to cover the full 
1-9 range. It demonstrates the effect of cognitive load on the sensitivity to the absolute 
amount of the prize. 
There are many demonstrations of negativity having a greater impact on 
valuation, especially regarding attitude, social interaction and impression formation 
(Baumeister, Bratslasky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Lewick, Czapinsi, & Peeters, 1992; 
Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). Rozin and Royzman (2001) identified many additional 
domains where negativity bias manifests itself and offered several theories–generally 
based on the adaptation principle–to account for the vast occurrence of negativity bias 
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and the positive-negative asymmetry. 
In a recent paper, Sakaguchi and Stewart (2016) analyzed tweets with negative 
and positive connotations, and found that negative tweets were more likely to include 
words that imply causal thinking. Causal thinking requires engagement with a negative 
event. This finding is in line with research in social cognition showing that people reason 
the most when they experience negative events. One reason why this could be the case is 
that reasoning could serve as mechanism to control negative feelings (Abele, 1985). 
Another way to regulate negative feelings and behavior could be to make satisfying 
comparisons (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and LaPrelle (1985) for 
example observed that participants who were led to believe that they performed poorly on 
a bogus test (a negative event) were more likely look for information about the 
performance of other participants when they expected other participants to have 
performed poorly. Kassam et al. (2011) hypothesized that dealing with negative 
outcomes is more likely to lead to an effortful search for satisfying comparisons than it is 
when dealing with positive outcomes and they presented data in line with this hypothesis.  
What Kassam et al.’s studies also show is that equally high prizes can be 
perceived as positive or negative events in the light of a foregone alternative. The salient 
alternative can make a prize seem rather bad, if the alternative is larger, or rather good, if 
the alternative is smaller, which the authors showed led to different evaluations and 
possibly also processing of the exact same outcome. The fact that salient alternatives 
matter, and impact valuation, is also in line with decision affect theory (Mellers, 
Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) and regret theory (Loomes & Sudgen, 1992). In both of 
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these theories, the psychological value of an alternative is based, in part, on the 
comparison with the alternatives under other states of the world.  
These counterfactual comparisons offer a possible resolution of the Easterlin 
paradox: at the level of nations, despite increasing income, wellbeing has not increased. 
Clark, Frijters, Shields (2008) used social comparison and habituation to explain the 
Easterlin paradox: An increase of everybody’s income in the same time frame, does not 
lead to an increase in individual happiness, if people compared their income with the 
income of their peers. Increases in your own income do not make you happy when 
everyone else’s income increases at the same time (see also Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 
2010).  
The role of salient comparisons and the question about which alternatives matter 
was also posed by Medvec, Madey and Gilovich (1995) in a study where they 
investigated emotional responses of Olympic medallists. Their results suggested that 
bronze medallists tended to look happier than silver medallists did. Their explanation for 
this effect was that all medallists think of what might have happened, and compare their 
current state to these could-be scenarios: silver medallists might have won gold, whereas 
bronze medallists might have not won a medal at all. The different standards of 
comparisons of silver and bronze medallists would cause bronze medallists to be happier 
than silver medallists. Research by Larsen, McGraw, Mellers and Cacioppo (2004) 
supports this explanation: When they asked participants to rate a win that could have 
been better on a positive and a negative affect scale, they found that participants 
experienced both, positive and negative emotions simultaneously. This is perhaps due to 
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making satisfying and dissatisfying comparisons at the same time. The current state 
might determine which comparisons dominate. 
Reanalysis of Kassam et al.’s Experiment 2: Winners too love money 
Kassam et al. kindly provided us with the raw data from their Experiment 2. We 
have exactly replicated their analysis of the responses to the four critical trials, as 
described above. In addition to replicating the analysis Kassam et al. report in their paper, 
we also report an additional analysis here; an analysis to the responses to these filler 
trials. While participants made affective ratings in all critical trials, they only made 
ratings in two of the seven filler trials. We used those for our analysis. In one trial 
participants always won $5 instead of $1. In the other trial participants always won $3 
instead of $1. Recall that Kassam et al. only compared trials with a gap of $2 between 
prize and alternative. We however, calculated the difference in positive affect to winning 
$5 rather than $1 when the alternative prize was $3. Whilst Kassam et al. found that 
participants were equally happy when winning $5 instead of $3 as they were when 
winning $3 instead of $1, suggesting that positive affect does not increase with the 
absolute prize, we found that positive affect does increase when the difference between 
the prize and the alternative amounts increases, Mean difference (MD) =1.71 95% CI 
[1.27, 2.16] (see Figure 5.3). Thus given their data, we might slightly modify Kassam et 
al.'s claim: Winners do not just care about winning–they also care by how much they win.  
Experiment 1 
 Because of the importance of Kassam et al.'s effect for the series of experiments 
that we planned, we began by collecting new data in an attempt to replicate their 
Experiment 1. Recall that in this experiment Kassam et al. found that participants’ 
!!
117 
positive affect was sensitive to absolute amount only when the alternative was higher, but 
insensitive to absolute amount when the alternative was lower (given that the gap 
between the prize and alternative was equal).  
 
Figure 5.3. Means and 95% confidence intervals of positive affect for two filler trials of 
Kassam et al.’s Experiment 2. The difference between the prize and its alternative clearly 
matters for the valuation of the prize. 
Method  
 Participants and Design. 432 participants located in the USA were recruited using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. The departmental ethics committee approved this and all 
subsequent studies and all participants gave informed consent to take part by proceeding 
from the introduction to the main part of the experiment. To replicate the amount 
sensitivity experiment, we used a 3($1 and $3, $3 and $5 or $5 and $7)-x-2(winning the 
lower vs. winning the higher amount)-between-subjects design, in which we a) varied the 
amounts revealed to the participants when they clicked on the card and b) whether the 
prize value was lower (loser) or higher (winner) than the alternative amount. Participants 
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received a participation fee and the prizes were hypothetical sums of money. 
 Procedure. In a slight variation of Kassam et al.’s original task, we had participants 
click on one of two cards on a computer screen, rather than scratching one of two latex 
panels on a single card. Participants went through 1 trial of choosing cards and answering 
three questions. They were asked to choose one out of two cards, which hid an amount 
that was revealed by clicking on the card. After the amount was revealed and it said “You 
win $x”, participants were asked to click on the remaining card and find out what the 
alternative amount was. When they clicked the other card, it said: “You could have won 
$y”. For the winners, the first revealed amount was always higher than the alternative, for 
losers the first revealed amount was always lower than the alternative. After they have 
seen what is hidden under both cards, their prize and the foregone alternative, we asked 
them to indicate on a scale from one (not at all) to seven (extremely) how happy, 
regretful (reverse coded) and disappointed (reverse coded) they felt after having won the 
prize money. As in the original experiment we aggregated the three measures to one 
positive affect index. 
Results 
 Out of 432 participants we deleted 33 participants because of duplicate IP 
addresses. We calculated means and confidence intervals of the positive affect index to 
compare the groups within and between factors. We replicated the results of Kassam et 
al.’s Experiment 1. As Figure 5.4 shows, when participants win the lower of the two 
prizes (in conditions $1($3), $3($5) and $5($7)), on a scale from one to seven, their 
positive affect is highest when they win $5, lower when they win $3, MD$3-$5=0.34 
95%CI [-0.14, 0.83] and lowest when they win $1, MD$1-$3=0.66 95% CI [0.17, 1.16] and 
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MD$1-$5=1.00 95% CI [0.51, 1.50].  
 However, when participants win the higher of the two amounts (in conditions 
$3($1), $5($3), and $7($5)), they report being equally happy no matter what the absolute 
prize money was, with overlapping confidence intervals, MD$7-$5 = 0.09 95% CI [-0.18, 
0.37], MD$5-$3=0.02 95% CI [-0.25, 0.31], MD$7-$3=0.06 95% CI [-0.21, 0.34]. Compared 
to Kassam et al.’s Experiment 1, in our study participants reported higher positive affect 
in the winner conditions ($3($1), $5($3), and $7($5)) and lower positive affect in the 
loser conditions $1($3), $3($5), and $5($7)). The here relevant relative status by prize 
money interaction effect however, replicated perfectly. 
 
Figure 5.4. Means and 95% confidence intervals of positive affect after learning about 
the prize money and its alternative separately for winners and losers in Experiment 1. The 
same color and shape indicates equal prize money. 
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Testing(a(decision(by(sampling(account(of(the(Kassam(et(al.(effect 
Here we describe a possible decision-by-sampling account of the mechanism by 
which the losers show sensitivity to the absolute value of their prize. We only focused on 
losers, because this is where the DbS account fits in well with Kassam et al.’s explanation 
of their effect. Given that we find that Kassam et al.’s winners also seem to be sensitive 
to the alternative prize value, this does suggest that a similar hypothesis could be drawn 
for winners and losers alike.  
Decision by sampling assumes that values are constructed during a series of 
binary, ordinal comparisons between the target value and the other values in working 
memory. These other values are assumed to be both the values present in the immediate 
context, such as the forgone alternative value behind the other panel in these experiments 
here, and other values recalled from long-term memory, such as expectations about other 
possible prizes or memories of other sums of money, which will be taken into account if 
they are diagnostic (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995). What follows from this binary, 
ordinal comparison process is that if values are constructed by counting up favorable 
comparisons, values of attributes will be based on the rank position of the target value 
within the current sample of values in working memory. That is, the number of favorable 
comparisons will be proportional to the number of values in the sample smaller than the 
target value. We call this the rank hypothesis. Because sampling values from long-term 
memory is cognitively costly (Morewedge, Gilbert, Myrseth, Kassam, & Wilson, 2010), 
a working memory load would disrupt the comparison process between the current prize 
and other prizes from memory (but not to the salient forgone prize). 
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There is evidence to support the rank hypothesis of judgment in many different 
fields. We know that wage satisfaction is rank-dependent, and that general life 
satisfaction can be predicted by the rank position of somebody’s income within a 
comparison sample and that job satisfaction depends on the relative rank of one’s income 
among incomes of one’s colleagues (Boyce, Brown & Moore, 2010; Brown, Gardner, 
Oswald & Qian, 2008; Card, Mas, Moretti & Saez, 2011). We also know that judgments 
of symptom severity of people with depression, pain ratings, and gratitude all depend on 
and can be predicted by relative rank (Melrose, Brown & Wood, 2013; Watkins, Wood, 
Lloyd & Brown, 2013; Wood, Brown & Maltby, 2011). Aldrovandi, Wood, and Brown 
(2013) even showed that judged crime severity and the according punishment is not 
affected by the actual crime severity itself, but where it is believed to lie within a social 
comparison.  
 Could it be that the sensitivity to the absolute value of the prize for losers found 
by Kassam et al. is not actually revealing the sensitivity to the absolute amount per se, but 
instead is the result of extending a decision-by-sampling comparison process beyond the 
forgone prize to a larger sample of values from memory? This wider sample would 
provide a stable background against which a relative comparison process could operate to 
produce what looks like sensitivity to absolute value. In this account, the process by 
which winners rate their happiness higher than losers (and higher the bigger the 
difference between their prize and the alternative), would be the same process by which 
losers’ happiness ratings are sensitive to the prize. For winners, comparisons are made to 
the lower forgone amount, but for losers, comparisons could be even more expanded, to 
all other possible amounts from outside the current pair of outcomes. 
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The aim of the following experiments is to test this possibility. We manipulated 
the history of prizes participants experienced in a between-subjects design. Thus, when 
the participants encountered a critical losing trial, they will have recently encountered 
different distributions of prizes. If the decision-by-sampling account is right, then we 
should be able to see differences in the affect ratings on the losing trials across the 
different distributions of prizes participants have encountered on earlier trials. This would 
be evidence that it is the relative rank and not the absolute value of an amount that is 
predictive of positive affect. Specifically, by making people experience several different 
outcome values before the last critical outcome, we can test whether positive affect, after 
winning a prize is higher when its rank is high within its sample than if it is low within its 
sample.  
In contrast to our findings in Chapter 3, Kassam et al. provided evidence that 
working memory load lead to within-participant changes in valuation. This is why we 
made a second attempt at investigating this factor by adapting Kassam et al.’s design. We 
followed the procedure of their Experiment 2 and although their effect size for cognitive 
load was small, we also manipulated working memory load to investigate how it can play 
into the valuation process. If the decision-by-sampling account is correct in the 
assumption that working memory is required for the series of binary, ordinal comparisons 
from which value is constructed, we should see working memory load eliminate or at 
least reduce the effect of the different distributions of prizes. By inducing cognitive load, 
attribute values from previous trials would be either pushed out of participants’ working 
memory and/or the comparison process would be impaired. Such an elimination would be 
evidence that working memory is an important prerequisite for the comparison and 
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accumulation process. 
Experiment 2 
 The next three experiments all build on the fact that participants’ positive affect 
differs between prize moneys when they win the smaller of two possible prizes and that 
salient comparisons influence judgment. The next three experiments test two hypotheses 
at the same time: First, given that people were sensitive to the absolute amount of the 
smaller prize, are they also sensitive to the distribution of other foregone prizes and 
amounts encountered throughout the experiment? Specifically, we are interested in 
whether the rank hypothesis, which tests whether positive affect depends on the rank 
position of a prize within other prizes on offer holds when evaluating outcomes. To test 
this, we manipulated the distributions of prizes before the critical trial: In one between-
subjects condition, the prize won on the critical trial would be the lowest seen so far and 
the prize forgone on the critical trial would be the highest seen so far (Fillers-Inside). In 
this case, we expect the prize won to be perceived as much lower than the forgone prize 
and thus receive a very low rating. In the other between-subjects condition we 
manipulated the distribution of prizes such that there were prizes smaller than the prize 
won on the critical trial and that there were prizes higher than the foregone prize. Now 
the critical-trial prizes will fall right in the middle of the distribution of prizes from 
earlier trials, with the fillers either lower or higher (Fillers-Outside). In this case, we 
expect the prize won to be perceived as quite similar to the forgone prize and thus receive 
a higher rating than in the other condition (see Figure 5.5). 
 The second hypothesis we are testing is, as Kassam et al.’s propose, that prize 
sensitivity arises from the comparisons that people make. If it is true that people are 
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sensitive to the distribution of prize values and thus winning the prize in Fillers-Inside 
receives a lower rating than winning the same prize in Fillers-Outside, then, according to 
Kassam et al.’s hypothesis, sensitivity should be reduced by high cognitive load. As in 
Kassam et al., we will compare sensitivity to the distribution between low and high 
cognitive load ratings. DbS assumes that working memory plays an important role for 
evaluation as it implies and allows the sampling from memory and pairwise comparison 
process. By manipulating cognitive load, we test the role of working memory in the 
process leading up to rank effects in judgment. If we found the rank hypothesis 
confirmed and also found that it is removed or reduced by high cognitive load, this would 
suggest comparisons with a reference sample from memory (as proposed by DbS).
 
Figure 5.5. Example distribution of prizes in Experiment 2A. $3 and $8 are the prizes on 
offer on the critical trial.  
Experiment 2A 
 Method. 430 participants took part in this online experiment that we ran via 
MTurk, same as all other experiments. During 15 trials of the same type as in Experiment 
1 we varied the distribution of amounts participants experienced. The critical 15th trial 
was fixed to be “You win $3” and “You could have won $8.” In one manipulation, we 
chose the filler amounts for the first fourteen trials to make the $3 and $8 seem similar. 
Specifically, participants experienced the distribution Fillers-Outside with prizes $1, $2, 
Fillers-Outside 
Fillers-Inside 
$1 
$4 
$2 
$3 
$3 $8 $9 $10 
$6 $7 $8 $5 
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$3, $8, $9, $10 where $3 and $8 have similar rank positions, rank 3 and 4. In the Fillers-
Inside manipulation the distribution entailed prizes $3, $4, $5, 6$, $7, $8, where $3 and 
$8 have very different rank positions, rank 1 and 6. Crossing all amounts resulted in 15 
trials per condition, of which the first 14 served as fillers, making $3 and $8 appear 
similar (Fillers-Outside) or different (Fillers-Inside).  Additionally, we varied cognitive 
load randomly throughout the first 14 trials. For the last trial, we set cognitive load per 
condition: before the trial started, either an 8-letter string (High Load) or 2-letter string 
appeared on the screen and had to be memorized during the valuation task. After that 
participants were asked to recall the string. This experimental set-up resulted in a 2 
(Fillers-Inside vs. Fillers-Outside) x 2 (Low Load vs. High Load on the last trial) design. 
We were interested whether in the last –the critical–trial, participants reported a lower 
positive affect in Fillers-Inside than in Fillers-Outside and whether these differences were 
moderated by cognitive load. To avoid ceiling effects, the scale was adapted to reach 
from one to nine, as in Kassam et al.'s Experiment 2.  
 Results. After removing participants with duplicated IP addresses, as we planned in 
advance, 402 participants remained for the analysis. We first checked whether 
memorizing eight instead of two letters was indeed more challenging by checking the 
accuracy rates between conditions. Participants in the low load conditions were better at 
memorizing the letters than did participants in the high load conditions, MD = .32 95% 
CI [.24, .41]. 
 As Figure 5.6A shows, participants’ positive affect was neither sensitive to 
cognitive load, nor to the distribution of amounts experienced before the critical trial, 
MDLow= 0.06 95% CI [-0.52, 0.63] and MDHigh= -0.15 95% CI [-0.77, 0.46]. We find, at 
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most, a small effect of the distribution of prizes experienced across both the high load and 
the low load conditions, MDOverall= -0.04 95% CI [-0.46, 0.37], while Kassam et al. and 
we found a 1-point difference on a 1-7 scale between losers receiving $1 and losers 
receiving $5. Our best estimates of the effect the distribution of amounts is about 0.1 of a 
point on a 9-point scale, with CIs indicating it is unlikely that the effect of distribution is 
larger than 0.5 of a point.  
 We realized that having all prizes as single digit numbers strongly suggests that 
they are drawn from a uniform distribution of single digit $1-$9 (or maybe $1-$10) 
prizes, and this prior could overshadow the more subtle experimental manipulation. In 
Experiments 2B and 2C, we used different distributions of two digit numbers, sometimes 
across the whole range, and in some comparisons only small two digit numbers to avoid 
activating only numbers across the whole range (all two digit numbers). We think this 
will help avoid participants having a strong prior expectation of a uniform distribution, 
which may be responsible for the zero or very small effect in Experiment 2A.  
Experiment 2B 
 Method. 624 participants took part in Experiment 2B. The experimental set-up was 
exactly the same as in Experiment 2A. Here we used three distributions of amounts. 
Amounts $13, $29, $46, $65, $81, and $96 were used for Fillers-Outside and $46, $49, 
$53, $58, $61, and $65 for Fillers-Inside. These two distributions share the prizes $46 and 
$65 and serve as critical test between these conditions. We added the condition Fillers-
Inside-Small with amounts $13, $16, $19, $22, $26, and $29 to compare with Fillers-
Outside using the “You win $13” and “You could have won $29” as the critical trial. This 
will serve as an additional test of whether the distribution manipulation worked by using 
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prizes that are at the lower end in Fillers-Outside. 
 In contrast to Experiment 2A, the gaps between all prizes were fairly equally 
spaced within one condition. The critical trials for the comparison between Fillers-
Outside and Fillers-Inside were the 15th trials, “You win $46” and “You could have won 
$65”. The critical trials for the second comparison, which also serves as a manipulation 
check, was the 15th trial in Fillers-Inside-Small, “You win $13” and “You could have 
won $29” and whichever trial was the one where participants won $13, with forgone $29 
in Fillers-Outside. This critical trial is never the last one, but randomly appeared 
throughout the course of the experiment in Fillers-Outside. Everything else remained the 
same as in Experiment 2A. 
 Results. After removing participants with duplicated IP addresses, 587 participants 
remained for the analysis. We again checked whether participants in the low load 
condition were more accurate in the memorization task: Similar as above, participants in 
the low load conditions were better at memorizing the letters than did participants in the 
high load conditions, MD= .29 95% CI [.22, .36]. 
 As Figure 5.6B shows, participants’ positive affect was neither sensitive to 
cognitive load, nor to the distribution of amounts experienced before the critical trial, 
MDLow= 0.46 95% CI [-0.14, 1.05] and MDHigh= 0.24 95% CI [-0.35, 0.84]. 
 The second comparison however, does show an effect of distribution: Under low 
and high cognitive load participants report a higher positive affect in Fillers-Outside than 
in Fillers-Inside-Small, MDLow=0.70 95% CI [0.01, 1.39], MDHigh=1.28 95% CI [0.61, 
1.95] (See Figure 5.6B–$13($29)). Although high cognitive load even seems to increase 
distribution sensitivity, there is no interaction effect, MDLoad*Distribution=0.58 95% CI [-
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2.98, 4.14]. This is the first time across our experiments in this chapter where we find an 
effect of the distribution of prizes from earlier trials. 
 To test whether this effect was real, we needed to replicate it. We also wanted to 
consider cognitive load. Maybe the effect of distribution so far was attenuated by 
inducing cognitive load on all trials leading up to the critical trial. It is possible that 
because participants experienced some amount of cognitive load on every trial, the 
different distributions could not be properly encoded. Thus, we might expect that 
choosing prizes without needing to memorize letters on earlier trials might give a 
stronger effect of those prizes during the last, critical trial. 
Experiment 2C 
 Method. 421 participants took part in the last experiment. We copied the 
distribution of the fillers-outside and the fillers-inside conditions. In this experiment all 
but the third and the last trial were without cognitive load. The reason why we included 
load on the third trial was so participants already knew what it would look like and were 
prepared for the procedure when they arrived at the critical trial. In comparison to 
Experiment 2B, we additionally dropped the third condition pair and so had two 
distributions crossed with two load conditions just as in Experiment 2A. Everything else 
remained the same. 
 Results. We removed participants with duplicated IP addresses, so that 400 
participants remained for the analysis. As before, but with a higher accuracy overall–
probably due to only including two instead of all 15 trials with cognitive load–
participants in the low load conditions were more accurate in the memorization task than 
participants in the high load conditions were, MD= .23 95% CI [.16, 30]. 
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 As Figure 5.6C shows, and in line with all but one of our experiments, participants’ 
positive affects were very similar across conditions (MDLow= 0.06 95% CI [-0.53, 0.65] 
and MDHigh=0.20 95% CI [-0.35, 0.76]). In contrast to Experiment 2B–$13($29), the rank 
of the alternative prize did not impact people’s positive affect ratings. 
 To summarize so far, the ratings in the low-load-outside conditions were 
hypothesized to be higher than those in the low-load-inside conditions, because the 
alternative prize in the fillers-inside conditions created a larger difference in rank position 
between the won and forgone prizes. The effect of distribution was only found in 2B–
$13($29), but did not replicate. The difference was hypothesized to be attenuated by 
cognitive load, but given we see no effect of the distribution of earlier prizes, we cannot 
expect it to be attenuated by cognitive load and indeed we did not see this.  
Meta-analysis 
 We have conducted three experiments, with four comparisons for both low and 
high cognitive load conditions. Our pattern is fairly consistent across experiments with 
the exception in Experiment 2B–$13($29). To be able to estimate the overall effect size 
for the manipulation of the distributions from our four comparisons and to compare the 
effects from across our four comparisons with one another (and with other experiments), 
we conducted a meta-analysis using mean differences between the fillers-inside and the 
fillers-outside conditions. Because the experiments were not exact replications of one 
another we implemented a random-effects model and used cognitive load as a moderator 
variable. 
 As Figure 5.7 shows, the effect of the distribution manipulation overall is a 
difference of 0.32 95% CI [-0.02, 0.65] on a 9-point scale. That is, the difference in the 
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rank positions of the prizes has a positive effect of perhaps one third of a point on a nine-
point scale. Given the confidence interval, the effect is probably positive, but it could be 
as small as zero or it could be as large as two thirds of a point. 
 Our manipulation of rank was not subtle: In the fillers-inside condition the 
difference between the prize and the alternative was the difference between receiving the 
lowest (1st) and highest (6th) ranking outcomes in the experiment; in the fillers-outside 
condition, the difference was between two adjacent ranks (3rd and 4th) in the middle of 
the distribution. For comparison, in our reanalysis of Kassam et al.'s Experiment 2 fillers, 
the difference in ratings between $5($1) and $3($1) was 1.71 points 95% CI [1.27, 2.16] 
on the same nine-point scale. The difference between $1($3) and $5($7) for the losers in 
our Experiment 1 was 1.00 point 95% CI [0.51, 1.50] on a seven-point scale. The effect 
of the distribution of prizes that we have found in our four comparisons is small in 
comparison to the Kassam et al. effect sizes. 
Given we at best estimated a small effect of the distribution of previous prizes, we 
should not expect cognitive load–which we hypothesized should reduce this difference 
between the distribution of attribute values–to have a large moderating effect. And it does 
not: Cognitive load has no or only a very small effect on the difference in ratings on the 
critical trial across conditions, with wide confidence intervals on the estimate, betaLoad = 
0.07 95% CI [-0.65, 0.78]. 
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Figure 5.6. Means with 95% confidence intervals of positive affect ratings for the critical 
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trials in Experiments 2A-2C. Generally, there is no effect of either distribution or 
cognitive load across experiments. 
 
Figure 5.7. Mean differences with 95% confidence intervals between Fillers-Outside and 
Fillers-Inside, separately for low and high cognitive load of Experiments 2A-2C. 
Conclusion 
We have replicated Kassam et al.’s finding that people are sensitive to the 
absolute value of a prize only when it is the smaller of two possible prizes but not the 
larger. We also manipulated the rank position of the prize and the forgone alternative by 
varying the prizes experienced in earlier choices, so that the selected and forgone prizes 
would be very different or very similar in rank between participants and hypothesized 
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that the bigger the difference in rank the lower people’s reported positive affect would be. 
Additionally, inspired by Kassam et al.’s findings on the effect of cognitive load on 
people’s amount sensitivity, the second goal was to test whether the hypothesized rank 
effect would decrease under high cognitive load, which would be in line with DbS. 
However, because we failed to find an effect of rank, we cannot estimate how cognitive 
load reduces this effect.  
To contrast these findings, results of very similarly set-up experiments by Stewart 
and Reimers (2008) yielded comparably big differences on attractiveness ratings of 
gambles dependent on the rank position of the manipulated attribute, as reported in the 
previous chapter. One difference between the experiments is that in the Stewart and 
Reimers experiments, participants evaluated options, whereas here they evaluated 
outcomes. Other studies however, do find effects when judging their life satisfaction or 
their wage satisfaction (Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 2010; Card et al., 2012), which in itself 
are outcomes. Maybe outcomes experienced here are just not aversive and relevant 
enough for participants to engage with, as opposed to studies where more serious 
questions are asked. Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, and Wilson (2004) showed that a 
certain amount of negative affect must be reached before people engage in 
rationalization. This problem could apply in our case: If participants did not feel bad 
enough, they will not take the other prizes into account and thus affect ratings will not 
depend on other foregone prizes. We think our results could point to a boundary 
condition in terms of when DbS-like processes might lead to rank effects in judgment and 
when they do not.  
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6 A Negative Zero is Better than a Positive Zero: 
The Mutable-Zero Effect and Category-Consistent Counterfactuals 
Apparently innocuous changes in the description, or “framing,” of options can 
dramatically reverse preferences between options. One way in which framing can reach 
its effect is by evoking alternatives or counterfactuals to which options or their features 
are compared. For instance, in the evaluation of a job offer, a given income can be seen 
as better if it is framed in order to bring to mind other smaller incomes, like salaries of 
other junior staff members, than if it brings to mind other higher incomes, like salaries of 
other senior staff members. Kahneman and Miller (1986) referred to the ease with which 
alternatives or counterfactuals are brought to mind as the mutability of the information 
given. The mutable-zero effect (Scholten, Read, Canic, & Stewart, 2016) is one example 
of such a framing effect: Swapping the word “receive” zero for “pay” zero increases an 
option’s attractiveness. For example, when choosing between  
A: “Receive £100 today and pay £400 in a year” and 
B: “Pay £200 today and pay £0 in a year,”  
most people chose Option B. However, when choosing between 
A’: “Receive £100 today and pay £400 in a year” and 
B’: “Pay £200 today and receive £0 in a year,” 
most people chose Option A’. The manipulation is the simplest possible, in that the 
difference is just one word, but it has a very reliable effect on preference. 
Scholten et al. (2016) offered a hypothesis for the effect based on Kahneman and 
Miller’s concept of relative mutability. The terms “pay zero” and “receive zero”, they 
proposed, bring to mind different counterfactuals. The thought of paying something 
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brings to mind other amounts that one might pay (and zero is the best payment possible), 
while the thought of receiving something brings to mind other amounts you might receive 
(and zero is the worst possible receipt). These counterfactual values are important in 
valuations that arise from the expectations that certain categories and situations form 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986). In this paper we develop this idea further, and test three 
versions of the counterfactuals hypothesis. We call these the Any-Counterfactuals 
Hypothesis, the Category-Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis and the Unhappiness-
Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis. These hypotheses all assume that the comparisons 
that people make with their spontaneously generated counterfactuals are what give rise to 
the mutable-zero effect. They differ in terms of the conditions under which and what kind 
of counterfactuals are used for the comparison process. We next discuss the hypotheses in 
turn. 
The Any-Counterfactuals Hypothesis  
In the Any-Counterfactuals Hypothesis, the phrases “pay zero” and “receive zero” 
prompt people to generate different counterfactuals. Once generated, these 
counterfactuals are treated like any other counterfactual. Just as in the Ebbinghaus 
illusion, the counterfactuals would work by contrast: Surrounding a central circle with 
many smaller circles makes the central circle appear larger and surrounding the same 
central circle with many larger circles makes the central circle appear smaller. In this 
analogy, the “pay/receive zero” is the central circle, and the counterfactuals are the 
surrounding circles. So in this hypothesis the mutable-zero effect emerges just because of 
the comparisons with any available counterfactuals. According to the Any-
Counterfactuals Hypothesis, people are influenced not only by spontaneously evoked, 
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implicit counterfactuals–it is assumed that the phrases “pay zero” and “receive zero” 
induce different counterfactuals to which zero is then compared–but also by 
counterfactuals encountered in the environment, which could be explicit counterfactuals 
added by the experimenter. If the explicit counterfactuals work just as the implicit 
counterfactuals, then these explicitly presented counterfactuals will work alongside and 
blend in with the implicit counterfactuals people generate, or even suppress or reverse the 
effect of those implicit counterfactuals. That is, we will see two additive affects: the first 
is the effect of the implicit counterfactuals generated by participants upon reading the 
words “pay zero” or “receive zero”, and the second is the effect of the explicit 
counterfactuals in the environment. For example, if participants read “receive zero” they 
will generate implicit counterfactuals about other larger receipts. If they then learn from 
the environment that “receive zero” could have been any other receipt, these explicit 
larger receipts will combine with the implicit counterfactual larger receipts to make 
“receive zero” seem especially bad. But if they instead learn from the environment that 
the “receive zero” could have been any other payment, these explicit counterfactual 
payments will combine with the implicit larger receipts, and because the implicit and 
explicit counterfactuals are acting in opposite directions on the “receive zero”, the effect 
of the implicit counterfactuals will be attenuated or even reversed. Similarly, if 
participants learn that “pay zero” could have been any other payment, they will be more 
likely to choose this option than when participants learn that it could have been any other 
receipt. 
If the data supports the Any-Counterfactual Hypothesis, it would mean that the 
mutable-zero effect works by comparing and contrasting implicit and explicitly presented 
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counterfactuals alike. It would also mean that we could manipulate the mutable-zero 
effect by contrasting the mutable zero with either favorable (all payments) or unfavorable 
(all receipts) counterfactuals. We will contrast this below with the idea in the Category-
Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis that the words “pay” and “receive” in front of 
zero will constrain the possible counterfactuals that will be used for the comparison 
process. 
The Category-Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) entertain “the compelling intuition that some 
alternatives are closer to reality than others and some changes of reality are smaller than 
others,” and that “a counterfactual possibility should be ‘close’ if it can be reached by 
altering some mutable features of reality” (p. 7). Suppose that, when considering “receive 
zero”, only counterfactual receipts encountered in the environment are close to reality, 
and that counterfactual payments are not, and that when considering “pay zero”, only 
counterfactual payments encountered in the environment are close to reality, and that 
counterfactual receipts are not. Then, counterfactuals encountered in the environment will 
only have an effect (or at least will have a larger effect) when they match the 
spontaneously evoked counterfactuals. Following this framework, only counterfactuals 
matching the pay/receive category of the mutable zero would be close enough to reality 
and therefore be valid comparison values. Thus “pay zero” would only be compared to 
explicitly provided payment counterfactuals, and explicitly provided receipt 
counterfactuals will have no effect. Similarly, “receive zero” would only be compared to 
explicitly provided receipt counterfactuals, and explicitly provided payment 
counterfactuals will have no effect. This Category-Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis 
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differs from the Any-Counterfactuals Hypothesis in that participants are only affected by 
counterfactuals in the environment when they match the pay/receive category of the 
mutable zero, and, unlike the Any-Counterfactuals Hypothesis, participants will be 
unaffected by counterfactuals where the pay/receive category does not match the mutable 
zero, because they are not close enough to reality. 
The Unhappiness-Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis  
Negative evaluations demand greater cognitive processing (Kanouse & Hanson, 
1987; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). Thus, in the Unhappiness-Induced-Counterfactuals 
Hypothesis, it is possible that only “receive zero”, but not “pay zero”, will ever be 
compared to counterfactuals encountered in the environment. In Chapter 5 Experiment 1 
we replicated Kassam et al.’s experiment implying that, when an initial outcome is 
satisfying enough, people avoid further sampling and avoid making further comparisons, 
because they already are in a desirable emotional state. For “pay zero”, the initial 
counterfactuals generated are other payments, and these all make “paying zero” look 
good—so the comparison process stops because people are already in an emotionally 
desirable state. Counterfactuals in the environment will not be compared with “pay zero” 
because the comparison process has stopped. For “receive zero”, the initial 
counterfactuals generated are other receipts, and these make “receiving zero” look bad–so 
the comparison process continues in an attempt to reach an emotionally desirable state. 
Now counterfactuals in the environment will be involved in continuing comparisons with 
“receive zero” and will thus affect the valuation of “receive zero”. The Unhappiness-
Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis thus predicts that counterfactuals provided by the 
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experimenter will only have an effect (or at least will have a stronger effect) for “receive 
zero” options, but not for “pay zero” options.  
Figure 6.1 shows the designs used in our test of the three hypotheses under 
investigation. In all experiments, participants make a choice between two options. Before 
making the choice, a (seemingly) random device determined a missing value on one of 
the options (either from a spinning fruit machine drum or the turning over of face-down 
cards). Figures 6.1A and 6.1B show our “spinner” random device which we used in 
Experiments 1A-B and 2A-B-C. Figures 6.1C and 6.1D show our “cards” random device 
which we used in Experiments 2D and 3A-B-C. In all experiments, participants viewed 
various forgone values on the random device before the final value, which was always 
either “pay 0” or “receive 0”, was filled in. One factor was whether the label of the 
mutable zero as “pay” or “receive”, i.e., “pay zero” or “receive zero”. The second factor, 
orthogonal to the first, was the set of foregone values, i.e., the explicitly provided 
counterfactuals in the environment (context items, for short). 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Design. The participants’ primary task was to make one choice between two 
options: the Static Option “Receive £100 today and pay £400 in a year” or the M0 Option 
(the option entailing the mutable zero) “Pay £200 today and [receive/pay] £0 in a year”. 
Whether the £0 in the M0 Option was described with the word “pay” or “receive” was 
manipulated between participants. Initially the £0 component in the M0 Option was not 
set but was (apparently) determined by a slot machine spinner, which we fixed to finish 
on either “pay £0” or “receive £0”. The spinner was realistically animated to give the 
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impression of viewing a cylindrical drum with outcomes printed on it rolling and 
stopping. The view of the drum was constrained by a window, just like on a slot machine. 
When the spinner stopped, we changed the color of the spinner to match the rest of the 
option and blend in, which gave the appearance of the “[pay/receive] £0” embedding 
itself into that option. Participants clicked on a button to activate the spinner. We 
manipulated alternative entries on the spinner (context items) which spun past to be either 
“pay £100”, “pay £200”, and “pay £300” or “receive £100”, “receive £200”, and “receive 
£300” between participants. This resulted in a 2 (receive versus pay category) x 2 
(receive £100-£300 context items versus pay £100-£300 context items) between-
participants design. We have labeled conditions ReceiveContext-Receive0 (for “receive 
context, receive zero”), ReceiveContext-Pay0, PayContext-Receive0, and PayContext-
Pay0. See Figure 6.1 for the experimental set-up and click here, if you would like a go at 
the experiment yourself. 
Participants and procedure. We collected data from 96 Warwick students who 
participated for course credit (Experiment 1A). Additionally, we recruited 202 
students via Prolific Academic (Experiment 1B), a new online platform similar to 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, but with an English university student population. The 
departmental ethics committee approved this and all remaining studies. Participants gave 
informed consent to take part before they started the experiment. In the online version, 
they were informed that proceeding from the introduction to the main part of the 
experiment is equivalent to giving consent. For this one-choice task, we paid the online 
participants £0.60. 
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Figure 6.1. Experimental set-up of all nine experiments. In 1A and 1B participants click on „Spin“ and watch the context items (in the 
grey box) pass by before it stops at either „pay zero“ or „receive zero“, at which point the box blends in and turns green. In 1C and 1D 
participants click on the blue cards in whichever order they prefer. The last card they click on moves into the space where the „?“ was 
and turns green. Click here to play the experiment with the spinner or here to play the experiment with the cards set-up
1A 1B
1D1C
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In addition to making the choice between the Static Option and the M0 Option, 
we asked participants to memorize and recall the four entries on the spinner. To ensure 
that they saw and would remember the entries, they could click on a button labeled 
“replay the spin” and see the entries spin past exactly as before as many times as they 
wished. They were instructed that they would have to recall the entries after they made 
their choice, to make sure they were paying attention. The choice and memorization were 
not incentivized. 
The results would support the Any-Counterfactuals Hypothesis if the M0 Option 
was more attractive in the PayContext-Pay0 and PayContext-Receive0 than the 
ReceiveContext-Receive0 and ReceiveContext-Pay0 conditions. On the other hand, the 
results would support the Category-Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis if the M0 
Option was more attractive in the PayContext-Pay0 and ReceiveContext-Pay0 than the 
PayContext-Receive0 and ReceiveContext-Receive0 conditions. Finally, the results 
would support the Unhappiness-Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis if the M0 Option 
was most attractive in PayContext-Pay0 and ReceiveContext-Pay0 conditions and more 
attractive in the PayContext-Receive0 than in the ReceiveContext-Receive0, which 
would make the M0 Option seem least attractive. 
The Any-Counterfactuals Hypothesis predicts only main effects of our 
manipulation of “pay” or “receive” zero category and our manipulation of “pay” or 
“receive” context items. The Category-Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis predicts an 
interaction, such that our manipulation of “pay” or “receive” contexts will only have an 
effect or a much stronger effect when the pay/receive category of the context matches the 
category of the mutable zero. The Unhappiness-Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis 
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predicts a different interaction, such that our manipulation of “pay” or “receive” contexts 
will only have an effect for “receive zero” and not for “pay zero”. Figure 6.2 plots out the 
predictions of the three different hypotheses. 
Results and discussion 
We calculated the proportion of participants choosing the M0 Option in 
Experiment 1A and 1B (Figure 6.3.1A and 6.3.1B). We fitted a two-predictor logistic 
regression to estimate the odds of choosing the M0 Option as a function of whether the 
context items were payments or receipts, and whether the M0 Option was a payment or a 
receipt (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1  
Odds Ratios (OR) for choosing the M0 Option with 95% confidence intervals. 
Experiment Context-OR  
[95% CI] 
Mutable Zero Category-OR  
[95% CI] 
Interaction-OR  
[95% CI] 
1A 0.98 [0.35, 2.65] 5.50 [2.13, 15.86] 2.78 [0.39, 21.76] 
1B 0.99 [0.52, 1.89] 2.95 [1.58, 5.68] 1.11 [0.31, 4.02] 
2A 4.31 [1.36, 
16.65] 
  
2B 2.63 [1.67, 6.21]   
2C 1.86 [0.98, 3.55]   
2D 1.80 [1.03, 3.17]   
3A 1.71 [1.12, 2.63] 2.39 [1.57, 3.67] 1.71 [0.73, 3.99]. 
3B 0.85 [0.57, 1.26] 1.63 [1.09, 2.44] 1.11 [0.50, 2.45] 
3C 1.27 [0.85, 1.43] 1.56 [1.04, 2.33]. 0.92 [0.41, 2.05] 
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Figure 6.2. Predicted choice proportions of M0 picks predicted according to the three hypotheses.
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The main effect of the mutable zero category was the same as in Scholten et al.’s 
(2016) earlier studies, with more people choosing the M0 Option with “pay zero” like in 
conditions PayContext-Pay0 and ReceiveContext-Pay0 than with “receive zero” like in 
conditions PayContext-Receive0 and ReceiveContext-Receive0. The estimate of the main 
effect of context, given by the values that participants encountered on the spinner, was 
almost exactly null (i.e., odds ratio about 1), though the relatively wide confidence 
intervals leave open the possibility of an effect as large as halving or doubling the odds of 
choosing the M0 Option. Finally, the estimate of the interaction between the factors was 
poor—the wide confidence intervals in both experiments allow us to say little about 
whether the effect of the context depended on the label of the mutable zero. 
However, another possibility is that people did not attend to the experimentally 
provided counterfactuals on the spinner. To check if this is so, we ran the next series of 
experiments. In Experiment 2, we tested whether participants were sensitive to the 
context when the zero was not labeled with “pay” or “receive” and thus could not 
obviously belong to either category. The M0 Option was simply presented as “£0” 
without the words “pay” or “receive” preceding it. We anticipated that if participants paid 
attention to the counterfactuals encountered in the environment, zero should take on that 
same category as the counterfactuals from the environment. If it does take on the same 
category, participants should be less likely to choose the M0 Option in the 
ReceiveContext condition because “£0” here is relatively unattractive. On the other hand, 
participants should be more likely to choose the M0 Option in the PayContext condition 
because “£0” here is relatively attractive. And independently from all of the theorizing 
about counterfactuals, if the manipulation of context had no effect for unlabeled zeros, 
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we see little reason to expect an effect for labeled zeros. Thus Experiments 2A-D serve as 
a check of the potential strength of our context manipulation which, to preempt the 
results, show robust effects of context. 
 In Experiment 1 we have not taken the performance of the recall task into 
account. Because only the mutable zero category and not the counterfactuals encountered 
in the environment affected participants’ choices, for Experiment 2 we decided in 
advance to look only at those participants’ choices who correctly remembered which 
category the counterfactuals in the environment belonged to. We ran four variants of 
Experiment 2, as detailed below. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Design. In Experiment 2 the counterfactuals encountered in the environment 
(context items) were either all payments or all receipts, and zero was always unlabeled. 
We therefore had two conditions: the PayContext condition (“pay £100”, “pay £200”, 
“pay £300”, before settling on “£0”) and the ReceiveContext condition (“receive £100”, 
“receive £200”, “receive £300”, before settling on “£0”). 
We made an additional change to the recall phase. We gave participants the 
option between “receive” and “pay” from a drop-down menu, rather than requiring them 
to type the word before the number. The aim was to make it as easy as possible to recall 
the label correctly and as intuitive as possible for participants to understand what their 
task was. Also, the memorization process should make the context items more salient and 
therefore make the effect–should it exist–as large as possible. 
Participants and procedure. We collected data from 124 Prolific Academic 
!!
145 
participants for Experiment 2A. We found that only about half of participants could 
correctly choose the options from the drop-down menu so we ran Experiment 2B as a 
replication of Experiment 2A. In order not to lose power by excluding too much data, 
Experiment 2B had 210 Prolific Academic participants, roughly double the number of 
Experiment 2A. To ensure that participants paid attention to the context items, we added 
an instruction stressing that it was essential for them to remember the four entries on the 
spinner. However, we still found poor recall of the context items. We therefore ran 
Experiment 2C with 186 Prolific Academic participants. In Experiment 2C, in order to be 
able to make a choice, participants had to fill in the context items correctly. By making 
sure that participants couldn’t proceed until they have correctly filled in the context 
items, we traded-off being able to use the data of all 186 participants with the possible 
impact that swapping the order of the recall and the choice task might have had on 
participants’ choice. 
For Experiment 2D we ran 201 Prolific Academic participants and used a similar 
experimental set-up but now, instead of clicking a button to spin a spinner, we presented 
participants with four cards with hidden amounts that were revealed one-by-one as they 
clicked on the cards to turn them over (see Figure 6.1C-D). Participants were told that the 
last card they clicked would fill in the missing space in the M0 Option. Participants 
clicked on the cards in any order they wanted. Unbeknownst to the participants, the last 
card they clicked always offered “£0”. At the same time the “£0” was revealed, it slid 
into the missing space and blended into the M0 Option. The motivation behind switching 
from spinners to cards was to allow the context to remain on the screen at the time of the 
choice, removing the need for memorizing the category of the context and thus the 
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cognitive load that might interfere with the choice during the task. At the same time, it 
increased the salience of the context. Second, participants didn’t have to think about a 
rationale for memorizing the context, which made it seem more intuitive than the spinner 
version with memorization. We also made a slight change to the amounts on the option, 
equalizing the sum of outcomes of the two options, which therefore implied a zero 
interest rate. Here participants chose between the Static Option: “Receive £400 today and 
pay £900 in a year” and the M0 Option: “Pay £500 today and £0 in a year”. 
Results and discussion 
As we consider remembering if the context was “receive” or “pay” as an easy 
task, especially because all context items belonged to the same category, we had decided 
in advance to exclude all participants who did not correctly remember the context 
category. In Experiment 2A, 48 out of 124 participants did not choose the correct option 
(either “pay” or “receive”) all three times in the memory test. We excluded 23 
participants in the PayContext condition and 25 participants in the ReceiveContext 
condition, which left us with 76 participants. We excluded a similar proportion of 
participants in Experiment 2B (104 out of 210 participants, 58 from the PayContext and 
46 from the ReceiveContext condition). 
We had expected some people to fail to recall correctly whether the context 
category was “pay” or “receive”, given the poor recall seen in Experiments 1A and B. It 
is still surprising to us that so many people failed to recall only three entries from the 
same category when instructed to do so. It was especially puzzling, because in other 
unrelated experiments run at the same time also using the subject pool provided by 
Prolific Academic, participants’ choices showed remarkable consistency, suggesting 
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reliable data coming from the platform we used. 
The proportion of participants choosing the M0 Option throughout the four 
experiments is presented in Figure 6.3.2A-6.3.2D and odds ratios of choosing the M0 
Option as a function of the context items (“pay £100”, “pay £200”, “pay £300” or 
“receive £100”, “receive £200”, “receive £300”) are displayed in Table 1. Throughout all 
four experiments, the context consistently influenced choice. The M0 Option was more 
attractive in the PayContext than the ReceiveContext conditions. From this series of 
experiments, we also concluded that participants did pay attention to the context and that 
they did make comparisons between zero and the context items, as the context was the 
only thing that differed between PayContext and ReceiveContext. 
 In summary, when the M0 Option is unlabeled, we found evidence for the Any-
Counterfactuals Hypothesis. There is an alternative interpretation however: Instead of 
comparing the zero with the context items, the context category could be applied to zero–
as if zero inherits its category from the context–and become a mutable zero, which then 
would lead to the mutable-zero effect. However, we think this category inheritance option 
is less likely. In other experiments, entirely in the domain of gains, we find that the 
context has a large effect, and this cannot be due to the target item inheriting its category 
from the context category, because the target items’ categories do not differ in those 
experiments. 
 So far, we consistently replicated the mutable-zero effect in the original form 
(Experiments 1A and B). We also see a large context effect when the zeros are unlabeled 
(Experiments 2A-D). Evidence for the Unhappiness-Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis, 
however, is less clear because of the large confidence intervals on the interaction effect in 
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Experiments 1A and B. Thus, we ran one more series of experiments with the cards set-
up from Experiment 2D, in which respondents revealed counterfactual cards one at a 
time, and the cards remained onscreen when a choice was being made. One advantage of 
the cards set-up is that we were able to retain the data of all participants. The other 
advantage is that the cognitive load of the task was minimized so that the memorization 
of the context items did not interfere with the choice that people made. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Design. This series of experiments is a combination of the designs of Experiments 
1A-B and Experiment 2D. The options were the same as in Experiment 2D and we used 
the cards set-up, which maximized the salience of the context items.  As in Experiments 
1A-B, the £0 in the M0 Option was described with the word “pay” or “receive” and the 
context (displayed as cards were turned) was pay £100, £200, £300 or receive £100, 
£200, £300, both manipulated between participants. In Experiments 3A-B the expected 
values of both options were net losses. For Experiment 3C, we decided to test the effects 
in the gain domain too. So in Experiment 3C the Static Option was “Receive £900 today 
and pay £400 in a year” and the M0 Option was: “Receive £500 today and [receive/pay] 
zero in a year”. This change resulted from swapping all receive-attributes for pay-
attributes and vice versa from Experiments 3A and B. Everything else remained the 
same. 
Participants and procedure. We collected data from 401 participants for 
Experiment 3A, 398 participants for 3B and 398 participants for Experiment 3C, all via 
Prolific Academic. As before, we paid participants £0.60. Other details followed the 
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procedure of Experiment 2D. 
Results and discussion 
The proportion of participants who chose the M0 Option throughout the three 
experiments is presented in Figure 6.3A-6.3C and odds ratios of choosing the M0 Option 
providing evidence for the three hypotheses are displayed in Table 6.1. Participants 
consistently chose the M0 Option more often when the mutable zero was “pay zero” 
rather than “receive zero”. In Experiment 3A we found that the context had a moderate 
influence, but the finding did not replicate in the remaining two experiments. Here, the 
interaction effect was better estimated than Experiment 1A and B, and we can rule out 
large effects. 
 The experiments in this last series replicated the mutable-zero effect found in 
Experiments 1A and B. But we found very little or no evidence for the effect of the 
counterfactuals encountered in the environment, or an interaction with the label of the 
mutable zero. Using the cards set-up allowed us to have more power to detect possible 
effects of the context and the interaction effect also. Should there be such effects, they are 
probably not very large. Experiment 3C extends the results from dealing with net losses 
to net gains and does not suggest differences between the two domains.  
Meta-analysis 
We have run three series of experiments, nine experiments in total. We found 
consistent effects of the mutable zero category in every experiment where we tested for it 
(i.e., in Experiments 1A and B, and Experiments 3A-C). However, when the zero was 
labeled with “pay” or “receive” we find at best weak evidence for the effect of 
manipulating the context. But in Experiments 2A-D, where the zero was unlabeled, we 
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find strong evidence for the effect of context items. Figure 6.3 shows the choice 
proportions pattern for all nine experiments.  
To combine evidence over our experiment series, we now use a random effects 
meta-analysis to estimate the effect sizes for the effect of the mutable zero category, the 
context items, and their interaction. We used the metafor package in R (Viechtbauer, 
2010), with the odds ratios as effect size measures.  
Main effect of Mutable Zero 
To quantify the effect of the mutable zero, we only included Experiments 1A-B 
and 3A-C, as Experiment 2A-D omitted the label from the zero. With “pay zero”, 
participants were more likely to choose the M0 Option than with “receive zero”, OR = 
2.19 times, 95% CI [1.41, 3.41] (Figure 6.4). The effect size of the mutable zero category 
in the zero-labeled experiments (Experiments 1A-B and 3A-C) is comparable to the 
effect size of context in the zero-unlabeled experiments (Experiments 2A-D).  
Main effect of context 
To quantify the effect of context, we used all nine experiments. Because, in 
Experiment 2 the zero was unlabeled, we used Label (with or without) as a moderator. As 
Figure 6.5 shows, the effect of the context depends on the presence of the label. If there 
was no label prior to zero (Experiment 2), participants were more likely to choose the M0 
Option in the PayContext conditions than the ReceiveContext conditions, OR = 2.26 95% 
CI [1.24, 4.13]. However, the context items did not influence choice when zero already 
belonged to either the “pay” or the “receive” category, OR=1.26 95% CI [0.81, 1.97].
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Figure 6.3. Choice proportions of M0 picks and 95% confidence intervals for all nine experiments.
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Figure 6.4. Random effects meta-analysis to test the effect of the mutable zero category. 
Odds ratios (OR) greater than 1 indicate an increase in the preference for the M0 Option 
with „pay zero“ instead of „receive zero“. 
Context-by-M0 interaction 
 To establish how big the interaction effect is between the final zero category and 
the context items, we again only used Experiments 1 and 3. Although Experiments 1A 
and 3A indicated a potential difference between the effect of context when the mutable 
zero was labeled as “receive zero” from when it was labeled as “pay zero”, when 
combining all experiments, the meta-analysis yielded only a weak interaction between 
context and mutable zero category with wide confidence intervals, OR=1.29 95% CI 
[0.69, 2.43] (Figure 6.6).  
Random Effects Model
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Figure 6.5. Random effects meta-analysis on the effect of experimentally provided 
counterfactuals for experiments with (1A-B and 3A-C) and without a labeled zero (2A-D) 
separately. Odds ratios (OR) greater than 1 indicate an increase in the preference for the 
M0 Option with pay-context instead of receive-context. 
General Discussion 
In five experiments, we have shown that participants’ choices depend on whether 
a zero outcome is labeled as “pay £0” or “receive £0”, replicating Scholten et al.’s (2016) 
mutable-zero effect. The odds of choosing an option with a zero component were about 
double when the zero is described as “pay £0” compared to “receive £0” (Experiments 
1A and B and 3A-D).  
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Figure 6.6. Meta-analysis to estimate the difference of the effect of experimentally 
provided counterfactuals between the pay-category and the receive-category. Odds ratios 
greater than 1 indicate that the difference between receive-context and pay-context with a 
“receive zero” attribute is bigger than the difference between receive-context and pay-
context with a “pay zero” attribute. 
We also found that a zero presented alone as just “£0”, without “pay” or “receive” 
labels, is affected by values in the experimental context (Experiments 2A-D), exhibiting a 
typical context-effect in the evaluation of magnitudes. But, despite this result and a large 
body of experiments showing that values in the experimental context affect choice (e.g., 
Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 2010; Birnbaum, 1992; Carmon & Ariely, 2000; see Stewart et 
al., 2015, for a recent review), counterfactual values provided in the experimental context 
do not seem to affect the mutable-zero effect in which a zero is 
Random Effects Model
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accompanied by a “pay” or “receive” label. For example, “£0” appears good in the 
context of “pay £100”, “pay £200” and “pay £300” and bad in the context of “receive 
£100”, “receive £200”, and “receive £300”, but “pay £0” and “receive £0” are unaffected 
by the same context. This is a quite remarkable finding: just adding a single word “pay” 
or “receive” seems to have completely blocked, or at least greatly attenuated, effects of 
context which are well-replicated across many laboratories.  
In the Introduction we described three hypotheses about how the mutable-zero 
effect might work. The first was the Any-Counterfactuals Hypothesis, in which the 
mutable-zero effect works because the mutable zero leads people to generate 
counterfactuals, and these counterfactuals work in just the same way as any other 
counterfactuals. By comparing the size of the effect of the labels “pay” or “receive” in the 
mutable-zero effect with the size of the effect of experimentally provided counterfactuals 
when the zero is unlabeled, we see our estimates of the effect sizes are similar, which 
might suggest a similar mechanism. But, as described above, the experimentally provided 
counterfactuals presented with a mutable zero do not have an effect. This suggests that 
the experimentally provided counterfactuals are not being treated in the same way as the 
counterfactuals that we hypothesize the labels “pay” and “receive” cause people to 
generate. 
The second hypothesis was the Category-Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis, 
in which counterfactuals only have an effect when they match the sign of the zero. So 
here, we only expect the counterfactuals of “pay £100”, “pay £200” and “pay £300” to 
have an effect when the zero is labeled with “pay”. And we would only expect 
counterfactuals of “receive £100”, “receive £200”, and “receive £300” to have an effect 
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when the zero is labeled with “receive”. But, as described above, we did not find an 
effect of the experimentally provided counterfactuals, even when the labels match that of 
the zero. For the Category-Consistent-Counterfactuals Hypothesis to work, we need to 
assume that the counterfactuals people generate match the magnitudes of the 
experimentally provided counterfactuals. So we would have to assume that people did 
compare “pay £0” with counterfactuals “pay £100”, “pay £200”, and “pay £300”. But in 
“receive £0” condition with “pay £100”, “pay £200”, and “pay £300” we would need to 
assume people to disregard the “pay” counterfactuals, and replace them with generated 
counterfactuals of about “receive £100”, “receive £200”, and “receive £300”. In our 
experiments where all the sums are round hundreds less than £500, assuming people 
generate counterfactuals like “receive £100” and “receive £300” when presented with 
“receive £0” seems quite plausible. Because these generated counterfactuals are about the 
same size as the experimentally provided counterfactuals, they end up having the same 
effect. In short, if people ignore counterfactuals from the opposite category and instead 
generate counterfactuals of about the same magnitude from the same category, we’d see 
no effect of changing the experimentally provided counterfactuals. 
Thus, the Category-Consistent-Counterfactual Hypothesis could be consistent 
with the data, where gains are only compared against other gains and losses are only 
compared against other losses (McGraw et al., 2010). Walasek and Stewart (2015) found 
evidence consistent with this suggestion. In their experiment, people were offered the 
chance to play or reject 50/50 lotteries with a gain and a loss. For example, would you 
play a 50/50 lottery offering a gain of $10 and a loss of $10? In a condition where the 
maximum gain on offer in the experiment was $40 and the maximum loss on offer in the 
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experiment was $20, Walasek and Stewart found classic loss-averse behavior with people 
rejecting the gain $10 lose $10 lottery. But with the ranges of gains and losses on offer 
reversed, so that the maximum gain was $20 and the maximum loss was $40, people 
were much more likely to accept the gain $10 lose $10 lottery. If people were simply 
evaluating all magnitudes, without segregating them into gains and losses, this would not 
occur, because the magnitude of amounts on offer is the same in both situations (all 
between $0 and $40). Instead people seem to evaluate a gain against only the range of 
gains and a loss against only the range of losses. 
The suggestion that people only make comparisons within the same category is 
related to older ideas about the alignability of attributes. For example, Slovic and 
MacPhillamy (1974) found that when participants compared pairs of students, they 
focused on dimensions that the pair had in common. In similarity, differences on 
alignable attributes are weighted more heavily and this alignment is relevant in decision 
processes (Medin, Goldstone, & Markman, 1995; Zhang & Markman, 2001). In valuation 
and choice, alignable dimensions are more evaluable and weight more heavily in 
judgments and decisions (see the evaluability hypothesis, Hsee, 1996; Hsee, 
Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; see Hsee & Zhang, 2010, for a review). 
In the third, Unhappiness-Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis, people only make 
comparisons with the experimentally provided counterfactuals in the “receive zero” 
conditions because, unlike “pay zero”, the mutable zero counterfactuals generated by 
participants, lead “receive zero” to be evaluated negatively. We found little evidence for 
the Unhappiness-Induced-Counterfactuals Hypothesis, under which we expected an 
interaction between the mutable zero category and the experimentally provided 
!!
158 
counterfactuals. We don’t doubt Kassam et al.’s finding that initial negative evaluations 
are more likely to lead to further comparison, because we have replicated their findings in 
several experiments (see Chapter 5). One reason why there was no interaction effect here 
between the experimentally provided counterfactuals and the mutable zero category could 
be that making satisfying comparisons may be a very important mechanism in judgment 
(the dependent variable in Kassam et al.’s studies), but could be less important in choice 
(the dependent variable in our studies). We don’t know if this was the key difference 
between Kassam et al.’s experiment and ours. Another explanation for the mutable-zero 
effect could have nothing to do with counterfactuals and comparison processes. The 
effect could arise through the associations we make when we are presented with “pay 
zero”, which could be associated with positive outcomes, and “receive zero”, which 
could be associated with negative outcomes. That is, the word “pay” would acquire a 
negative associative strength by repeated pairing with bad outcomes and the word 
“receive” would acquire positive associative strength by repeated pairings with good 
outcomes (as in Hebbian theory, Hebb, 1949; see Shanks 2006, 2010, for recent reviews). 
However, this associative learning account cannot explain why the experiment provided 
counterfactuals have an effect with no “pay” or “receive” accompanying a zero, but then 
have no effect for the mutable “pay zero” and “receive zero”. 
We have replicated the mutable zero effect, in which an option with a zero 
outcome is more attractive when the outcome is described as “pay 0” instead of “receive 
0”. We have also found that although other foregone values provide counterfactuals 
against which an unlabeled “0” is compared, including a label “pay” or “receive” disrupts 
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this comparison. We think this is because people only make within-payment or within-
receipt comparisons, and do not compare across categories. 
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7 Conclusion 
Here, I will give an overview of the results and conclusions from previous chapters and 
then propose theoretical and methodological implications of our findings. The aim of this 
thesis was to test potential mechanisms involved in choice and judgment. We used the 
DbS model to make predictions and investigate whether people choose options and 
evaluate outcomes according to their rank position within an underlying sample and 
under which circumstances comparison processes are involved in risky choice and 
affective valuation. We thereby test for the DbS proposed cognitive mechanisms of 
pairwise comparisons and the role of working memory in choice valuation. 
Chapter 2 
Overview. Chapter 2 tested the robustness and the DbS interpretation of the SRH 
effect. The SRH effect describes the dependence of the shape of the preference functions 
on the distribution of attribute values used in the choices presented to participants. In a 
four-level analysis, we reanalyzed already existing data sets (Level 1), we replicated the 
experiments with varying experimental properties (Level 2) and extended the 
experiments from a between-subjects design to a within-subjects design, where 
participants unbeknownst to them were presented with attributes originating from two 
distributions (Level 3). Level 3 tested whether the SRH effect is caused by the DbS 
mechanism of sampling, pairwise comparisons between the current options and other 
available options from memory and frequency accumulation. If indeed the combination 
of these cognitive tools is what causes the SRH effect, then exposing participants to (in 
their world) one distribution should not lead to differences in preference functions when 
choice data is split retrospectively for the analysis. In contrast to the DbS prediction, the 
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SRH effect still emerges. In Level 4, the effect size comparison between the different 
designs via meta-analysis lets us conclude that the DbS mechanisms can, at best, only be 
part of the explanation for the effect. We do not know of any model that can account for 
the differences in the preference functions generated through the differently skewed 
distributions of attribute values presented to participants in the non-flagged versions of 
our experiments. However, our findings also hint to problems in the modelling procedure, 
which are probably causing the SRH effect (see Stewart, Canic, & Mullett, 2016). Are 
other results that found differences between conditions affected by these findings? 
Implications. The findings of this chapter raise important methodological aspects: 
While the call for replications (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) is indeed crucial and 
an important step in the right direction, here we find that problems with the decision by 
sampling account only arise when we went beyond replication. Moreover, by using Levitt 
and List’s (2009) methodology and our subsequent meta-analysis, it made us realize that 
there is a problem with the conclusions that might be drawn when only using exact 
replications to confirm certain findings. Specifically, we now know that the SRH effect 
reported in Stewart, Reimers and Harris (2015) cannot be attributed to DbS proposed 
mechanism. Although the DbS model predicted the SRH results in advance, and the SRH 
result replicates well, our extensions show that DbS is almost certainly not the 
explanation of the effect. Therefore, the SRH effect must be caused either via a yet 
unspecified mechanism. Alternatively, although our modeling procedure of fitting 
expected utility to reveal risk aversion is pretty standard in this field, the results here 
suggest this could be the problem, and indeed it is (Stewart, Canic, & Mullett, 2016). 
There is no reason to believe that other results using the same or a similar procedure do 
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not suffer from the same draw-backs. Furthermore, these results prompted more specific 
investigations in identifying the cause for the SRH effect. As our findings show, the 
effect is robust and substantial, despite the fact that DbS is unlikely to be its origin. This 
fact further questions preference-based accounts of choice. 
Chapter 3    
 Overview. The Chapter 3 experiments are set up very similarly to the Chapter 2 
experiments. We were still interested in the choice mechanism responsible for the SRH 
effect. Our premise was that cognitive load interferes with the decision making process 
under risk (Unsworth & Heitz, 2007). The DbS proposed cognitive tools are sampling, 
pairwise comparisons and frequency accumulation, and they should all depend on 
cognitive capacity and thus might all be affected by cognitive load. Therefore, working 
memory is assumed to play a major role in the proposed mechanism. Specifically, DbS 
predicts that whilst under cognitive load, it would be hard for participants to either keep 
track of the sample of attribute values presented, or the probability of making mistakes 
could be increased during pairwise comparisons or frequency accumulation, if this is how 
the process works. We used a blocked within-subjects design where participants made 
consecutive choices, sometimes under high cognitive load and sometimes under low or 
no cognitive load. The estimated value functions resulting from choices under high 
cognitive load, closely resembled the value functions resulting from choices under low or 
no cognitive load. Does this mean that choices remained unaffected by cognitive load? 
We tested additional hypotheses, namely that cognitive load leads to noisier choices 
(Andersson et al., 2013) and that cognitive load leads to more risk averse choices 
(Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013). Using the same modelling procedure, we found no 
!!
163 
effect of cognitive load on risk aversion. However, cognitive load did decrease choice 
consistency across all three experiments run in this chapter.  
Implications. To our knowledge, this was the first attempt at using a cognitive 
load manipulation in order to detect possible mechanisms of the SRH effect. We took 
advantage of our design to check for evidence of other hypotheses also, namely that 
cognitive load increases risk aversion and that cognitive load decreases choice 
consistency. Whilst the SRH effect seemed unaffected by cognitive load, which further 
points away from DbS as its originating mechanism, our estimates of decreasing choice 
consistency confirm Andersson et al.’s findings (2013). Especially given that risk 
aversion remained unaffected by cognitive load, our findings also suggest that studies 
relating cognitive capacities and cognitive load with risky decision making need to be 
able to control for choice consistency. Otherwise, spurious results cannot be excluded. It 
is also worth thinking about other results that might be affected by the same issue. As 
more evidence emerges that risk aversion remains unaffected by cognitive load (see 
Olschewski, Scheibehenne, & Rieskamp, 2015), it raises the question whether results of 
studies which find a relationship with cognitive capacities and choice behavior so far 
(and which we reviewed earlier), are confounded. 
Chapters 4 and 5  
Overview. In Chapter 4 we review evidence for the rank hypothesis and estimate 
rank effects in judgment and risky choice with yet unpublished data collected by Stewart 
and Reimers (2008). We present over 20 papers with different response modes and 
distribution manipulations with varying dependent variables including behavioral or 
neurophysiological measures. The findings support the rank hypothesis and none of the 
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studies uses modelling procedures that might be contaminated with the same problems 
that the previous two chapters face. Some studies found context effects when 
manipulating the range or the skew of the response scale (Birnbaum, 1992; Stewart et al., 
2003), other manipulated the range or skew of the attributes in the choice set (Vlaev et 
al., 2007; Walasek & Stewart, 2015) and still others manipulate the background context 
(Janiszewski & Lichtenstein, 1999). There is not just behavioural, but also 
neurophysiological evidence for context effects; Studies found that brain regions 
associated with valuation, are activated according to the relative value of prizes on offer 
(Mullett & Tunney, 2013), and other activation pointed to non-linear mapping between 
objective reward and subjective value (Rigoli et al. 2016). There is also evidence for 
comparison processes when looking at the monkey brain in more detail, by measuring the 
activation in single cells: Activation was higher for an outcome that was favored over 
another outcome, than if the same outcome was not favored over an alternative outcome, 
showing relativity in neural responding. We present an additional study that is in line 
with the reviewed findings. In seven experiments, Stewart and Reimers (2008) asked 
participants to rate the attractiveness of prospects or to choose between two prospects. 
They varied the rank position of one or both attribute value (either the probability only or 
the amount only or both) between conditions and found higher attractiveness ratings for 
common prospects if these prospects were presented with positively skewed attribute 
values than if they were presented with negatively skewed attribute values. This is 
because a common value will have a higher rank position in a positively skewed 
distribution than a negatively skewed distribution, other factors like range held constant. 
They also found that the preference for a critical prospect reversed if its attribute values 
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ranked lower than if they ranked higher within the attribute values presented up until the 
critical choice. Given the SRH effect in the within-subjects design experiments and no 
effect of cognitive load in Chapter 3, we cannot conclude that the malleability of 
preference functions can be attributed to DbS proposed cognitive tools. Here, however, 
the context effects can only emerge through adaptation to the attribute values the 
participants were exposed to during the course of the experiment. Thus even if the 
estimated value functions do not originate via a decision-by-sampling-like process, the 
conclusion remains that attributes of prospects are evaluated relative to other available 
attributes in the environment and or in memory. 
 In Chapter 5 we build on the findings from Chapter 4. We know that prospects 
with attribute values that rank higher among other attribute values in the sample are also 
perceived as more attractive than prospects with attribute values that rank lower (Stewart 
& Reimers, 2008). We combine this finding with findings from Kassam et al. (2011): 
They asked participants to choose between two scratch panels, which hid different prizes. 
They found prize sensitivity in positive affect ratings when participants win the lower of 
the two prizes, but insensitivity when participants win the higher of the two prizes. Thus, 
participants report an equally high positive affect no matter if they win $7 instead of $5 
or $3 instead of $1. However, participants report a lower positive affect when they win 
$1 instead of $3 than when they win $5 instead of $7. Kassam et al. attribute this 
asymmetry to the comparisons that people make. They test this hypothesis by introducing 
cognitive load and find evidence that supports their hypothesis: Under cognitive load–
presumably unable to make further comparisons–participants’ positive affect ratings were 
suddenly insensitive to the absolute prize value. Only under low cognitive load did prize 
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sensitivity remain. We use Kassam et al.’s insight and test the hypothesis that people 
compare their prize not just with the salient foregone prize that remains on the screen, but 
also with other recently experienced prizes. We manipulated the rank position of a won 
and salient foregone prize and expected to find lower positive affect ratings when the 
prize won was several ranks lower than the foregone prize and relatively high affect 
ratings when the prize won was only one rank lower than the foregone prize. In contrast 
to our expectations and the rank hypothesis, participants positive affect ratings seem 
unaffected by the rank position of the prize and its alternative within the sample of 
previously experienced prizes. In contrast to Kassam et al.’s findings, we found no effect 
of cognitive load on the reported positive affect. However, we might not even expect an 
effect, given that we did not find evidence for the rank hypothesis either. So when do 
people form judgments through comparison processes and adjust to the context and when 
do they not adjust? 
 Implications. We establish a firm basis for the relativity of prospects, outcomes 
and their context-dependent representation in the brain, and we were surprised by the null 
results in Chapter 5. They imply that when a prize (outcome in the domain of gains) is 
evaluated in the context of a higher prize, the relative rank position of both prizes within 
the experimental context is not used to evaluate the prize. We could speculate that the 
null result is due to the prize range being very familiar, which made the context 
manipulation too weak, or that the fact that the prizes were hypothetical made 
participants not engage enough with the experiment. However, whilst one could explore 
other prize ranges or use incentives to be able to exclude those reasons for sure, it would 
not explain why some findings in Chapter 4 still display rank effects even though they 
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were conducted under similar conditions. Still, it might be as simple as the familiarity 
argument (see Mellers, Ordonez and Birnbaum, 1992): Because people are very familiar 
with the feeling of having received some amount that ranges between £1 and £100, the 
comparisons that automatically come to people’s minds are numbers from £1 to £100. 
This would make the comparisons with the prizes from the experimental context some 
among many others, which in turn would be insufficient to yield observable rank effects. 
If this is true, one should establish when and to what degree long-term memory as well as 
effects from the immediate context influence the evaluation of outcomes.  
Chapter 6 
 Overview. In Chapter 6 we used the mutable-zero effect (Scholten et al., 2016) to 
look at which counterfactuals influence the evaluation of an option. The mutable-zero 
effect is the phenomenon that an option is more likely to be chosen when it entails a zero 
outcome that is described as “pay zero” instead of “receive zero”. Scholten et al. 
hypothesized that the effect emerges through the comparisons that people make: When 
people encounter “pay zero”, other payments come to mind, which make “pay zero” 
comparably desirable. On the other hand, when people encounter “receive zero”, other 
receipts come to mind, which make “receive zero” comparably undesirable. We tested 
whether all counterfactuals provided by the experimental context can shift preference, or 
whether only counterfactuals provided by the experimental context that match the 
mutable-zero category (category-consistent counterfactuals) can shift preference. We also 
tested an interaction hypothesis, in which only when people encounter a disappointing 
“receive zero” do people make further comparisons so that all counterfactuals will be 
able to shift participants’ preferences. When participants encounter a happy “pay zero”, 
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participants will not make further comparisons so that the counterfactuals provided by the 
experimental context will have no effect. We consistently found that whilst 
experimentally provided context influences valuation when zero stands on its own 
without “pay” or “receive” standing in front of it, counterfactuals provided by the context 
affect valuation in the same way as “pay zero” or “receive zero” do. However, as soon as 
zero is preceded by “pay” or “receive” the category blocks comparisons with 
counterfactuals that are inconsistent with the mutable-zero category so that only 
category-consistent counterfactuals are decisive for the evaluation process. This is a quite 
striking result: Adding a single word (either “pay” or “receive”) completely eliminated 
the otherwise strong effects of the distribution of attribute values in the experiment. 
 Implications. The findings reported in this chapter nicely build up on the 
hypothesis that long-term memory as well as the immediate context play important roles 
in the evaluation process of alternatives. Here, the long-term memory component is 
represented in terms of a representation of amounts that belong to the category “pay” or 
“receive”. Even if the experimental or the choice context provide actual counterfactuals, 
they are not taken into account when they are not consistent with the category of the 
attribute to be evaluated. Thus an existing category will block category-inconsistent 
counterfactual values. This also suggests some kind of monitoring process and 
representation of the world that involves both, a long-term and a working-memory 
component. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that the manipulation of the choices presented to participants does 
robustly alter the utility functions elicited from those participants. But the results are 
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unlikely to be due to the decision-by-sampling mechanism in which the attribute values 
in the choices are evaluated by accumulating favorable pairwise ordinal comparisons 
between them. We reach this conclusion because we find different utility functions are 
elicited when different subsets of retrospectively partitioned choice sets are used to 
estimate them. This points to a problem using models like prospect theory and expected 
utility to reveal utility functions (and which we confirm in Stewart, Canic, & Mullett, 
2016).  
We have also not found any evidence that working memory plays a role in 
decision making; not in the SRH effect nor in the “winners love winning losers love 
money” effect, beyond affecting the consistency of people’s choices: Higher load makes 
people a bit more random. However, given that there might be an issue with the 
estimation procedure in the SRH effect and that we did not find a robust effect of the 
experimental context in the “winners love winning losers love money” effect, we should 
perhaps not conclude too much from this failure.  
There is overwhelming evidence for context effects like those that decision by 
sampling predicts, and we have used a meta-analysis on some simpler experimental 
designs where we can see shits in ratings for common gambles, or shifts in preference for 
common choices, as we vary the distribution of attribute values across experimental 
conditions. We have also been able to place boundaries of what kinds of comparisons 
matter in affecting valuations, and in exploring the mutable zero effect, we have added to 
evidence that comparisons only spontaneously happen within gains, or within losses, but 
not across gains and losses.
!!
170 
References 
Abele, A. (1985). Thinking about thinking: Causal, evaluative and finalistic cognitions about 
social situations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 315–332.  
Ackerman, P. L., Beier, M. E., & Boyle, M. O. (2005). Working memory and intelligence: The 
same or different constructs? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 30–60. 
Adaval, R., & Monroe, K. B. (2002). Automatic construction and use of contextual information 
for product and price evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 28, 572–588. 
Aldrovandi, S., Wood, A. M., & Brown, G. D. (2013). Sentencing, severity, and social norms: A 
rank-based model of contextual influence on judgments of crimes and punishments. Acta 
psychologica, 144, 538–547. 
Alempaki, D., Canic, E. Mullett, T., Tufano, F., Matthews, W., Stewart, N., Starmer, C. (2016). 
Examining how utility and weighting function get their shapes: A multi-level, quasi-
adversarial replication. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Allais, M. (1953). L'extension des théories de l'équilibre économique général et du rendement 
social au cas du risque. Econometrica, Journal of the Econometric Society, 269–290. 
Anderson, J. R., & Schooler, L. J. (1991). Reflections of the environment in 
memory. Psychological Science, 2, 396-408. 
Andersson, O., Tyran, J. R., Wengström, E., & Holm, H. J. (2013). Risk aversion relates to 
cognitive ability: Fact or fiction? (IFN Working Paper No.964). Stockholm: Research 
Institute of Industrial Economics. 
Arvai, J., Gregory, R., Ohlson, D., Blackwell, B., & Gray, R. (2006). Letdowns, wake-up calls, 
and constructed preferences: people’s responses to fuel and wildfire risks. Journal of 
Forestry, 104, 173–181.  
!!
171 
Ayal, S., & Hochman, G. U. Y. (2009). Ignorance or integration: The cognitive processes 
underlying choice behavior. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22, 455–474. 
Barberis, N., & Thaler, R. (2003). A survey of behavioral finance. Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance, 1, 1053–1128. 
Baron, J. (2007). Thinking and deciding (4th ed.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Barrouillet, P., Portrat, S., & Camos, V. (2011). On the law relating processing to storage in 
working memory. Psychological Review, 118, 175–192. 
Bateman, I., Kahneman, D., Munro, A., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (2005). Testing competing 
models of loss aversion: An adversarial collaboration. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 
1561–1580. 
Beauchamp, J. P., Benjamin, D. J., Chabris, C. F., & Laibson, D. I. (2012). How malleable are 
risk preferences and loss aversion. Working paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
http://economics. cornell. edu/dbenjamin/HowMalleableareRisk 
PreferencesandLossAversion_3-10-2012-Combined. pdf. 
Benartzi, S., & Thaler, R.H. (2001). Naive diversification strategies in defined contribution 
saving plans. American Economic Review. 91, 79–98.  
Benjamin, D. J., Brown, S. A., & Shapiro, J. M. (2013). Who is ‘behavioral’? Cognitive ability 
and anomalous preferences. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 1231–
1255. 
Bergman, O., Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., & Svensson, C. (2010). Anchoring and cognitive 
ability. Economics Letters, 107, 66–68. 
Bernoulli, D. (1954, original 1738). Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk. 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 23–36. 
!!
172 
Birnbaum, M. H. (1992). Violations of the monotonicity and contextual effects in choice-based 
certainty equivalents. Psychological Science, 3, 310–314. 
Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Causes of Allais common consequence paradoxes: An experimental 
dissection. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 48, 87–106. 
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008a). Evaluation of the priority heuristic as a descriptive model of risky 
decision making: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006). 
Psychological Review, 115, 253–260. 
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008). New paradoxes of risky decision making. Psychological Review, 115, 
463–501. 
Birnbaum, M. H. (2010). Testing lexicographic semiorders as models of decision making: 
Priority dominance, integration, interaction, and transitivity. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology, 54, 363–386. 
Birnbaum, M. H., & Bahra, J. P. (2007). Gain-loss separability and coalescing in risky decision 
making. Management Science, 53, 1016–1028. 
Birnbaum, M. H., & McIntosh, W. R. (1996). Violations of branch independence in choices 
between gambles. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67, 91–110. 
Birnbaum, M. H., & Navarrete, J. B. (1998). Testing descriptive utility theories: Violations of 
stochastic dominance and cumulative independence. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 17, 
49–79. 
Birnbaum, M. H., & Stegner, S. E. (1979). Source credibility in social judgment: Bias, expertise, 
and the judge's point of view. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 48–74. 
Bohm, P., Linden, J., & Sonnegard, J. (1997). Eliciting Reservation Prices: Becker DeGroot- 
Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets. Economic Journal, 107, 1079–1089. 
!!
173 
Boyce, C. J., Brown, G. D., & Moore, S. C. (2010). Money and happiness rank of income, not 
income, affects life satisfaction. Psychological Science, 21, 471–475. 
Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). The priority heuristic: making choices 
without trade-offs. Psychological Review, 113, 409–432. 
Brown, G. D., Gardner, J., Oswald, A. J., & Qian, J. (2008). Does Wage Rank Affect Employees’ 
Well"being? Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 47, 355–389. 
Bruza, B., Welsh, M. B., Navarro, D. J. (2008). Does memory mediate susceptibility to cognitive 
biases? Implications of the Decision-by-Sampling theory. Proceedings of the 30th Annual 
meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 1498–1503. 
Burks, S. V., Carpenter, J. P., Goette, L., & Rustichini, A. (2009). Cognitive skills affect 
economic preferences, strategic behavior, and job attachment. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 106, 7745–7750. 
Busemeyer, J. R., & Townsend, J. T. (1993). Decision field theory: A dynamic-cognitive 
approach to decision making in an uncertain environment. Psychological Review, 100, 
432–459. 
Camerer, C. F. (1992). Recent tests of generalizations of expected utility theory. In W. Edwards 
(Ed.), Utility theories: Measurements and applications (pp. 207–251). Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Canic, E. (2016). Affective evaluation of monetary outcomes is unaffected by rank position. (In 
unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.  
Card, D., Mas, A., Moretti, E., & Saez, E. (2012). Inequality at work: The effect of peer salaries 
on job satisfaction. The American Economic Review, 102, 2981–3003. 
Carmon, Z., & Ariely, D. (2000). Focusing on the forgone: How value can appear so different to 
buyers and sellers. Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 360–370.  
!!
174 
Clark, A.E., Frijters, P., & Shields, M.A. (2008). Relative income, happiness, and utility: An 
explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and other puzzles. Journal of Economic Literature, 
46, 95–144.  
Cokely, E. T., & Kelley, C. M. (2009). Cognitive abilities and superior decision making under 
risk: A protocol analysis and process model evaluation. Judgment and Decision 
Making, 4, 20–33. 
Colom, R., Flores-Mendoza, C., & Rebollo, I. (2003). Working memory and 
intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences, 34, 33–39. 
Conway, A. R., Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2003). Working memory capacity and its relation to 
general intelligence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 547–552. 
Corbin, J., McElroy, T., & Black, C. (2010). Memory reflected in our decisions: Higher working 
memory capacity predicts greater bias in risky choice. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 
110–115. 
Corrigan, J. R., Drichoutis, A. C., Lusk, J. L., Nayga, R. M., & Rousu, M. C. (2011). Repeated 
rounds with price feedback in experimental auction valuation: An adversarial 
collaboration. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, aar066. 
Deck, C., & Jahedi, S. (2015). The effect of cognitive load on economic decision making: A 
survey and new experiments. European Economic Review, 78, 97–119. 
De Neys, W. (2006). Dual processing in reasoning two systems but one reasoner. Psychological 
science, 17, 428–433. 
Dhar, R., Nowlis, S. M., & Sherman, S. J. (2000). Trying hard or hardly trying: An analysis of 
context effects in choice. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 9, 189–200. 
Dohmen, T. J., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2007). Are risk aversion and impatience 
related to cognitive ability? IZA Discussion Papers, No. 2735, http://nbn-
!!
175 
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-20080402396 
Dougherty, M. R. P., Gettys, C. F., & Ogden, E. E. (1999). MINERVA-DM: A memory process 
model for judgments of likelihood. Psychological Review, 106, 180–209.  
Dougherty, M. P. R., & Hunter, J. (2003a). Hypothesis generation, probability judgment, and 
individual differences in working memory capacity. Acta Psychologica, 113, 263–282. 
Dougherty, M. P. R., & Hunter, J. (2003b). Probability judgment and subadditivity: The role of 
working memory capacity and constraining retrieval. Memory & Cognition, 31, 968–982. 
Drichoutis, A. C., & Nayga, R. M. (2013). Eliciting risk and time preferences under induced 
mood states. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 45, 18-27. 
Dunlop, W. P., Cortina, J. M., Vaslow, J. B., & Burke, M. J. (1996). Meta-analysis of 
experiments with matched groups or repeated measures designs. Psychological Methods, 
1, 170–177. 
Dunning, D., & Hayes, A.F. (1996). Evidence for egocentric comparison in social judgment. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 213–229. 
Edwards, W. (1955). The prediction of decisions among bets. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 50, 201–214. 
Edwards, W. (1962). Subjective probabilities inferred from decisions. Psychological Review, 69, 
109–135. 
Elliott, R., Agnew, Z., & Deakin, J. F. W. (2008). Medial orbitofrontal cortex codes relative 
rather than absolute value of financial rewards in humans. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 27, 2213–2218. 
Engle, R. W. (2002). Working memory capacity as executive attention. Current directions in 
Psychological Science, 11, 19–23. 
!!
176 
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999). Working memory, 
short term memory, and general fluid intelligence: A latent variable approach. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 309–331. 
Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 12, 168–192. 
Ert, E., & Erev, I. (2013). On the descriptive value of loss aversion in decisions under risk: Six 
clarifications. Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 214–235. 
Etchart-Vincent, N. (2004). Is probability weighting sensitive to the magnitude of consequences? 
An experimental investigation on losses. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 28, 217–235. 
Evans, J. S. B. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annual Reviews in Psychology, 59, 255–278. 
Fehr-Duda, H., Bruhin, A., Epper, T., & Schubert, R. (2010). Rationality on the rise: Why 
relative risk aversion increases with stake size. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 40, 147–
180.  
Fehr-Duda, H., Epper, T., Bruhin, A., & Schubert, R. (2011). Risk and rationality: The effects of 
mood and decision rules on probability weighting. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 78, 14–24. 
Fiedler, K. (2010). How to study cognitive decision algorithms: The case of the priority 
heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 21–32. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 10, 171–178. 
Fischer, G. W., & Hawkins, S. A. (1993). Strategy compatibility, scale compatibility, and the 
prominence effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 19, 580–597. 
!!
177 
Franco-Watkins, A. M., Rickard, T. C., & Pashler, H. (2015). Taxing executive processes does 
not necessarily increase impulsive decision making. Experimental Psychology, 57, 193–
201. 
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19, 25–42. 
Friedman, D., Isaac, R. M., James, D., and Sunder, S. (2014). Risky curves. On the empirical 
failure of expected utility. Routledge, NY: Princeton University Press.  
Galanter, E., & Pliner, P. (1974). Cross-modality matching of money against other continua (pp. 
65-76). Springer Netherlands. 
Getz, S. J. (2013). Cognitive Control and Intertemporal Choice: The Role of Cognitive Control in 
Impulsive Decision Making (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Princeton University, 
Princeton, NJ. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox. In Simple 
heuristics that make us smart (pp. 3-34). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gilbert, D.T., Giesler, R.B., & Morris, K.A. (1995). When comparisons arise. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 227–236.  
Gilbert, D.T., Lieberman, M.D., Morewedge, C.K., & Wilson, T.D. (2004). The peculiar 
longevity of things not so bad. Psychological Science, 15, 14–19.  
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008). Do people make decisions under risk based on ignorance? an 
empirical test of the priority heuristic against cumulative prospect theory. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 107, 75–95. 
Greiner, B. (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE. 
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1, 114-125. 
!!
178 
Haggag, K., & Paci, G. (2014). Default tips. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6, 
1–19. 
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior. New York: Wiley. 
Helson, H. (1964). Current trends and issues in adaptation-level theory. American 
Psychologist, 19, 26–38. 
Hilbig, B. E. (2008). One-reason decision making in risky choice? A closer look at the priority 
heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 457–462. 
Hinson, J. M., Jameson, T. L., & Whitney, P. (2003). Impulsive decision making and working 
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 29, 
298–306. 
Hsee, C. K. (1996). The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation for preference reversals between 
joint and separate evaluations of alternatives. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 67, 247–257. 
Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S., & Bazerman, M. H. (1999). Preference reversals 
between joint and separate evaluations of options: a review and theoretical 
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 576–590. 
Hsee, C. K., & Zhang, J. A. (2010). General evaluability theory. Perspectives On Psychological 
Science, 5, 343–355. 
Holroyd, C. B., Larsen, J. T., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). Context dependence of the event"related 
brain potential associated with reward and punishment. Psychophysiology, 41, 245–253. 
Jameson, T. L., Hinson, J. M., & Whitney, P. (2004). Components of working memory and 
somatic markers in decision making. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 515–520. 
Janiszewski, C., & Lichtenstein, D. R. (1999). A range theory account of price 
perception. Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 353–368. 
!!
179 
Janiszewski, C., & Van Osselaer, S. M. (2000). A connectionist model of brand-quality 
associations. Journal of Marketing Research, 37, 331–350. 
  
Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g factor: The science of mental ability. Politics and the Life Sciences, 
17, 230–232. 
Johnson, E. J., Häubl, G., & Keinan, A. (2007). Aspects of endowment: a query theory of value 
construction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 
461–474. 
Johnson, E. J., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., & Willemsen, M. C. (2008). Process models deserve 
process data: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006). Psychological 
Review, 115, 263–272. 
Kahneman, D. (2003a). Experiences of collaborative research. American Psychologist, 58, 723–
730. 
Kahneman, D. (2003b). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. The 
American Economic Review, 93, 1449–1475. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan. 
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2007). Frames and brains: Elicitation and control of response 
tendencies. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 45–46. 
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. 
Psychological Review, 93, 136–153. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under 
risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47, 263–291. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39, 
341–350. 
!!
180 
Kane, M. J., Hambrick, D. Z., & Conway, A. R. (2005). Working memory capacity and fluid 
intelligence are strongly related constructs: comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle 
(2005). Psychological Bulletin, 131, 66–71. 
Kanouse, D. E., & Hanson Jr, L. R. (1987). Negativity in evaluations. In E. E. Jones, D. E. 
Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: 
Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 47–62). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
Kassam, K. S., Morewedge, C. K., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2011). Winners love winning 
and losers love money. Psychological Science, 22, 602–606. 
Kobayashi, S., de Carvalho, O. P., & Schultz, W. (2010). Adaptation of reward sensitivity in 
orbitofrontal neurons. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 534–544. 
Kőszegi, B., & Rabin, M. (2006). A model of reference-dependent preferences. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 121, 1133–1165. 
Kyllonen, P. C. (2002). g: Knowledge, speed, strategies, or working-memory capacity? A 
systems perspective. In R. J. Sternberg, & E. L. Grigorenko (Eds.), The General Factor of 
Intelligence: How General Is It (pp. 415-445). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Laming, D. R. J. (1997). The measurement of sensation. London: Oxford University Press. 
Larsen, J. T., McGraw, A. P., Mellers, B. A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2004). The agony of victory and 
thrill of defeat mixed emotional reactions to disappointing wins and relieving 
losses. Psychological Science, 15, 325–330. 
Latham, G. P., Erez, M., & Locke, E. A. (1988). Resolving scientific disputes by the joint design 
of crucial experiments by the antagonists: Application to the Erez–Latham dispute 
regarding participation in goal setting. Journal of Applied Psychology, 73, 753–772. 
!!
181 
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2009). Field experiments in economics: the past, the present, and the 
future. European Economic Review, 53, 1–18. 
Lewicka, M., Czapinski, J., & Peeters, G. (1992). Positive"negative asymmetry or ‘When the 
heart needs a reason’. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 425–434. 
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices in 
gambling decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46–55. 
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under 
uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.  
Loomes, G. (2010). Modeling choice and valuation in decision experiments. Psychological 
Review, 117, 902–924. 
Luce, R.D. (1959) Individual Choice Behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Mandel, D. R. (2014). Do framing effects reveal irrational choice? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 143, 1185–1198. 
Maniadis, Z., Tufano, F., & List, J. A. (2014). One swallow doesn’t make a summer: New 
evidence on anchoring effects. The American Economic Review, 104, 277–290. 
Mazar, N., Koszegi, B., & Ariely, D. (2014). True Context"dependent Preferences? The Causes 
of Market"dependent Valuations. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 27, 200–208. 
McGraw, A. P., Larsen, J. T., Kahneman, D., & Schkade, D. (2010). Comparing gains and 
losses. Psychological Science, 21, 1438–1445. 
Medin, D. L., Goldstone, R. L., & Markman, A. B. (1995). Comparison and choice: Relations 
between similarity processes and decision-processes. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2, 
1–19. 
!!
182 
Medvec, V. H., Madey, S. F., & Gilovich, T. (1995). When less is more: counterfactual thinking 
and satisfaction among Olympic medalists. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 69, 603–610. 
Mellers, B., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D. (2001). Do frequency representations eliminate 
conjunction effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration. Psychological Science, 12, 
269–275. 
Mellers, B. A., Ordoñez, L. D., & Birnbaum, M. H. (1992). A change-of-process theory for 
contextual effects and preference reversals in risky decision making. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52, 331–369. 
Mellers, B.A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I. (1997). Decision affect theory: Emotional 
reactions to the outcomes of risky options. Psychological Science, 8, 210–214.  
Melrose, K. L., Brown, G. D., & Wood, A. M. (2013). Am I abnormal? Relative rank and social 
norm effects in judgments of anxiety and depression symptom severity. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 26, 174–184. 
Morewedge, C.K., Gilbert, D.T., Myrseth, K.O.R., Kassam, K.S., & Wilson, T.D. (2010). 
Consuming experience: Why affective forecasters overestimate comparative value. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 986–992.  
Oberauer, K., Schulze, R., Wilhelm, O., & Süß, H. M. (2005). Working memory and 
intelligence–their correlation and their relation: comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle 
(2005). Psychological Bulletin, 131, 61–65. 
Oberauer, K., Süß, H. M., Schulze, R., Wilhelm, O., & Wittmann, W. W. (2000). Working 
memory capacity–facets of a cognitive ability construct. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 29, 10171045. 
!!
183 
Oechssler, J., Roider, A., & Schmitz, P. W. (2009). Cognitive abilities and behavioral 
biases. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72, 147–152. 
Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. 
Science, 349, aac4716. 
Payne, J. W. (1976). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: An 
information search and protocol analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 16, 366–387. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman J. R., & Schkade D.A. (1999). Measuring constructed preferences: towards 
a building code. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19, 243–270.  
Payne, J. W., Samper, A., Bettman, J. R., & Luce, M. F. (2008). Boundary conditions on 
unconscious thought in complex decision making. Psychological Science, 19, 1118–
1123. 
Parducci, A. (1959). An adaptation-level analysis of ordinal effects in judgments. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 58, 239–246. 
Parducci, A. (1963). Range-frequency compromise in judgment. Psychological Monographs: 
General and Applied, 77, 1–50. 
Parducci, A. (1965). Category judgment: a range-frequency model. Psychological Review, 72, 
407–418. 
Parducci, A. (1974). Contextual effects: A range-frequency analysis. In L. Carterette & M. P. 
Friedman (Eds.), Handbook of perception (Vol. 2, pp. 127–141). New York: Academic 
Press. 
!!
184 
Parducci, A., Calfee, R. C., Marshall, L. M., & Davidson, L. P. (1960). Context effects in 
judgment: Adaptation level as a function of the mean, midpoint, and median of the 
stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 60, 65–77. 
Peeters, G. (1971). The positive"negative asymmetry: On cognitive consistency and positivity 
bias. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 455–474 
Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction 
between affective and informational negativity effects. European Review of Social 
Psychology, 1, 33–60. 
Prelec, D., Wernerfelt, B., & Zettelmeyer, F. (1997). The role of inference in context effects: 
Inferring what you want from what is available. Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 118–
126. 
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & LaPrelle, J. (1985). Social comparison after success and 
failure: Biased search for information consistent with a self-serving conclusion. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 195–211.  
Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 3, 323–343. 
Rieger, M. O., & Wang, M. (2008). What is behind the priority heuristic? A mathematical 
analysis and comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006). Psychological 
Review, 115, 274–280. 
Rieskamp, J., Busemeyer, J. R., & Mellers, B. A. (2006). Extending the bounds of rationality: 
evidence and theories of preferential choice. Journal of Economic Literature, 44, 631–
661. 
Roese, N. J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 133–148. 
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. 
!!
185 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 296–320.  
Reyna, V. F. (2008). A theory of medical decision making and health: fuzzy trace 
theory. Medical Decision Making, 28, 850–865. 
Rick, S. (2011). Losses, gains, and brains: Neuroeconomics can help to answer open questions 
about loss aversion. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21, 453–463. 
Rigoli, F., Friston, K. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2016). Neural processes mediating contextual influences 
on human choice behaviour. Nature Communications, 7, 12416. 
Rigoli, F., Rutledge, R. B., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2016). The influence of contextual reward 
statistics on risk preference. NeuroImage, 128, 74–84. 
Sakaguchi, H., & Stweart, N. (2016). Negative Tweets Have More Reasoning Statements than 
Positive Tweets: An Evidence for the Negativity Bias in Twitter. Manuscript in 
preparation. 
Scholten, M., Read, D., Canic, E., & Stewart, N. (2015). The scope and specificity of the 
mutable-zero effect. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Seymour, B., & McClure, S. M. (2008). Anchors, scales and the relative coding of value in the 
brain. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 18, 173–178. 
Shafir, E. (1993). Choosing versus rejecting: Why some options are both better and worse than 
others. Memory & Cognition, 21, 546–556.  
Shanks, D. R. (2006). Bayesian associative learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 477–478. 
Shanks, D. R. (2010). Learning: From association to cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 
273–301. 
Shepard, R.N. (1957). Stimulus and response generalization: A stochastic model relating 
generalization to distance in psychological space. Psychometrica, 22, 325–345. 
!!
186 
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The quarterly journal of economics, 
69, 99–118. 
Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1992). Choice in context: Tradeoff contrast and extremeness 
aversion. Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 281–295. 
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 119, 3–22. 
Slovic, P., & MacPhillamy, D. (1974). Dimensional commensurability and cue utilization in 
comparative judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 11, 172–194. 
Sprenger, A., & Dougherty, M. R. (2006). Differences between probability and frequency 
judgments: The role of individual differences in working memory 
capacity. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99, 202–211. 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 161–188. 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Advancing the rationality debate. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 23, 701–717. 
Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1989). Violations of the independence axiom in common ratio 
problems: An experimental test of some competing hypotheses. Annals of Operations 
Research, 19, 79–102. 
Stewart, N. (2009). Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 1041–1062. 
Stewart, N., Canic, E., & Mullett, T. (2017). On the futility of estimating utility functions: Why 
the parameters we measure are wrong, and why they do not generalize. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
!!
187 
Stewart, N., Chater, N., & Brown, G.D.A. (2006). Decision by sampling. Cognitive Psychology, 
53, 1–26.  
Stewart, N., Chater, N., Stott, H. P., & Reimers, S. (2003). Prospect relativity: How choice 
options influence decision under risk. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 
23–46. 
Stewart, N. & Reimers, S. (2008). How the distribution of attribute values influences ratings of 
risky prospects. Unpublished manuscript. 
Stewart, N., Reimers, S., & Harris, A. J. (2015). On the origin of utility, weighting, and 
discounting functions: How they get their shapes and how to change their 
shapes. Management Science, 61, 687–705. 
Strack, F., Schwarz, N., & Gschneidinger, E. (1985). Happiness and reminiscing: The role of 
time perspective, affect, and mode of thinking. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 49, 1460–1469. 
Taylor, S. E. (1991). Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: the mobilization-
minimization hypothesis. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 67–85. 
Tremblay, L., & Schultz, W. (1999). Relative reward preference in primate orbitofrontal 
cortex. Nature, 398, 704–708. 
Tversky, A. (1969). Intransitivity of preferences. Psychological Review, 76, 31–48. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent 
model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1039–1061. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of 
uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323. 
Ungemach, C., Stewart, N., & Reimers, S. (2011). How incidental values from the environment 
affect decisions about money, risk, and delay. Psychological Science, 22, 253–260. 
!!
188 
Unsworth, N., & Engle, R. W. (2005). Working memory capacity and fluid abilities: Examining 
the correlation between Operation Span and Raven. Intelligence, 33, 67–81. 
Van Osselaer, S. M., & Alba, J. W. (2000). Consumer learning and brand equity. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 27, 1–16. 
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 36, 1-48. 
Vlaev, I., Chater, N., & Stewart, N. (2007). Financial prospect relativity: context effects in 
financial decision"making under risk. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 273–
304. 
Vlaev, I., Chater, N., Stewart, N., & Brown, G. D. (2011). Does the brain calculate value? Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 546–554. 
Vlaev, I., Seymour, B., Dolan, R. J., & Chater, N. (2009). The price of pain and the value of 
suffering. Psychological Science, 20, 309–317. 
von Neumann, M., & Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (2nd 
ed.).!Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Walasek, L., & Stewart, N. (2015). How to make loss aversion disappear and reverse: Tests of 
the decision by sampling origin of loss aversion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 144, 7–11. 
Warren, C., McGraw, A. P., & Van Boven, L. (2011). Values and preferences: Defining 
preference construction. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2, 193–205. 
Watkinson, P., Wood, A. M., Lloyd, D., & Brown, G. D. A. (2013). Pain ratings reflect cognitive 
context: A range frequency model of pain. Pain, 154, 743–749. 
!!
189 
Weber, E. U., Johnson, E. J., Milch, K. F., Chang, H., Brodscholl, J. C., & Goldstein, D. G. 
(2007). Asymmetric discounting in intertemporal choice a query-theory 
account. Psychological Science, 18, 516–523. 
Wedell, D. H. (1991). Distinguishing among models of contextually induced preference 
reversals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 
767–778. 
Whitney, P., Rinehart, C. A., & Hinson, J. M. (2008). Framing effects under cognitive load: 
The role of working memory in risky decisions. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 1179–1184. 
Wood, A. M., Brown, G. D. A., & Maltby, J. (2011). Thanks, but I'm used to better: A relative 
rank model of gratitude. Emotion, 11, 175–180.  
Wu, G., & Markle, A. B. (2008). An empirical test of gain-loss separability in prospect 
theory. Management Science, 54, 1322–1335. 
Yeung, N., & Sanfey, A. G. (2004). Independent coding of reward magnitude and valence in the 
human brain. The Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 6258–6264. 
Yoon, S. O., & Simonson, I. (2008). Choice set configuration as a determinant of preference 
attribution and strength. Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 324–336. 
Zhang, S., & Markman, A. B. (2001). Processing product unique features: Alignability and 
involvement in preference construction. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 11, 13–27. 
  
!!
190 
Appendix A 
The calculation errors in the SRH’s original analysis that were discovered as a result of 
our Level 1 replication analysis are as follows: 
•! In experiment SRH 1A the original analysis takes into account only 120 instead of 150 
questions. However, except from moving the functions slightly, this has no effect on the 
difference between the two conditions. 
•! In the description of the analysis of experiment SRH 2B it is mentioned that none of the 
participants violated dominance in more than 10% of the trials. Our analysis shows that 4 
participants violated dominance and therefore should have been excluded from further 
analysis. Again, the differences between conditions reported by SRH remain significant 
after this adjustment. 
As we explain in the main paper, the Level 1 analysis we apply and report in the manuscript 
differs from SRH’s original analysis in terms of the estimation of both the confidence 
intervals (i.e., we used a more reliable bootstrapping method) and the revealed functions (i.e., 
we estimated the revealed functions separately for each condition).  To further probe the 
robustness of the inference from SRH’s as well as our own (Level 1) analysis, it is useful to 
test statistically whether SRH conclusions would still hold when correcting the above 
calculation errors. Hence, we applied SRH’s original analysis (without the refinements we 
use in the analysis reported in the main paper) to SRH raw data and compared the results with 
and without taking into account these errors. The results from this comparison are reported in 
Table A1 below. Even though there are some minor differences in the reported statistics with 
regard to Experiments SRH 1A and SRH 2B, the results are qualitatively very similar and 
none of SRH’s original claims are affected by correction of these minor errors. 
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Table A1  
Results from the SRH’s original analysis using SRH raw data with and without the calculation errors. 
 With the calculation errors Without the calculation errors 
Experiment 
Differences in 
concavity in the 
revealed functions 
between 
conditions 
Differences in 
weighting common 
amounts or common 
probabilities between 
conditions 
Differences in 
concavity in the 
revealed functions 
between conditions 
Differences in 
weighting common 
amounts or common 
probabilities between 
conditions 
SRH 1A 
χ2(1)=6.36, 
p=0.012 
χ2(1)=7.05, p=0.0079 
for comparison 
between £200 and 
£310 
 
χ2(1)= 11.93, p=.0006 
χ2(1)=22.75, p<0.0001 
for comparison between 
£200 and £310 
SRH 1B 
χ2(1)=6.99, 
p=.0082 
χ2(1)=26.96, p<0.0001 
for the common £100, 
χ2(1)=7.16, p=0.0074 
for the common £200 
χ2(1)=6.98, p=.0082 
χ2(1)=27.20, p<0.0001 
for the common £100, 
χ2(1)=6.77, p=.009 for 
the common £200 
SRH 1C χ2(1)=3.50, p=0.06 
χ2(1)=59.79, p<0.0001 
for the common £100, 
χ2(1)=50.47, p<0.0001 
for the common £200 
χ2(1)=3.49, p=.06 
χ2(1)=59.75, p<0.0001 
for the common £100, 
χ2(1)=50.32, p<0.0001 
for the common £200 
SRH 2A χ2(1)=2.18, p=0.13 
χ2(1)=18.18, p<0.0001 
for the common 30%, 
χ2(1)=14.31, p=0.0002 
for the common 70% 
χ2(1)=2.18, p=0.14 
χ2(1)=18.22, p<0.0001 
for the common 30%, 
χ2(1)=14.41, p=0.0001 
for the common 70% 
SRH 2B χ
2(1)=181.5, 
p<0.0001 
χ2(1)=41.72, p<0.0001 
for the common 50% 
χ2(1)=119.6, p<0.0001 χ
2(1)=22.8, p<0.0001 
for the common 50% 
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Appendix B 
In our Level 3 replication in order to account for the within-subject nature of this series of 
experiments, we used only one model including all random effects, instead of using separate 
models for each condition as we did for the between-subject experiments. Figure B1 shows the 
functional forms and the relative confidence intervals obtained by estimating a separate model for 
each condition. By comparing Figure B1 to Figure 2.5, it is possible to see that both the estimated 
functional forms and the confidence intervals are very similar across the two figures. 
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Figure B1. Revealed functions from the replications of SRH in Level 3 using two models instead 
of one model. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
